



European Union
Terrorism
Situation and
Trend Report
2019



EUROPEAN UNION TERRORISM SITUATION AND TREND REPORT 2019

© European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation 2019.

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. For any use or reproduction of individual photos, permission must be sought directly from the copyright holders.

This publication and more information on Europol are available on the Internet.

www.europol.europa.eu



ISBN 978-92-95209-76-3
DOI 10.2813/788404
QL-AJ-19-001-EN-N

Contents

04

Foreword

06

Trends

08

Executive summary

10

General overview

Terrorist attacks and arrests

Terrorist and violent extremist activities

Convictions and penalties

28

Jihadist terrorism

*Terrorist attacks and suspects
arrested in the EU*

Terrorist propaganda

Travel for terrorist purposes

Terrorist situation outside the EU

53

**Ethno-nationalist and
separatist terrorism**

56

**Left-wing and
anarchist terrorism**

60

Right-wing terrorism

63

Single-issue terrorism

annexes

A1	Amendments in National Legislation on Terrorism in 2018	65
A2	Overview of the failed, foiled and completed attacks in 2018 per EU Member State and per affiliation	68
A3	Arrests in 2018 per EU Member State and per affiliation	69
A4	Convictions and penalties	71
A5	Europol counter terrorism activities	74
A6	Methodology	78
A7	Acronyms	80

Foreword

In 2018, terrorism continued to constitute a major threat to security in EU Member States. Horrific attacks perpetrated by jihadists like those in Trèbes, Paris, Liège and Strasbourg killed a total of thirteen people and injured many more. In addition, one terrorist attack by a right-wing extremist in Italy and numerous arrests of suspected right-wing terrorists for attack-planning across the European Union (EU) indicate that extremists of diverging orientation increasingly consider violence as a justified means of confrontation. Terrorists not only aim to kill and maim but also to divide our societies and spread hatred. We need to remain vigilant if we are to protect our citizens and values in the face of attempts to use violence for political aims.

I am particularly saddened that three police officers lost their lives in terrorist acts in the EU in 2018 while trying to keep their communities safe. Our thoughts are with their families and loved ones. We pay special tribute to the late Colonel Arnaud Beltrame, who exchanged himself for a hostage taken by an attacker in Trèbes knowing that he was putting his life in danger.

Compared to the year before, the number of attacks and the number of victims in the EU dropped significantly with regard to terrorism of all ideological tendencies. Whereas in 2017 jihadists perpetrated ten terrorist attacks in the EU, we suffered seven jihadist terrorist attacks last year. At the same time, however, the number of disrupted jihadist terrorist plots increased substantially. The latter included attempts to produce and deploy chemical and biological substances, a fact which illustrates the level of intent and commitment of individuals, cells and networks to use terrorist tactics to harm the societies they live in.

The level of the threat from terrorism, thus, has not diminished, despite the military defeat of IS earlier this year. If anything, the situation has become more complex. Within the jihadist milieu, multiple actors of diverging motivation and allegiance are plotting alone or conspiring with others; and right-wing extremists, in a bid to justify violence, prey on the perception of a threat from Islam, which some people readily fuel by interpreting terrorist propaganda and criminal behaviour as representative of a world religion.

In the light of the above, I am confident that the efforts of law enforcement, security services, public authorities, private companies and civil society organisations to counter terrorism have substantially contributed to the decrease in violence in Europe. Faced with the surge in terrorist violence that Europe has witnessed since 2014, public authorities and private organisations that used to work largely separately have established new and creative ways of cooperation. There is a general realisation that everyone needs to play a role and must assume her part of the shared responsibility to conserve the precious good of living in societies with a high level of security. Equality and freedom can only thrive where citizens can trust that they can exercise their rights and participate in public life without intimidation or fear of violence.

Unfortunately, in a growing number of locations outside Europe, violence has become prevalent. In countries like Syria, Libya, Mali, Afghanistan, among others, terrorist groups have

gained influence to an extent that they rival the state, whose authority in many cases has already been undermined by particularistic policies, weak structures and corruption. Citizens of these countries are exposed to existential threats to their lives and property based on their belonging to particular communities or adhering to particular practices or beliefs. The perpetuation of these crises has proven to have an impact on Europe, be it through the creation of new grievances or prejudice among different communities in Europe, discrediting international efforts at crisis resolution through diplomacy or providing space for destructive ideologies and terrorist networks to prosper.

As the line between online and offline communities becomes increasingly blurred, terrorist propaganda preying on human suffering abroad reaches audiences in Europe to unprecedented extents, inciting some to act and driving others to embrace extremist views on the opposite end.

In Europe, the feeling of insecurity that terrorists try to create must be of the greatest concern to us because it has the potential to undermine the cohesion of our societies. Increasing polarisation and the rise of extremist views is a concern for EU Member States. The public debate about sensitive phenomena like terrorism,

therefore, must be based on facts before reaching conclusions. I am proud to say that the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) has provided verified facts on terrorism in Europe since 2006. The report has been accepted as a benchmark in discussions about EU counterterrorism policies and academic studies. It is my privilege to hereby hand over the 2019 edition of the TE-SAT to the public.

In doing so, I would like to thank the EU Member States and third parties for their contributions to the TE-SAT 2018. In addition, the work of the members of the Advisory Board, consisting of the 'troika' (Presidencies of the Council of the EU, namely Austria, Romania, and Finland); France; Spain; Eurojust; the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) and the Office of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator has been indispensable for the 2019 edition of the TE-SAT. We are grateful for their continued engagement in ensuring the quality of the document.

Finally, the somewhat technical discussions on terrorism and counterterrorism should not make us forget that terrorism affects real people. I, therefore, want to close this foreword with a thought for the victims of terrorist violence. ●



A handwritten signature in black ink, reading 'C. De Bolle'.

Catherine De Bolle
Executive Director of Europol

Trends

01.

Thirteen people were killed in terrorist attacks in the EU in 2018 – a decrease compared to 2017. All the attacks were jihadist in nature and committed by individuals acting alone.

In addition to the seven completed attacks, EU Member States reported 16 foiled jihadist terrorist plots, illustrating the effectiveness of counter terrorism efforts. The significant number of thwarted attacks and the so-called Islamic State's (IS) continued intent to perpetrate attacks outside conflict zones indicate that the threat level across the EU remains high.

02.

03.

Three terrorist plots involving CBRN materials were disrupted in the EU in 2018. A general increase of CBRN terrorist propaganda, tutorials and threats was observed.

Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist attacks in the EU continued to greatly outnumber other types of terrorist attacks.

04.

05.

The number of arrests linked to right-wing terrorism remained relatively low but increased for the third year in a row. Right-wing extremists prey on fears of perceived attempts to Islamicise society and loss of national identity. The violent right-wing extremist scene is very heterogeneous across EU Member States.

06.

With regard to terrorism trials concluded in 2018, jihadist terrorism convictions remained the highest in number; but there was a noted increase in left-wing and right-wing terrorism convictions.

The number of European foreign terrorist fighters travelling, or attempting to travel to conflict zones was very low. The focus of jihadist networks in EU Member States has shifted towards carrying out activities in the EU.

07.

The number of individuals returning to the EU also remained very low. Hundreds of European citizens – including women and minors, mainly of a very young age – remain in detention in the Iraqi and Syrian conflict zone. While minors are essentially victims, there are concerns among EU Member States that they have been exposed to indoctrination and training in former IS territories and may pose a potential future threat.

08.

There is continued concern that individuals with a criminal background, including those currently imprisoned, are vulnerable to indoctrination and might engage in terrorism.

09.

IS succeeded in maintaining an online presence largely thanks to unofficial supporter networks and pro-IS media outlets. Pro-IS and pro-al-Qaeda channels promoted the use of alternative platforms and open source technologies.

10.

Outside Europe, al-Qaeda continued to exert power and influence in conflict areas, partly at the expense of IS affiliates. Al-Qaeda affiliates exploited political grievances at local and international level, including in messages directed at European audiences.

11.

Executive summary

In 2018, all fatalities from terrorism were the result of jihadist attacks: 13 people lost their lives. In addition, 46 people were injured in jihadist attacks. This is a considerable decrease compared to 2017, when ten attacks killed 62 people. In 2018, EU Member States reported 16 thwarted jihadist terrorist plots, a fact that indicates both continued high terrorist activity and illustrates the effectiveness of counter terrorism efforts.

All jihadist terrorist attacks were committed by individuals acting alone and targeted civilians and symbols of authority. Often the motivation of the perpetrator and the links to other radicalised individuals or terrorist groups remained unclear. Mental health issues contributed to the complexity of the phenomenon.

Completed jihadist attacks were carried out using firearms and unsophisticated, readily available weapons (e.g. knives). The diminished sophistication in the preparation and execution of jihadist terrorist attacks contributed to a lower number of casualties in completed attacks. Several disrupted terrorist plots included the attempted production and use of explosives and chemical/biological materials. There was also an increase in the use of pyrotechnic mixtures to produce improvised explosive devices (IED) in jihadist plots. Three terrorist plots involving CBRN materials were disrupted in 2018 in the EU. A general increase of CBRN terrorist propaganda, tutorials and threats was observed.

The situation in Europe with regard to jihadist terrorism continued to be influenced by external developments. Ungoverned spaces in conflict areas, including Afghanistan, Libya, the Sahel region, Syria and Yemen provide opportunities for jihadist groups to establish control over territories that can later turn into safe havens. The year 2018 saw a decrease in the activities of the so-called Islamic State (IS) affiliates in a number of regions outside the EU. EU Member States assessed that IS' diminishing territorial control is likely to be replaced by increased al-Qaeda efforts to reclaim power and influence in the area. Al-Qaeda's strategy relied on building alliances with local tribes while exploiting political grievances at local and international level, including in Europe.

The military defeat of IS in Iraq and Syria had a significant impact on the group's digital capabilities. In parallel, the coherence of IS narratives was compromised by the group's inability to internally unify its ideological positions. Nevertheless, IS succeeded in maintaining an online presence largely thanks to unofficial supporter networks and pro-IS media outlets. Both IS and al-Qaeda continued to seek out new online vectors for their propaganda. In particular, they promoted the use of alternative platforms and open source technologies.

While IS online propaganda remained technologically advanced, and hackers appeared to be knowledgeable in encrypted communication tools, the group's cyber-attack capabilities and techniques were rudimentary. In addition, no other terrorist group with a demonstrated capacity to carry out effective cyber-attacks emerged in 2018.

Despite the degradation of IS' organisational structures, the group maintains the intent to conduct attacks outside conflict zones, potentially using former members and individuals inspired by propaganda. There is a continued risk that individuals with criminal background, including those currently imprisoned, are vulnerable to indoctrination and might engage in terrorism.

The number of European foreign terrorist fighters travelling, or attempting to travel to the Iraqi and Syrian conflict zone in 2018 was very low. Cases of traveling to alternative areas of conflict were reported, although current numbers also appear to be very low. Rather than attempting to travel to the conflict zone, the focus of jihadist networks in EU Member States has shifted towards carrying out activities in the EU – both online and offline. Jihadists continued to be inspired by IS propaganda but also consumed propaganda produced by other groups claiming to defend Islam against a global attack, including al-Qaeda.

The number of individuals returning to the EU remained very low, with hundreds of European citizens remaining in detention in Iraq and Syria. All men and some women are believed to have received weapons training, with men also acquiring combat experience. While minors are essentially victims, there are concerns among EU Member States that they have been exposed to indoctrination and training in former IS territories, and may pose a potential future threat. The abuse of migration flows by terrorists to enter the EU does not seem to be systematic.

As in previous years, ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist attacks in the EU greatly outnumbered other types of terrorist attacks in 2018. The number of left-wing and right-wing attacks and arrests remained relatively low and was limited to a small number of countries. However, the number of arrests linked to right-wing terrorism, while remaining relatively low, continued to increase strongly, effectively doubling for the second year in a row. Right-wing extremists exploit fears of perceived attempts to Islamicise society and grievances linked to an alleged loss of national identity. The violent right-wing extremist scene is very heterogeneous on the national level and among EU Member States.

Hawala banking continued to be an important instrument in terrorism financing. The misuse of credit systems, non-profit and charity organisations, and small-scale business ventures in fundraising for terrorism remain a matter of concern.


With regard to terrorism trials concluded in 2018, jihadist terrorism convictions remained the highest in number; nevertheless, there was also a noted increase in left-wing and right-wing terrorism convictions.

1/ General overview



Terrorist attacks and arrests

Attacks and arrests by EU Member State in 2018.



Attacks

In 2018, a total of 129 foiled, failed and completed attacks were reported by EU Member States.


The United Kingdom¹ (UK) experienced the highest number of attacks in total (60), followed by France, Italy, Spain, Greece, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, and Sweden².

¹ Of the attacks reported by the UK, 56 were acts of security-related incidents in Northern Ireland, including one attack on national security targets.

² For detailed information, see Annex 2.

Failed, foiled or completed **attacks** in the EU per affiliation/Member State in 2018.

Terror attacks by affiliation




Terror attacks by Member State

The total number of attacks decreased after a sharp spike in 2017, primarily because of the decrease in reported separatist-related incidents.

Overall, attacks specified as ethno-nationalist and separatist continued to represent the largest proportion. As in previous years, the countries reporting terrorist attacks linked to separatist terrorism were the UK (56), France (20) and Spain (7).

Terrorist attacks in the EU by affiliation, 2015-2018.




In 2018, the number of foiled, failed and completed jihadist terrorist attacks decreased significantly compared to 2017, from 33 to 24.

This number includes 16 incidents reported by France (7), the UK (3), the Netherlands (2), Germany (2), Italy (1) and Sweden (1) as foiled terrorist plots. Notably, for the second year in a row, the number of reported foiled terrorist attacks outnumbered the completed attacks.

Similarly to 2017, Greece, Italy and Spain were the targets of attacks carried out by left-wing and anarchist terrorists. One right-wing attack was noted by Italy.

Jihadist terrorist attacks 2017-2018



In 2018, **13 victims died** as a result of terrorist attacks and **53 people were injured**. Similar to previous years, all reported fatalities and the vast majority of casualties were caused by jihadist terrorists.



In terms of **weaponry**, the use of firearms and explosives continued to prevail, in particular in separatist and anarchist-affiliated attacks.





Civilians, private businesses and public institutions were among the most frequent targets.

Arrests


In 2018, 1 056 individuals were arrested in the EU on suspicion of terrorism-related offences, with the highest number of arrestees in France (310) and in the UK (273³). The number slightly decreased compared to 2017 but remained close to the average of recent years.

³ The number excludes 148 arrests made in Northern Ireland.


Similar to the trend observed in previous years, most arrests in 2018 were related to jihadist terrorism (511 out of 1056).



The number of arrests related to left-wing and right-wing terrorism remained comparatively low, however the number of right-wing terrorist arrests continued to increase for the third consecutive year.




In 2018, most arrests were made on suspicion of preparing or attempting to commit a terrorist act; membership of a terrorist group, including while being abroad; and financing terrorism.



The average age of those arrested was 33, with almost half of the suspects being younger than 30, and 22 % older than 40. As in previous years, the suspects were predominantly male.



The majority of arrestees were EU citizens, with female suspects more likely to possess EU citizenship. In most cases, the country of birth was the same as that of citizenship.



Terrorist and violent extremist activities

Financing of terrorism

The majority of terrorist acts committed in 2018 required minimal or no financing and were unsophisticated in their preparation and execution. The perpetrators themselves were able to provide the funds for such attacks in various ways, without leaving traces.

Whenever external funding is needed, diverse methods are employed, from the basic to the highly complex. Funds may be generated by terrorist organisations from illegal activities, e.g. extortion and the smuggling of migrants. Many terrorist organisations, however, have legitimate businesses from which the proceeds are diverted to terrorism purposes. Small-scale business ventures are also assessed to be used for the financing of terrorism. Terrorist funding has also occurred through loans and credit which are not paid back.

Terrorist groups have been observed to use charities and fundraising organisations to extract funds from communities under the umbrella of humanitarian aid, for instance, to support families and orphans of killed fighters, and to build mosques and wells. Furthermore, non-profit organisations may be used for money laundering.

The *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan* (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party) is known to collect money in Europe from membership fees, the sale of publications, public events (concerts, etc.) and annual fundraising campaigns. Belgium reports the sentencing in 2018 of four individuals



Hawala banking continued to be an important instrument in the financing of terrorism

Terrorists continued using non-profit organisations to raise funds for terrorist purposes from Muslim communities

for participating in a 'Kampanya' (fundraising campaign). The money collected is believed to having been used to finance the functioning of the many PKK media and the functioning of the organisation, the purchase of equipment to support the PKK military camps, the purchase of weapons for the guerrillas and also the organisation of attacks on Turkish territory.

Money transfer systems such as *hawala*⁴ continue to be an important instrument in terrorism financing. The core of the 'underground banking' systems is the specifics of the financial and interpersonal relationships and is highly adaptable to conditions of conflicts/war and

⁴ *Hawala* is an informal method of money transfer based on trust and honour, operating outside the traditional banking system, whereby money is paid to a network of brokers (known as a *hawaldars*).

economic sanctions. This manner of conducting business, ethnic-oriented and based on trust, is a suitable channel to move and provide finances for terrorist purposes. Nevertheless, an important note has to be made – the underground banking is profit-oriented. The connections and the possibility for support from 'underground banking' to terrorist organisations is undoubtedly an important aspect, but not the main purpose of existence of the 'underground' financial system.

A number of investigations in the EU Member States demonstrated how the issues of money laundering, human trafficking and migrant smuggling and terrorism financing interlinked. Italy, for example, reported the arrests of four individuals in 2018 on suspicion of transferring money to Syria, originating both from spontaneous donations of Syrian individuals living in various European countries and from proceeds generated by smuggling of migrants from the Middle East to Northern Europe. Part of the money involved was to be used to fund a terrorist organisation affiliated to al-Qaeda operating in Syria.

Both surface- and dark-web sites are used to request online donations, including virtual currencies. The most common crypto currency appears to be Bitcoin. One example of fundraising campaigns through the dark-web is the one done via Sadaqa Coins, a crowdsourcing project that allegedly supports jihadist groups in Syria. Since the areas in Africa, the



Most explosives in incidents linked to jihadist terrorism were homemade

The use of low explosives and pyrotechnic mixtures increased

Middle East or the Caucasus region to which the funds have been remitted may be under control of terrorist groups, it is difficult to assess where the funds really end up.

Explosives

The key threat in Europe related to the unlawful use of explosives in the form of bomb attacks continued to emanate from groups or lone actors linked to jihadist terrorism. Even though 2018 did not witness a completed jihadist bomb attack, information collected during investigations into a considerable number of disrupted terrorist plots revealed plans and preparatory acts to utilise this type of weapons. However, in 2018, the number of jihadist bomb attacks and plots decreased compared to 2017.

Homemade explosives (HMEs) were still used in most known explosive-related incidents linked to jihadist terrorism. Regarding the type of HMEs, a shift from the previously predominant use of triacetone triperoxide (TATP) to a broader range of HMEs was noted – in particular, low explosives such as black powder, chlorate mixtures and fertilisers-based mixtures.

Control measures have made procurement of precursors for the production of TATP increasingly difficult. In 2018, there were indications of attempts to use alternative explosive precursors for its manufacture. In addition, some investigations indicated the use of TATP in combination with other types of explosive materials, in order to enhance the power and lethal effects of the improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Failures in using TATP by terrorists in the second half of 2017 (incidents during TATP manufacture

and malfunctions of IEDs with TATP charges)⁵ appeared to have accelerated these developments.

In parallel, an increased use of pyrotechnic mixtures (mainly fireworks) – obtained legally or, more often, illegally – was observed in jihadist terrorist attacks and plots. In order to reduce availability and misuse of illegal pyrotechnics, international law enforcement operations in 2018 targeted and successfully disrupted complex organised crime groups (OCGs) dealing with the illegal production and sale of pyrotechnics across the EU⁶.

Notably, attempts to use IEDs in combination with chemical or biological toxins were observed in 2018, something that has long been promoted in jihadist propaganda and IED-making manuals.

In most cases, knowledge transfer with regard to HME and IED production was facilitated by the use of online, often encrypted, social networks and forums. While there were still cases of targeted instructions or remote assistance by virtual advisors on encrypted social platforms, an increasing trend of collecting bomb-making knowledge from readily available online open sources (for example, pyrotechnic and explosive enthusiast sites and forums) was noted.

The explosive-related jihadist plots in 2018 were aimed at soft targets and mass gathering locations (public events, shopping areas, bars and clubs, etc.).

⁵ For example, the explosion of the HME laboratory in Alcanar, Spain, August 2017; and the above-ground Parsons Green Underground station bombing in London, UK, September 2017.

⁶ See, for example, Eurojust and Europol joint press release “International cooperation disrupts illegal fireworks network”, 6 December 2018, <http://www.eurojust.europa.eu/press/PressReleases/Pages/2018/2018-12-06.aspx>.



In contrast, targets chosen by anarchist extremist groups were mostly state, financial, military, or law enforcement targets. For example, there was an incident in Italy where police first responders attending a crime scene of an explosion were targeted with a secondary victim-operated IED. IEDs used in anarchist attacks were made from an array of readily available materials. As in previous years, in 2018 the anarchist groups utilised simple improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) filled with flammable liquids or IEDs filled with easily accessible explosive materials, such as pyrotechnic mixtures (flash powder or black powder).

The attack methodologies and capabilities used by Dissident Republican (DR) groups in Northern Ireland (UK) vary across the groups. Many attacks involved firearms or small IEDs such as pipe bombs, but they also deployed larger and/or potentially more destructive devices such as vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) and explosively formed projectiles (EFPs).

Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN)

In 2018, three incidents involving the use of chemical, biological, radioactive or other nuclear (CBRN) materials were reported in the EU. In May 2018, an Egyptian national was arrested in France on suspicion of preparing a terrorist attack. At his apartment in Paris, black powder extracted from pyrotechnics and several tutorials explaining how to make an IED and how to use ricin to commit a terrorist attack were found.

In June, a terrorist plot using ricin was uncovered in Cologne (Germany). Police found a large number of castor beans and a quantity of already produced ricin in an apartment of a Tunisian citizen. The suspect who was allegedly inspired by IS, was planning to combine the ricin with explosives, ball bearings and bladed weapons. In the context of the investigation his wife was also arrested.



Three terrorist plots involving CBRN materials were disrupted in 2018 in the EU

A general increase of CBRN terrorist propaganda, tutorials and threats was observed

In November, in Sardinia (Italy) a Lebanese citizen was arrested for the preparation of a chemical-biological plot. His aim was to produce a mixture of lethal poisons in order to contaminate drinking water. The case was linked to the arrest of another individual in Lebanon suspected of planning to poison the water supply of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Despite the high toxicity of the substances involved, to date these have not been associated with any terrorist attack.

Online discussions of planning CBRN attacks increased in 2018. As in previous years, intentions to use CBRN materials were expressed mainly by jihadists. Closed forums were used to propose possible *modi operandi*, share instructions to produce and disperse various agents and to identify high-profile targets. However, the technical information was not always accurate.

In July and August 2018, IS-linked group al-Abd al-Faqir Media (AF Media) launched a campaign titled *Bio-Terror* via Telegram promoting the use of biological weapons. A number of videos, posters and infographics contained instructions, albeit inaccurate, for manufacturing biological agents and providing instructions on how to obtain and deploy the microorganisms⁷.

The barrier for gaining knowledge on the use of CBRN weapons has decreased. The handling and containment of biological agents, which used to be a major challenge, has become more feasible. Dual-use equipment and materials (e.g. laboratory kits or home cleaning products) are easily accessible. In 2018, the procurement of biological toxins, such as abrin and ricin, through online and underground marketplaces continued to be a trend. There were no reports of terrorist use of radioactive isotopes or nuclear material in 2018.

⁷ The information contained in the *Bio-Terror* video released during this campaign about the production of deadly microorganisms – petalominium – was very basic and with several mistakes indicating poor knowledge of microbiology. The information provided was therefore considered not enough to weaponise the microorganisms concerned.



Cyber-attack tools and techniques used by terrorists remained limited

IS sympathisers successfully carried out defacements and low-level hacks


The convergence of cyber and terrorism

There has been much concern and speculation over the past few years that terrorists could turn to launching cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure. However, while the so-called Islamic State (IS) online propaganda appears technologically advanced and their hackers may be well versed in encrypted communication tools, their cyber-attack tools and techniques remain rudimentary. They still purchase domain-hosting services, downloading software and renting botnets for distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks rather than developing their own cyber weapons.

IS sympathisers have successfully carried out a small number of defacements and low-level hacks and in March 2018, IS supporters attempted to come up with an alternative to Facebook. Dubbed the *Muslim's Network*, it was made available in Arabic, English and French. However, the platform was not an in-house development but had been purchased online for a small amount of money.

Convictions and penalties

Number of **individuals in concluded court proceedings** for terrorist offences in 2016, 2017 and 2018, as reported to Eurojust*.



* The data for previous years corresponds to the data reported in the respective TE-SAT reports.

In 2018, 17 EU Member States reported a total of 653 individuals who were convicted or acquitted of terrorist offences⁸. This number is higher than the numbers reported over the past two years⁹.

In 2018, France was the Member State that reported the highest number of individuals in concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences (141), followed by Spain (120), the UK (115) and Belgium (80)¹⁰. In Greece, ten individuals were tried more than once during the year in different terrorism proceedings. As a result, the total number of verdicts pronounced for terrorism-related offences in 2018 was 664.

Some of the defendants who appeared before courts in the EU Member States were minors at the time of trial and/or when the offences were committed. The number of female defendants judged in 2018 (94) continued to increase

as compared to 2017 (66) and 2016 (53). The practice in some countries, such as Belgium, France and the Netherlands, to render sentences in absentia continued with respect to defendants who were believed to be in conflict zones or were claimed to have died but were not officially declared dead. Some individuals sentenced for terrorist offences in 2018 had previously been convicted of terrorism or other offences in the same Member State or abroad.

⁸ Eurojust received contributions containing information on terrorism-related court decisions in 2018 from the following EU Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK. If a verdict pronounced in 2018 was appealed and the appeal was concluded before the end of the year, Eurojust reported only on the latest/final verdict.

⁹ Please refer to Annex 4 for additional information on the numbers mentioned in this section.

¹⁰ The UK contribution includes proceedings on offences under anti-terrorism legislation, as well as other offences assessed to be terrorism-related. Similar to previous years, the UK data for 2018 refers only to convictions.

Some of the verdicts reported in 2018 are final while others are pending judicial remedy, as appeals have been submitted¹¹.

Type of terrorism

In 2018 the majority (399) of verdicts in the EU Member States concerned jihadist terrorism confirming a trend that started in 2015¹². Similar to the previous years, a large part of the verdicts for jihadist terrorism concerned offences related to so-called Islamic State (IS); however, persons linked to al-Qaeda (AQ), the Taliban, Al-Shabaab or Hezbollah were also tried in 2018.

Courts in France, Belgium and Spain rendered the highest number of verdicts concerning jihadist terrorism in 2018 (123, 76 and 68 respectively). Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, Slovenia and Sweden reported only verdicts for jihadist terrorism in 2018.

Six defendants appeared before the *Audiencia Nacional* (National High Court) in Spain for their alleged involvement in a major terrorist

network recruiting and sending fighters to join jihadist terrorist organisations abroad. The network had facilitated the integration of foreign fighters into *al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb* (AQIM), the *Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa* (MOJWA), *Jabhat al-Nusra* and IS, in Mali, Libya, Iraq and Syria. It had members in Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Turkey, Tunisia, Libya, Mali, France and Morocco, all performing different functions, including recruitment, document forgery, financing, facilitators in the destination country and smugglers. The court convicted all six defendants of terrorist offences. The leader of the network was found guilty of directing and promoting a terrorist organisation, with a mitigating circumstance for confessing the crime and was ordered to serve eight years of imprisonment, followed by probation for seven years. Four of his co-defendants were convicted of belonging to a terrorist organisation and received a six-year sentence each and a probation period of five years upon release. The four had also confessed to the crime. The sixth defendant was sentenced to five years' imprisonment, followed by a probation period of five years, after the court found him guilty of collaboration with a terrorist organisation.

The main living suspect of the 2015 Paris attacks was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment, and a fine of EUR 6 000 by the Court of First Instance of Brussels for terrorist offences unrelated to the attacks. The same penalty was handed to his co-defendant. Both men had been arrested in Brussels on 15 March 2016 following a shoot-out with the police, which had left four officers

injured. The two were found guilty of attempted assassination and illegal possession of firearms, both in a terrorist context.

A prison sentence of six years was ordered by the District Court of Rotterdam in the case of a Dutch foreign fighter, who had joined IS and is believed to still be in Syria. The man, tried *in absentia*, was found guilty of participation in a terrorist organisation. He left for Syria in November 2013 and has been recognised in several videos from the conflict zone. The Dutch authorities also received information from the US Department of Defense that an IS registration form in his name had been found in October 2015 in Syria. The court considered the form authentic. The defendant had been informed of the upcoming court hearings via Facebook Messenger. He had informed the police of his intention to return to the Netherlands, which was the reason why a hearing had been postponed to allow him to be present. Following news in the media that the defendant had died in battle, a journalist published an article claiming he had received an open letter from the defendant addressed to the judge. The letter claimed that, together with his fiancée, he had staged his own death to ensure his safe trip to the Turkish border. It stated further that he would not be able to come back for the court hearing but would definitely do so if he were convicted and need to appear before the Court of Appeal. The court concluded that the defendant had clearly revoked his right to be present at the first instance trial. When considering the severity of the penalty, the court did not take into account the fact that the defendant had left for Syria in a period when

¹¹ According to Council Decision 2005/671/JHA of 20 September 2005 on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences, the information to be submitted to Eurojust is in relation to final convictions. Due to the specifics of reporting, some EU Member States submit information on final decisions only, while other EU Member States also report on not final decisions. The data provided by the UK did not distinguish between final decisions and decisions pending judicial remedy. As reported, all convictions in the UK are effective from the moment of their being pronounced, even if an appeal is made.

¹² The data provided by the UK was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore not included in the numbers in this section.



less had been known about IS and the caliphate had not been declared. Furthermore, it considered it an aggravating circumstance that the defendant had been with IS in a period when the terrorist organisation had committed an increased number of attacks.

The majority (64) of the female defendants were tried for jihadist terrorist offences, which also presents an increase compared to 2017 (42). The Court of First Instance of West Flanders, Bruges division, in Belgium heard the case of a young woman charged with participation in the activities of a terrorist group. The court re-qualified the conduct as spreading or making otherwise public of a message with the purpose of inciting a terrorist offence. In particular, the charges referred to making propaganda for IS via the internet, maintaining contacts with fighters in the conflict zone and providing moral and financial support to French nationals suspected of terrorist offences. All activities had been carried out over the internet. The court found that the defendant had been extremely active online and had uploaded content, directly and indirectly, inciting the commission of terrorist acts, including bomb attacks. The court found her guilty and ordered her to serve four years in prison, of which two on probation, and to pay a fine of € 2000.

Five EU Member States (Austria,

Belgium, France, Germany and Spain) reported cases of separatist terrorism in 2018. Courts in Spain tried the largest number of individuals charged with such offences (40). In March 2018, for example, the Spanish National Court handed a prison sentence of almost six years to an *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* (ETA) member with several previous terrorism convictions. The man was found guilty of participation in a terrorist organisation. He left Spain after serving his sentence for a previous conviction. He settled in France from where he made contacts with ETA. He received false documents and a car registration plate and was instructed to leave for London, where he was hosted by another ETA member. In January 2014 the Spanish authorities issued a European Arrest Warrant in his name. He was arrested in the UK in February 2016 together with another ETA member and was later surrendered to the Spanish authorities.

The Higher Regional Court of Celle in Germany found one Turkish national guilty of membership in a foreign terrorist organisation and sentenced him to 18 months' imprisonment. The court found that the man had belonged to the PKK and played a leading role in the terrorist organisation's structures in the Lohne-Dinklage area between August 2014 and October 2016. The man had also acted as a co-leader for the region of Oldenburg.

As in 2017, left-wing terrorism cases were brought before the courts in Czechia, Greece and Spain in 2018. The greatest increase was seen in Greece, where 33 verdicts were handed down, as compared to 17 in 2017. The number of decisions includes those in which the defendants were acquitted. One Czech case heard by the High Court in Prague was brought against two men and three women, accused of preparing a bomb attack on a train in Czechia. These alleged offences were charged as preparation of a terrorist attack and categorised as left-wing terrorism. The defendants were acquitted.

Germany and the Netherlands reported verdicts for right-wing terrorist offences and the total number of reported verdicts increased from four in 2017 to 22 in 2018. In Germany, for instance, the Higher Regional Court of Dresden heard the case of seven men and one woman accused to have formed part of the extremist right group *Gruppe Freital* (Freital Group) since July 2015. The group's objective was to attack asylum seeker accommodation, and apartments, offices and vehicles of its political opponents. Group members had been accused of committing a series of bomb attacks in 2015, including on the vehicle of a left-wing politician and a left-wing party office, on a refugee camp and an asylum centre. The charges against them included leadership or membership in a terrorist organisation, multiple attempted murders and grievous bodily harm. The court found all eight defendants guilty and sentenced seven of them to prison terms of five to ten years, and one to a youth sentence of four years.



Type of offences

As in previous years, a large number of criminal cases concluded in 2018 concerned participation in (the activities of) a terrorist group. A smaller number of the defendants in 2018 were tried for glorification of terrorism and humiliation of victims of terrorism, recruitment and (self-) training for terrorist purposes, financing of terrorism, travel to a zone controlled by a terrorist group, instigation to commit terrorist acts, etc. or for attempting to commit such crimes. In some cases, terrorism charges were filed in parallel with charges for other offences, e.g. murder, manufacture, supply and possession of explosives or weapons, migrant smuggling, aggravated damage to property, and forgery of official documents.

In 2018, several cases concerned the preparation or the commission of recent terrorist attacks in Europe. In Sweden, for example, Stockholm District Court in June 2018 sentenced an Uzbek national to life imprisonment for committing terrorist crimes. The defendant, a 40-year old male, stole a lorry to mow down pedestrians in the centre of Stockholm on 7 April 2017. The incident led to the death of five individuals; ten others were injured.

The man stated that he performed the attack on behalf of IS.

In June 2018, the Varsinais-Suomi District Court sentenced the perpetrator of a terrorist attack in Turku, Finland, in August 2017 to a cumulative sentence of life imprisonment for killing two people and injuring eight others. The defendant was further liable to pay damages to the victims. The court found that the defendant had acted in the name of IS and that the murders and attempted murders had been committed with terrorist intent. The defendant had intended to cause serious fear among the population and perceived himself as a promoter of IS's cause. He also prepared for the attack by sharing a manifest that expressed the ideological and political background and objectives of IS, as well as aspirations to promote its goals, with discussion forums on the Telegram instant messaging service.

Life imprisonment, with a minimum of 16 years to be served, and a prison term of six years and nine months were ordered by the Central Criminal Court of England and Wales to a mother and a daughter who belonged to the first female terrorist cell in the UK. The daughter had planned to carry out a knife attack close House

of Parliament in London and was assisted by her mother. Her sister was also convicted of planning to commit another attack close to the British Museum in London. She was sentenced in August to a life term, with a minimum of 13 years to be served. She had married an IS fighter online and had planned to join him in Syria before being stopped by the security service. The mother is believed to have played a major role in radicalising her daughters. A fourth young woman was also found guilty of possessing information about terrorist acts.

Judgments in 2018 continued to address the use of social media and various other online platforms to spread terrorist content, glorify and incite the commission of terrorist acts. In Spain, the National Court heard the case of a Moroccan national charged with self-indoctrination. On several occasions through the *Amaq news Agency*, the defendant accessed propaganda which had been created and spread by IS. The defendant's radicalisation process was further boosted by regularly accessing the website Muslim News, which contained a depository of numerous audio files and roughly 5 000 videos with radical jihadist content. The



defendant admitted to carrying out these acts. The court handed down a prison sentence of two years and two months.

In Italy, the Milan Assize Court found one person guilty of membership of a terrorist organisation and disseminating, via an app and on the internet, material inciting or provoking the commission of terrorist acts. The court sentenced the man to serve 28 months in prison after it considered it proven that he had publicly instigated others to commit terrorist offences. The court found that he had praised and fostered anti-democratic feelings and religious hatred, and glorified *jihād* and martyrdom. He had used multiple Facebook profiles to promote terrorist ideology and tools to pursue the goals of conquest and expansion of IS. The court considered the use of IT and electronic means of communication an aggravating circumstance.

In the Netherlands, a teenager appeared before Rotterdam District Court charged with participation in the terrorist organisations IS and the United Cyber Caliphate (UCC). The court heard that between November 2016 and June 2017 he had made and distributed videos on instruction from the UCC, as well as other videos inciting armed (jihadist) fighting. The videos also contained also images of

executions. The young man regularly looked up IS videos, supported their actions online, placed IS propaganda on the internet and visited websites about suicide terrorist attacks. In March, he was found guilty and sentenced to youth detention of six months and 181 days, part of which was suspended.

The female defendants in 2018 were tried for leading a terrorist group, preparing to commit terrorist acts, participating in or collaborating with a terrorist organisation, financing terrorism, glorification of terrorism, spreading messages inciting to commit a terrorist offence, among other types of offences.

In Spain, four defendants appeared before the National Court charged with indoctrination and recruitment of supporters to a terrorist organisation. The group was led by a woman who started the recruitment and indoctrination of other women in 2014 with the intention to reach Syria to join IS. She was planning to marry one of the other defendants and travel with him to Syria. Moreover, she maintained a close relationship with the other woman in the group whose task also concerned the recruitment of supporters as well as the management of WhatsApp groups. To indoctrinate and recruit of supporters, they first used

Facebook and once contact with the person was satisfactory, they would use WhatsApp to continue with indoctrination. This process prompted the recruitment of at least three young people of Moroccan nationality. The defendants were sentenced between four and seven years imprisonment.

The Spanish National Court found another woman guilty of collaboration with a terrorist organisation and sentenced her to two years in prison. She had prepared to leave for Syria to marry a man who was presumably a member of IS. The defendant tried to help him come back to the EU by providing a false passport.

In 2018, courts in several EU Member States handled cases against defendants who were under legal age at the time the offences were committed. In Germany, the Higher Regional Court of Hamburg sentenced three Syrian nationals to years-long imprisonment for membership in a foreign terrorist organisation (IS) and (attempted) document forgery. The first defendant was sentenced to six and a half years imprisonment. The other two were minors at the time of the offence and as such received a juvenile penalty of three and a half years each. The court found that the three had been part of an IS 'sleeper cell'. The terrorist organisation had arranged for them to travel to

Germany with fake passports, cash and mobile phones in 2015 and awaited orders for an attack.

An Austrian court sentenced a 16-year-old minor to ten months imprisonment with a probationary period of three years. The minor, who is a Serbian national, was indicted for membership in a terrorist and criminal organisation, as well as for the endorsement of terrorist offences. The crimes were committed by actively participating in chat groups disseminating jihadist propaganda and setting up plans to travel to Syria in order to join IS.

Convictions and acquittals

In 2018, seven EU Member States reported that all terrorism verdicts had resulted in convictions, while others reported both convictions and acquittals¹³. Successful prosecutions resulting only in convictions were concluded in Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Slovenia and Sweden; whereas France, Germany and Greece had a very low percentage of acquittals securing convictions for the vast majority of those tried for terrorist

offences in 2018. In some cases, defendants were acquitted of terrorist offences but convicted of other offences, such as drug trafficking and document fraud¹⁴.

Similar to 2017, all prosecutions for right-wing terrorist offences in 2018 resulted in convictions. The percentage of convictions among the verdicts for jihadist terrorism in 2018 remained very high (89 %, the same as in 2017). The conviction rate for separatist terrorist offences remained the same as in 2017 (71 %), while that for left-wing offences decreased slightly (from 72 % in 2017 to 70 % in 2018)¹⁵.

Penalties

The average prison sentence for terrorist offences in the EU in 2018 was seven years, which is higher than in 2016 and 2017 (five years)¹⁶.

¹⁴ Eurojust considers it one verdict if an individual is convicted of more than one terrorist offence within the same proceeding, or convicted of a terrorist offence and acquitted of another offence. If an individual is acquitted of a terrorist offence and convicted of another offence, the verdict is included in the overview as acquittal of terrorism.

¹⁵ The data provided by the UK was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore not used to calculate the conviction rate.

¹⁶ For the purpose of the calculation of the average prison sentence, penalties exceeding 40 years of imprisonment and life sentences were counted as 40 years. In the cases where the court ordered a minimum number of years of the life sentence to be served, the sentence was included in the overview with the minimum number of years indicated.

The lowest prison sentence ordered by courts in the EU Member States in 2018 was three months and the highest was 535 years. Two such penalties of 535 years of imprisonment were given to two ETA members in Spain, who placed an explosive device in a busy Madrid street. Many people were injured and material seriously damaged as a result.

More than half (59 %) of the penalties handed down with guilty verdicts in 2018 were of imprisonment of up to five years, which presents a slight decrease compared to 2017 (61 %), while sentences of ten and more years of imprisonment increased from 12 % in 2017 to 15 % in 2018. In several cases in Austria, Finland, Germany, Sweden and the UK the courts ordered life sentences for the committed terrorist offences.

It should, however, be taken into consideration that the severity of the penalty in each case would depend on the respective offence and specific circumstances and cannot serve any comparative purposes. In addition, in some EU Member States the average sentence is calculated on the basis of one conviction, while in others it is based on a considerably higher number of convictions.

Similar to 2017, the highest average prison sentence was ordered for


¹³ 2018 data for the UK refers only to convictions and is not included in the numbers in this section.

left-wing terrorist offences and increased from ten to 16 years. The average prison term for separatist and right-wing terrorist offences increased from four to eight and six years respectively. As in the past two years, the average prison sentence for jihadist terrorist offences remained five years¹⁷.

In some cases, in addition to the prison terms ordered by the court, the convicted individuals were subjected to mandatory psychotherapy, or admitted in a mental health institution. Furthermore, additional penalties included fines, restrictions on exercising certain civil rights or working in certain sectors (e.g. education), travel bans, expulsion from the national territory, fixed probationary period upon release, etc. In France, most of those convicted were entered into the national judicial database for terrorist offences and in the UK, terrorist offenders were subjected to counter terrorism registration. In some cases, juvenile penalties were given or the sentence was partially or fully suspended. In other cases, the sentencing or the execution of the prison sentence was postponed upon certain conditions, or the penalty was still to be determined by the judge at the time of reporting.

In the cases when courts in the EU Member States did not impose a prison term, they ordered other penalties, such as community service, fines, referral orders in case of minor offenders, etc.

¹⁷ The data provided by the UK was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore not included in the overview.



Average* sentences (excluding non-prison penalties) per Member State in 2018, as reported to Eurojust.


Average sentence in years

* The average sentence in Bulgaria, Czechia and Slovenia is based on one conviction in each country. In Finland and Sweden, only one penalty of life imprisonment was ordered by the national courts and is therefore not included in the overview.


2/

Jihadist terrorism





Number of **suspects arrested** for religiously inspired/jihadist terrorism from 2014 to 2018.



Terrorist attacks and suspects arrested in the EU



Seven completed jihadist terrorist attacks were carried out and one attack failed in five EU Member States. Sixteen jihadist plots were successfully thwarted

Thirteen people were killed and 46 injured in jihadist attacks in 2018

All completed jihadist terrorist attacks in 2018 were perpetrated by lone actors

In 2018, there were seven completed jihadist terrorist attacks: three in France, two in the Netherlands, one in Belgium and one in the UK; one jihadist attack failed in Spain. In addition, another 16 incidents were reported as foiled jihadist terrorist plots. A total of 13 people were killed and 46 injured in jihadist attacks in 2018. The casualties included 12 police officers, three of whom were killed.

France, the Netherlands and the UK witnessed the highest number of attacks and the highest rate of successfully foiled terrorist plots. France, Germany and Italy reported disrupted terrorist plots involving the attempted use of chemical and/or biological materials¹⁸.

The completed and failed jihadist attacks were mostly carried out using knives and firearms, and predominantly targeted civilians. All attack plots involving the use of explosives were disrupted.

The majority of the perpetrators were acting or were planning to act alone. However, several foiled terrorist plots, including two in the Netherlands, were prepared by individuals acting in a group.

In 2018, a total number of 511¹⁹ individuals were arrested on suspicion of offences related to jihadist terrorism. Most arrests occurred in France, the UK and Belgium, followed by the Netherlands, Germany and Italy, in descending order. More than half of the suspects, both men and women, were arrested on suspicion of being a member of a terrorist group, including while abroad, and participation in attack planning and preparation.

EU and non-EU citizens were almost equally represented among jihadist arrestees and attack perpetrators. Among this population, non-EU-born individuals were slightly prevailing. The average age of attackers was 26, while the individuals arrested for terrorist offences were older, with the average age being 32. The attackers were all male. Women accounted for 22% of arrestees suspected of jihadist terrorism, as compared to 16 % in 2017 and 26 % in 2016.²⁰

¹⁸ See chapter Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN).

¹⁹ See Annex 3.

²⁰ These figures are calculated excluding data contributed by the UK and partially Belgium, which are not broken down to type of terrorism.


The following is an overview of the **COMPLETED JIHADIST TERRORIST ATTACKS** in 2018, four of which were claimed by the so-called Islamic State (IS):



On 23 March, a 26-year-old Moroccan male hijacked a car in Carcassonne (France), killing the passenger and wounding the driver. Later, he shot and wounded four police officers nearby military barracks, and attacked a supermarket in Trèbes, where he killed two civilians, injured several others and held the customers hostage. A lieutenant colonel of the French National Gendarmerie, who exchanged himself for a hostage, was shot and stabbed by the perpetrator and died later from his injuries. The special task force of the French National Gendarmerie killed the attacker. IS claimed in an *Amaq News* release that he was ‘a soldier of IS’;



On 5 May, a man stabbed and seriously injured three people in The Hague (the Netherlands) before being shot and arrested by police. The authorities later assessed that he had a terrorist motive;



On 12 May, a 20-year-old French citizen of Chechen origin armed with a knife killed one person and injured several more in Paris (France), before being shot dead by police. IS claimed responsibility for the attack through *Amaq News* affirming that the attacker was ‘a soldier of IS’, and released a video of the attacker pledging allegiance to IS;



On 29 May, a 31-year-old man who was released from prison on parole the day before, stabbed two female police officers and took one of their guns in Liège (Belgium). He used the handgun to shoot and kill both officers and the passenger of a car, and to wound four other police officers when exiting the school building where he had briefly held a woman hostage. The attacker was killed by police, and the following day IS claimed responsibility for the attack through *Amaq News*. The perpetrator had converted to Islam and had been radicalised to violence while serving a sentence for drug offences;



On 31 August, a 19-year-old Afghan national who had applied for asylum in Germany stabbed and severely wounded two American tourists in the Amsterdam central railway station (the Netherlands), before being shot and arrested by police. The authorities later assessed that he had a terrorist motive;



On 11 December, a 29-year-old French national of Algerian descent armed with a gun and a knife killed five people and injured others in an attack near Strasbourg Christmas market (France). He was wounded by police before fleeing the scene. After a two-day search, the perpetrator was killed in Strasbourg and IS claimed that the perpetrator was an 'IS soldier' through an *Amaq News* statement on 13 December. Several people were arrested in connection with the attack, including the individual who allegedly supplied the attacker with a firearm;



On 31 December, a 25-year-old man of Somali origin armed with a kitchen knife stabbed and injured three people including a police officer at Victoria station in Manchester (UK). The attacker was arrested, and the authorities later assessed that he had a terrorist motive.

In addition, Spain reported an incident in 2018 as a failed attack: on 20 August, a 29-year-old Algerian male entered a police station in Barcelona (Spain) wielding a knife and reportedly shouting 'Allahu akbar' (God is great). He was shot and killed after he attempted to stab a police officer. The incident occurred three days after the anniversary of the attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils in 2017 and around the time of the Islamic feast of Eid al-Adha.

EU Member States also reported that 16 terrorist plots were foiled. The decrease in the number of completed jihadist terrorist attacks

in the EU is at least partly the result of effective intelligence and law enforcement operations, illustrated by the relatively high number of reported foiled attacks. In September 2018, for example, the Netherlands successfully thwarted a major attack involving seven men who had reached an advanced stage in their planning. Three of the suspects had previously been arrested for attempting to travel abroad as foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs).

All attacks completed in 2018 were perpetrated by lone actors and not by groups. Lone actors, however, seldom act in total isolation. They often

maintain relations in loose networks or small unstructured groups, and may receive material and/or moral support from like-minded individuals. It is not always self-evident whether the individual is a dedicated jihadist acting on radical beliefs, or someone who suffers from mental health issues. For instance, neither the motivation nor the trigger for the stabbing of three people in The Hague (the Netherlands) on 5 May was immediately clear. The perpetrator was known to police due to his prior behaviour, but the prosecution concluded, based upon his own statements and recorded conversations, that the man had a jihadist motive for his attack.



A number of violent incidents in 2018 used *modi operandi* promoted by terrorists but were ultimately judged not to have been carried out by terrorists. For example, in August a car drove into pedestrians and cyclists and then crashed into a security barrier just outside the Houses of Parliament in London (UK). Three people were injured in the incident. The case was originally regarded as terrorism due to the location, methodology and alleged targeting of civilians and police officers, but later assessed to be a criminal act without a terrorist motive. The driver was charged with attempted murder.

In 2018, as in previous years, the majority of EU Member States did not report any jihadist terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, these same EU Member States were aware of the potential threats emanating from the increase in numbers of adherents to jihadist

ideology, the presence of extremist individuals with links to jihadist terrorist organisations, and the potential of returning FTFs from the conflict areas in Iraq and Syria.

Terrorist networks continue to be detected in Europe, including in prison. In October 2018, 25 inmates were identified in 17 different prisons all over Spain belonging to a jihadist network. The network was composed of prisoners with prior records for jihadist terrorism-related crimes and of inmates convicted of other criminal offences, who presumably became radicalised in prison. The members of the network ranged from one individual linked to the 11 March 2004 attacks in Madrid to returned and frustrated foreign fighters, including converts. Italy reported that radicalisation in prisons remains a matter of concern. Inside the Italian prisons in 2018, there was reportedly a further increase

in the number of prisoners showing support for IS. Threats to prison guards, provocations and disrespect to female prison staff and non-observant Muslim prisoners were the most common ways to express such support.

IS was under intense pressure and, at the time of writing, had lost almost all of the territory it once controlled in Iraq and Syria. The group's ability to direct external attacks against the West appears to be greatly reduced due to the consequent attrition of personnel and reduction in resources. However, despite the lack of capacity, the IS core maintains the intent to conduct such operations and might rely on former members, including those currently imprisoned, and sympathisers based in Europe.

Terrorist propaganda

IS media in 2018

The physical caliphate was a central propaganda tool of IS. The organisation's slogan *Baqiya wa tatamaddad* ('remaining and expanding') combined with successful military advances in previous years convinced thousands to emigrate to the lands of the caliphate. The military defeat of IS in Iraq Syria denied the group one of its most potent propaganda assets.

IS' current situation has had a significant impact on its digital capabilities: propaganda produced by official IS media outlets has visibly declined. The only publication that continued to be issued on a regular basis was the official Arabic weekly newsletter *al-Naba'* (The News).

The group's shrinking capabilities on the ground have significantly affected its strategic planning. This was evident in its failure to implement a planned remapping of its provinces. In July 2018, IS attempted to re-brand its propaganda to portray Iraq and Syria as consisting of just two provinces: *Wilayat al-Sham* (Levant province) and *Wilayat al-Iraq* (Iraq province), with

each province consisting of a number of regions. Videos began featuring these new epithets alongside the previous titles. However, this only lasted for a couple of weeks before the new titles were dropped and propaganda reverted to the use of the previous labels. Similarly, IS Hawran province – established in July 2018 in southern Syria – produced a very limited number of propaganda items and ceased that same month.

There is also a certain amount of confusion as to the actual number of IS provinces worldwide. One example is that of the IS East Asia province which released its first propaganda item in May 2018. While East Asia was recognised as an IS province in *al-Naba'* in late July 2018, it was subsequently downgraded to a region in subsequent issues, before again being referred to as a province in August.

One of the few regions where IS appears to be growing in strength and capability is in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as its Khorasan province is becoming an increasingly prominent actor in the Afghan conflict. In contrast to other IS branches, the Khorasan

province produced propaganda on a regular basis. While it focused heavily on local conflict, it also released a number of videos in 2018 suggesting the region as a new haven for those wishing to join IS but who are 'unable to emigrate to Iraq and Syria'. One of these videos, titled *'The land of God is wide'* and released in March, purported to document IS' authority over territories in Jawzjan (Afghanistan). The implication is that the utopian idea of the caliphate still holds potential in Afghanistan. This message was underscored in the video's use of languages: while most of the narration was in Arabic, fighters also delivered messages in Dari, Pashto and Uzbek.

Nevertheless, the various shifts and inconsistencies in IS propaganda in 2018 reflect the overall collapse of the claimed caliphate, previously the central pillar of its project. However, this collapse combined with the group's battlefield attrition did not stop the group's online sympathisers from continuing to proclaim their support for the group.

Re-mediatisation

A lack of IS propaganda from the battlefield resulted in re-mediatisation and was accompanied by a mushrooming of pro-IS media outlets and supporter-generated productions

The spin-off media outlets aimed to project the image of an IS franchise

IS leaders issued a total of three speeches in 2018: one was delivered by the group's caliph Abubakr al-Baghdadi on the occasion of the celebration of Eid al-Adha on 22 August 2018 and two by the group's official spokesperson Abu al-Hasan al-Muhajir.

The low number of speeches is not in itself unusual (neither the group's elusive leader nor its current spokesperson has delivered more than two speeches a year since 2015). Nevertheless, this has meant that IS sympathisers have been forced to resort to recycling older material to produce their supporter-generated content (SGC). In fact, the most notable speeches used for SGC purposes in 2018 date back to 2016 and were delivered by former IS spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani. This contrasts heavily with al-Qaeda – both core and affiliates – who issued topical speeches on a regular basis.

The year 2018 also saw a decrease in the number of IS videos featuring high-production values and high-definition drone footage of the battlefields. Official IS videos featured little beyond ruined towns and occasional forays into enemy territory. However, the group's attack on Iranian forces during a national military parade in Ahvaz (Iran) on 22 September 2018 provided IS with the opportunity to attempt



A lack of IS propaganda from the battlefield resulted in re-mediatisation and was accompanied by a mushrooming of pro-IS media outlets and supporter-generated productions

The spin-off media outlets aimed to project the image of an IS franchise

to debunk the idea that it was losing the ability to mount major military operations. IS official media and sympathetic media outlets latched on to the event and drew inspiration for their propaganda from it for weeks afterwards.

Another audio-visual production which attempted to highlight IS' capabilities was the video series entitled *'Harvest of the soldiers'*. The series consisted of detailed statistics and information regarding the types and the results of operations conducted by IS over a given week. Released in Arabic and English by the *al-Hayat Media Center*, the first episode in the series appeared in early August 2018 and continued to be issued for the remainder of the year²¹. While the production

²¹ The 25th episode on 17 January 2019 was the last to appear in the series.

aimed to showcase IS' proficiency, the utilisation of the same graphics and special effects from one video to the next illustrated the dwindling capabilities of the organisation.

Despite the shrinking of its physical footprint, the group continued to galvanise a significant amount of online supporters. A flurry of new media outlets burgeoned in the wake of IS' loss of territory and there was a noted increase in 2018 in SGC publications that were not officially linked to any terrorist organisation but which were obviously sympathetic to IS.

On social media, posters were the most recurrent type of SGC visual propaganda and covered a wide range of topics, including doctrinal texts and the familiar apotheosis of martyrdom. The most significant group of SGC posters called for lone-actor attacks and featured Western landmarks alongside exhortative quotes by IS leaders. The posters were produced in an array of languages and featured varying levels of refinement.

SGC experienced an uptick of activity over certain periods (e.g. during the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia; Christmas and New Year holidays; and the *gilets jaunes* protests in France), making them more visible in mainstream media. It is worth highlighting that the threats relating to the World Cup and the *gilets jaunes* were posted on media platforms supportive of the IS rather than in official statements or speeches by the group. It is therefore difficult to ascertain whether they resulted from a concerted decision by senior members of the group or if they were instead a spontaneous effort by propagandists. Discussions on Telegram later claimed

that IS had distanced itself from the World Cup threats, which did not materialise, highlighting an issue of command-and-control within the IS media network.

IS propagandists strive to project an idea of unity

Conscious of their disjointed appearance, the SGC outlets showed an increasing awareness of the need to appear united and aimed to project the image of an IS franchise. With this in mind, they were careful to produce propaganda that carried the hallmarks of IS and mimic the group's official braggadocio. The need to appear as a monolithic bloc and less like disparate groups also led to joint campaigns on Telegram, including #Answer_the_call and #Remaining_steadfast, in which the various pro-IS outlets produced publications under a common hashtag.

Another joint project is the unofficial *Youth of the Caliphate* magazine, of which three issues were released in 2018. The magazine is managed by a consortium of pro-IS media outlets (the *Ashhad Media Company*, the *Sunni Shield Foundation* and *al-Saqri Corporation for Military Sciences*) and is headed by the *al-Abd al-Faqir Foundation*. *Youth of the Caliphate* promotes publications from other IS-supportive media outlets, including *Asawirti Media*, the *Khattab Media Foundation*, *al-Battar Media*, *al-Bushrayat* and *al-Adiyat Media Production Company*. The magazine even encourages individual readers to send in their own SGC contributions for publication.

IS struggles to unify its ideological position

The need to appear united is even more crucial in the light of a long-standing ideological dispute – between the lesser and more radical members of IS – that is currently raging online. The debate on the concept of *takfir* (the act of declaring other Muslims unbelievers), which had come to the fore in official IS media and had ostensibly been settled in 2017 in favour of the less radical position²², continued in 2018 and extended to SGC outlets. The online dispute in 2018 pitted the central IS Media Department, which appears to have returned to its radical stance, against two more 'moderate' media foundations formerly supportive of IS: *al-Wafa'* and *al-Turath al-'Ilmi*. Supporters of the two camps

²² The disagreements date to May 2017 when IS issued a controversial memo which set out its new stance on *takfir*. The memo argued that *takfir* is a foundation of the Islamic faith. In practical terms, this would mean that even if a Muslim committed no sin him or herself, he or she could be denounced as a disbeliever for failing to condemn other alleged sinners. The memo also included an opinion on the issue of 'excuse of ignorance', roughly equivalent to the legal principle *ignorantia juris non excusat*. While the long-held IS position had been that ignorance of a religious obligation – such as refraining from declaring Muslims who take part in elections unbelievers – was held to be excusable, the new memo rejected ignorance as an excuse. As a result, not only did the memo cast doubt on whether Sunni Muslims worldwide could be considered true Muslims, but some of IS' own leaders and members could be declared unbelievers under the terms delineated in the ruling. In addition, the debate also included discussion of other religious concepts that supported IS ideology, including *al-wala' wal-bara'* (loyalty to Muslims and disavowal of polytheists) and *nawaqid al-Islam* or nullifiers of Islam (sets of conditions with which all Muslims must comply, e.g. not to ally with infidels against Muslims). The ruling was quick to spark controversy among IS followers and deepened the already existing debate on the issue. Some of IS' senior ideologues objected to this definition of *takfir*. See also Europol, TE-SAT 2018, p. 33.

exchanged insults and refutations online, with the former arguing that the IS Media Department is too radical in its approach to issues such as *takfir*, and the latter accusing *al-Wafa'* and *al-Turath al-'Ilmi* of being spies and calling into question their support for the caliphate.

The overall result was an energetic media campaign increasingly divorced from realities on the ground. The loss of a coherent narrative in the light of the organisation's territorial losses, its weakened branding and waning credibility underscored a general state of confusion in the ranks of IS and a lack of cogency in its arguments.

An al-Qaeda resurgence?

IS' loss of significant territory in Iraq and Syria stands in contrast to al-Qaeda's lack of major change over the same period. While IS dominated headlines, al-Qaeda has focused on consolidating its influence in both existing and new theatres. As a result, it has succeeded in subsuming a number of franchises in a global movement that runs from North-West Africa to South Asia. Furthermore, despite boasting a less diversified online infrastructure than its rival, al-Qaeda's propaganda output has remained constant.

Al-Qaeda sets itself apart from IS in its discourse and presents itself as a level-headed pragmatic group that seeks redress for the people. The organisation is currently focusing more on local concerns as opposed to global *jihad* and couches its speeches in the context of political realism. Al-Qaeda has also successfully gained



Despite boasting a less diversified online infrastructure, al-Qaeda's propaganda output has remained constant

Al-Qaeda sets itself apart from IS in its discourse and presents itself as a level-headed pragmatic group with legitimate political and socio-economic grievances

leverage by giving more space to local affiliates and recognising the added value of coalescing power from the grassroots level.

Al-Qaeda also takes a more nuanced approach in its diatribes against the West, although – like IS – it also conflates the terms 'crusaders', 'Christians' and 'Westerners'. However, al-Qaeda focuses more substantially on what it describes as Western governments' iniquitous and predatory policies and less on the degeneracy and anathematisation of Western culture as a whole.

Al-Qaeda affiliates are gaining strength in the Sahel

Ayman al-Zawahiri, the nominal head of al-Qaeda, mentioned West Africa several times in his most recent speeches. He even devoted two videos over the course of one week in March 2018 to the topic of *jihad* in Africa and took the opportunity to call for an uprising against 'Western occupying powers in the region'.

Al-Qaeda's affiliates in West Africa, most notably *al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb* (AQIM) and *Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin* (JNIM, 'group in support of Islam and Muslims'), also issued a wave of threats against Western interests in the region. Two of the most common leitmotifs in AQIM and JNIM's speeches are the redistribution of resources and the need to resist Western hegemony. Both groups railed against the 'colonially installed governments' and 'surrogate regimes' who allowed their patrons largely unfettered access to local resources and served the interests of foreign powers ahead of their own citizens.

Al-Qaeda also stressed the paramountcy of the region's Islamic identity and its own role as a revolutionary exemplar for the *umma* (global Muslim community). It pointed to an alleged Western conspiracy against Islam and accused the West of harbouring plots and designs to subordinate, humiliate and undermine Islamic institutions and culture. The West in general – and France in particular – was presented as an occupying force corrupting Islam.

While AQIM and JNIM presented similar narratives in their audio-visual

productions and their message projected an overriding sense of unity and complementarity – indeed they appeared to share media resources – JNIM concentrated on the belligerent content, while AQIM had greater responsibility for the ideological content. An important point on the belligerent narrative is that al-Qaeda visibly attempted to differentiate itself from IS by not including scenes of beheadings in its propaganda.

In stark contrast to IS, AQIM and JNIM attempted to reach out to Western civilians to explain their position. Propaganda produced by the two al-Qaeda affiliates stressed that their targets for attack were the Western military contingents stationed in the region and not civilians. A case in point is the discourse put forward by a French female hostage held by JNIM since late 2016, who appeared in three videos produced by their official mouthpiece *al-Zallaqa Media* in 2018. She spoke of the respectful treatment she had received from her captors and described them as 'trustworthy'. In contrast, she accused the French government of obstructing her release. While hostage taking was a recurring theme in JNIM's productions, the group stressed that the hostages were taken as 'just retribution', the suggestion being that Western citizens would no longer be targeted, should these foreign powers stop their interventions in the region.

Similarly, in a speech released in late December 2018, AQIM's leader exploited the French *gilets jaunes* protests to denounce what he described as France's neo-colonialism and to appeal to the wider French public. He evoked a growing dichotomy between a 'corrupt French elite' and the majority of the French population and drew parallels

between the plight of the protesters and that of the ‘victims of French colonialism’. He described the costly military involvement of France in Mali, Libya, Central Africa and other African countries as the root cause of current socio-economic issues that prompted the *gilets jaunes* movement.

Al-Qaeda offshoots and branches in Syria continue to cause confusion

Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, ‘Levant Liberation Committee’), whose main component *Jabhat Fath al-Sham* publically split from al-Qaeda in 2016²³, became the dominant jihadist force in Syria in 2018. HTS distanced itself from the international terrorist group brand in a statement in June 2018 and condemned its terror designation by the US State Department. The statement also stressed that HTS posed no threat to countries outside Syria.

In 2018, HTS focused on proving its state-building capabilities in a bid to position itself as a negotiating partner on the Syrian scene. In particular, it utilised its two media outlets (*Amjad Media* and the *Iba' News Agency* which, while it has not been officially linked to HTS, clearly acted as its mouthpiece) to document its ability to exert effective administrative control over the north-western Idlib governorate, one of the last armed opposition strongholds in Syria.

HTS continued to push back against all attempts to designate the organisation as a terrorist threat and, with this in mind, attempted to market

Iba' News as an unbiased and credible media outlet. Indeed, *Iba' News*, first issued in June 2018, resembles a mainstream newspaper in content and style and covers foreign policy issues and Syrian social issues. In contrast to IS' weekly *al-Naba'*, *Iba' News* contains no religious doctrinal texts. One clue to its ideological leanings is the derogatory designation of IS as *khawarij*²⁴. Its desire to present itself as a mainstream media outlet led *Iba' News* to denounce the Google Play Store in September 2018 for taking down its mobile phone application.

Another relevant armed group operating in Idlib is *Tanzim Hurras al-Din* (THD, ‘guardians of the religion organisation’), a splinter group from HTS and widely believed to be al-Qaeda's new affiliate in Syria, although it has not yet been officially accepted by the al-Qaeda senior leadership. THD subsumed a number of smaller jihadist factions and made new military alliances with others. THD also focused on developing its own brand. In addition to using *Sham al-Ribat Media* as its official outlet, the group launched the first issue of *al-Falah* magazine in late October 2018. *Al-Falah* offers political analysis interspersed with religious advice, political implementation of Islamic law and technical guidance with regard to anonymity and security. The magazine also aims to stress that al-Qaeda remains a robust organisation.

²⁴ The *Khawarij* were a group that rebelled against the fourth caliph, Ali ibn Abi Talib during the first century of Islam. The movement is known in Sunni and Shi'i circles for their extreme dogma (for example, with regard to excommunicating other Muslims).

Common aims and ambitions

While jihadist discourse targets Westerners in general, a number of states are singled out: France, the UK and the USA. These three countries in particular are vilified for their perceived negative role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and are generally accused of harbouring neo-imperialist ambitions in the Middle East and Africa. These accusations are levelled by supporters of both IS and al-Qaeda.

France, in particular, was the focus for a plethora of jihadist organisations in 2018. Media outlets supportive of IS and al-Qaeda targeted France (and French interests) both for attacks and what appears to be recruitment purposes. Al-Qaeda's senior leadership, as well as AQIM and JNIM, accused France of plundering Muslim countries' resources and of refusing to let go of its former colonies. JNIM also claimed France was seeking to create a turf war in the region. HTS also accused France of duplicitously claiming to defend human rights in Syria while supporting the Syrian regime.

In terms of French-language propaganda, *al-Kifah* continued to provide French translations of al-Qaeda productions, while the *Centre Médiatique an-Nur* and the online magazine *Mediaction* – first released in February 2018 – catered to IS francophone supporters. The official HTS outlet *Amjad* provided French subtitles to a number of its videos in what appears to be a bid to rally French-speaking supporters. However, the *Amjad* videos bore no direct link to France and neither was France designated by HTS as a target for attacks.

²³ For developments since 2016, see Europol, TE-SAT 2018, p. 37.



There were also attempts to revive English-language publications in support of IS. In February 2018, for example, *Ahlut-Tawhid* launched a new magazine titled *From Dabiq to Rome*. Although it claimed to have no organisational ties to any group and was generally restrained in tone (with the first issue dedicated to the discussion of religious concepts such as apostasy, disbelief and respect of shari'a regulations), the magazine contains a *News Recap* section that provides a collection of updates on IS developments on the field. However, overall the newsletter was amateurish in comparison to IS' former English language flagship magazines *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*. Similarly, the *Halummu News Agency*, which has in the past provided English translations of IS propaganda items, resurfaced on Telegram on 17 December 2018 as well as on alternative platforms.

IS and al-Qaeda continued to experiment with online platforms

In addition to the territorial losses inflicted on IS, 2018 took its toll on the group's digital presence. In response to intensified and coordinated take-downs in 2018 by law enforcement and social media platforms – including Telegram – IS supporters doubled their efforts to remain relevant online and continued to seek out new online vectors for their propaganda. Despite frequent deletions of content, the group and its supporters persisted in publishing on a wide array of media and file-sharing sites.

In this context, pro-IS Telegram channels reiterated the importance of '*media jihad*' and urged supporters to join 'invasion and publishing' brigades. This was followed by a noticeable increase in pro-IS media outlets specialising in providing instructions on cyber and operational security. The most prominent of these were *al-Saqri Corporation for Military Sciences*, *Horizons Electronic Foundation* and the *United Cyber Caliphate*. Given the relative scarcity of official IS instructional guides in English, these unofficial but increasingly specialised media outlets were attempting to fill a perceived gap. They also provided advice on how to avoid account deletion, with suggestions including using channel names that cannot be associated with IS. Channel administrators were also increasingly creating several versions of the same channel, allowing them to swiftly rebound from account suspensions. Similarly, IS-affiliated websites that act as repositories for the organisation's propaganda responded to recurrent suspensions by creating new domain names and re-emerging at new locations from backup copies.

Furthermore, pro-IS and pro-al-Qaeda Telegram channels advertised the use of alternative platforms relying on blockchain or peer-to-peer technology, e.g. Rocket.Chat and ZeroNet. However, jihadist activities on these platforms failed to gain traction in 2018. As a result, Telegram remained the platform of choice for both al-Qaeda and IS sympathisers. This attempted shift indicates jihadist groups' awareness of and willingness to exploit new technologies.

Travel for terrorist purposes



The number of European foreign terrorist fighters travelling or attempting to travel to the conflict zone continued to decline and was very low

Foreign terrorist fighters were reported to have travelled to alternative theatres of conflict but in low numbers

Since the beginning of the conflict, approximately 5 000 individuals from the EU have travelled to join fighting groups in Iraq and Syria. Belgium, France, Germany and the UK are the major EU source countries. At the end of 2018, the number of EU citizens still in the region appeared to amount to less than 2000 – with France²⁵ and the UK having the highest numbers, around 710 and 345, respectively.

More than 1 000 individuals are believed to be dead, and although accurate figures were not available at the time of writing, a large number appeared to have been taken prisoner or detained in Iraq and Syria. Some were reportedly being held in Kurdish camps (including women and minors) or by the Iraqi authorities; others were detained in Turkey. According to Spain, some former foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) were able to settle in Turkey.

Continuing decline in travelling FTFs

Compared to previous years, the number of EU FTFs travelling to the Iraq and Syria conflict zone in 2018 was very low. There were also some attempted journeys – for example, one individual was prevented from leaving Austria twice; and Spain reported two individuals that succeeded in travelling.

The European jihadist movement is currently in a process of reorientation. While in previous years the focus had been on travelling to and

fighting in jihadist conflict zones in Iraq and Syria, it has since shifted towards activities in the EU related to spreading the jihadist message – both online and offline. The jihadist movement in the Netherlands, for example, is now many times larger than it was before the war in Syria. In this context, it is notable that the Netherlands foiled an extensive terrorism plot in the latter part of 2018. The suspects – three of whom had been arrested in previous years for trying to travel abroad to fight – were seeking to carry out twin vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED, or car bomb) and gun attacks.


Travel of women and minors

The absolute number of women that have travelled/remain in the conflict zones is relatively low for most EU Member States. France appears to have a high number: 33 % of 1324 individuals who travelled from France since 2012 were women.

Already in 2016, EU Member States identified women as posing not only a threat concerning facilitation, recruitment, financing and propaganda production but also as potential attackers and fighters. Several plots involving women were foiled by police in Europe in recent years. During the latter part of 2017, IS promoted a more active role for women in combat zones.

The Netherlands also observed that by the end of 2018 at least 145 minors with a connection to the Netherlands were living in the conflict zone in Iraq and Syria. More than half of them are below the age of four and were mostly

²⁵ The breakdown of this figure still in situ from France includes 355 men, 301 women and 55 minors of more than 13 years old.



born there. In addition, there are at least 30 minors with a connection to the Netherlands living somewhere in the region outside the conflict zone. As previously stated France has at least 55 minors over the age of 13 in Iraq and Syria. Switzerland also mentioned the presence of approximately 20 children (younger than 12) among the jihadist travellers in conflict zones that have links to Switzerland.

While they are essentially victims, there are concerns among EU Member States that minors who have been exposed to indoctrination and training in former IS territories, may pose a potential future threat.

Travel to other destinations

Jihadists who were unable to reach IS territory in Iraq and Syria may have been directed to IS' branch or affiliate groups instead. As illustrated above, there also remains a high risk that aspirant travellers, unable to join IS become frustrated and turn their focus to conducting attacks in their home countries. Albeit current numbers appear to be relatively small, FTFs have been reported to have

travelled to alternative theatres of conflict.

Austria assessed that, with IS' decline in Iraq and Syria, North Caucasians – who constituted 40 % of their FTFs – increasingly returned to their former focus of fighting against Russia. Interestingly, Austria also stated that at least two North Caucasian fighters travelled to the conflict area in Eastern Ukraine – where they were fighting on the Ukrainian side.

Two countries – Germany and Spain – reported on one subject each that had travelled to the Philippines, located in a region where IS has ambitions to develop. Of specific note, in July 2018, a German-Moroccan national blew himself up at a checkpoint in Lamitan on the island of Basilan, killing 15 people; IS claimed responsibility for the attack. The suicide bomber is believed to have already left for the Philippines in October 2017 where he reportedly joined an 'IS-friendly' faction of the former Abu Sayyaf. This was the first suicide attack in the Philippines carried out by a German national. Also in the Philippines, an FTF from Spain was arrested in January 2018 in Maluso, Basilan. At the time of his arrest, he was accompanied by a known terrorist

from the region and police found several weapons and components to build explosives among his belongings. This person left Spain in the first trimester of 2017, presumably with the aim of joining IS in Iraq and Syria, but was unsuccessful – prompting his travel to the Philippines in October.

France reported that 39 individuals were localised in a 'third country' (at present unknown) after a stay in the Iraq/Syria zone. Moreover, Ireland, Italy and the UK observed that a number of FTFs travelled to Libya/ North Africa. In Italy's case, the suspects travelled there for training with IS and then returned to Italy.

Conversely, Sweden reported that there was no information indicating that Swedish members of IS or other jihadist organisations have relocated from Syria to other conflict zones. Their returnees have not been connected to a confirmed plot and most have returned to their former cities, neighbourhoods and groups of friends, and have taken up activities they were involved in before travelling. Sweden pointed out that almost all their returnees travelled back using their own travel documents.

Returnees and routes

Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, countries such as Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and Italy²⁶ have seen a return rate of between approximately 20 % and 30 %. The Netherlands and Spain have noted roughly 18 % have returned; and Germany and the UK appear to have experienced the highest proportions of their FTFs returning – around 33 % and 45 % respectively.

Those that have returned garner kudos with like-minded individuals. Their training and experience – such as handling weapons and explosives – makes them exceptionally dangerous. Furthermore, EU Member States’ ongoing concern is that these individuals can perpetuate and strengthen their networks both nationally and internationally.

Turkey continued to be the main hub for FTF travel. However, its increased law enforcement activity also likely contributed to stemming the flow of travellers. Confirmed overall figures of EU FTFs held in Turkey, Iraq and Syria are not currently available. For a number of countries, the collection and verification of information on their citizens’ fate remains a challenge.

Routes to and from Iraq and Syria do not appear to have markedly changed. The Western Balkans and EU countries such as Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania were again used as transit countries. Romania, for example, reported that the number of cases continued its downward direction since the previous year (in keeping with the European trend). Also of interest, in 2018 Moldova

detained and expelled five FTFs who were citizens of Russia, primarily from the North Caucasian Republics and Uzbekistan.

Women and minors are amongst those that have returned. Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, reported three adults returned to their territory from Syria (two women with three young male children and one man). In another example, Belgium reported that in December 2018, the process to repatriate six minors and their two widowed mothers in a camp in Syria was pending.

The pressure of migrant flows towards the EU stabilised in 2018, but the continuation of the use of smuggling routes, mainly through the Western Mediterranean Sea and Western Balkan countries, remained a matter of concern from a counter-terrorism perspective. As previously reported, terrorist use of the migrant flow has been observed, but it is not deemed systematic. However, future clandestine use of this *modi operandi* by FTFs cannot be ruled out.

Specifically, Italy reported that in 2018 jihadists linked to the Iraq and Syria IS branch or individuals from ‘radical Libyan environments’ were able to reach their shores, infiltrating the irregular immigration flows. An example illustrating this concerned arrests carried out in April (in Naples) and June 2018 (in Bari) of two asylum seekers from The Gambia who had previously illegally entered via Sicily. They had pledged allegiance to IS and had been sent by the group after being trained in Libya to commit an attack against a crowd using a vehicle.



In 2018, the number of FTFs returning from the Iraq and Syria conflict zone remained very low

Combat training, experience and international contacts of returnees remain a matter of concern


Terrorist use of the migrant flow has been observed, but it is not deemed systematic

²⁶ Italy stated that they have 28 returnees to Europe, with only 12 returning to Italy.

Terrorist situation outside the EU*

*This section is largely based on open sources, complemented by Europol in-house knowledge.

Several EU Member States expressed concern about developments in conflict zones outside the EU, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria and having a negative impact on the security situation inside the EU. Military setbacks of terrorist organisations in these regions might motivate their members to take retaliatory action in Europe.



Americas and Australia

Lone actor attacks claimed by IS took place in 2018 in Canada and Australia. In Canada, a 29-year-old Canadian of Pakistani origin armed with a firearm killed an 18-year-old woman and a 10-year-old girl on a busy street in Toronto on 22 July 2018. The assailant, who according to his family had suffered from mental health problems since his childhood, was killed by police. Three days later, IS claimed responsibility for the attack through its *Amaq News* outlet.

In Australia, a Somali citizen drove a car into shop fronts in Melbourne on 9 November 2018, exited and attacked passers-by with a knife, killing one person. He was killed by police. The attack was claimed by IS through an *Amaq News* statement, but no links

with the organisation had come to light at the time of writing. The IS newsletter *al-Naba'*, referring to the Melbourne attack, acknowledged that most lone actors had not actually met IS leaders or members, received ideological or military training or financial support. The attackers were solely inspired by IS acts, propaganda and ideology.

In 2018, despite IS calls for people in the USA to take advantage of the country's firearms laws to acquire weapons and perpetrate attacks, IS did not claim any violent incidents in the USA as having been perpetrated by its members.

In Bogotá (Colombia), in March 2018 a Cuban citizen, who had entered Colombia illegally, was arrested on suspicion of planning attacks on American and Cuban embassy staff and high-ranking *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas* (FARC, Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces) members. The suspect, who denied being a Muslim, was reportedly in contact with Libyan extremists via Telegram who provided advice on IED manufacturing and target selection and appealed to him to dedicate the attack to IS.



Western Balkans

Western Balkans countries reported that radicalised communities, some comprising returnees from the conflict zones in Iraq and Syria existed on their territories and were engaged in recruitment and propaganda activities, but terrorist activities were rarely observed.

In Montenegro, the jihadist community mostly includes returnees from Syria. Its members form a closely knit community and carry out propaganda activities with the aim to recruit new supporters. In February 2018, an explosive device was thrown at the US embassy in Podgorica, but its explosion caused no casualties. The attacker committed suicide by exploding a second device on himself.

Russia, Caucasus and Central Asia

Russia reported that in 2018, 37 terrorist cells were dismantled on its territory and 28 acts of terrorism prevented at different stages of preparation or execution. During the reporting period, 65 terrorists including 10 group leaders were killed and 166 recruiters identified. More than 60 Russian and foreign citizens were prevented from entering armed conflict zones to participate in the activities of international terrorist organisations. According to Russia, several cases of the attempted use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, i. e. drones) carrying explosive devices were noted.



In Chechnya (Russia), three coordinated attacks targeting security forces – all of whom survived – were carried out on 20 August 2018, a day ahead of *Eid*

al-Adha, by five young males aged between 11 and 17. The incidents included a knife attack on a police station and a car ramming targeting a police checkpoint, in which four of the attackers were killed. The third attack was an attempted suicide bombing, which the perpetrator survived. *Amaq News* released a video featuring the attackers pledging allegiance to IS.

Austria reported a restructuring among sympathisers and activists of the al-Qaeda-aligned Caucasus Emirate and IS' Caucasus province. This was connected to the death of a leading jihadist in November 2017 in Tbilisi (Georgia). He had been granted political asylum in Austria and had been part of a Europe-wide network of Chechen expatriates for several years. The impact of this restructuring had not become apparent at the time of writing.

On 29 July 2018, a terrorist attack in Tajikistan targeted a group of tourists cycling in the Danghara District. The attackers drove a car into the group and then stabbed the cyclists, killing two American citizens, one Dutch and one Swiss citizen; and wounding a Dutch and a Swiss citizen. The attack was claimed by IS through an *Amaq News* and a formal IS statement. In addition, a video released by *Amaq News* two days after the attack showed the five attackers pledging allegiance to IS.

Turkey

IS did not carry out any attacks in Turkey in 2018, despite repeated threats and calls for its supporters to do so. In addition to the threat of terrorist attacks, Turkey also reported that members of the Syrian opposition living in Turkey, in particular journalists, were targets of assassination.



Iraq and Syria

In Syria, IS continued losing territory in 2018 and, by the end of the year, was reduced to small pockets of land along the lower Euphrates valley near the Iraqi border. It was estimated that several thousand IS fighters, including European FTFs, were concentrated in this area.

Large numbers of IS members were taken prisoners in 2018, including many women and minors. Some detainees were suspected of committing atrocities, such as two UK nationals alleged to have been members of a notorious IS execution cell. They were reportedly captured by Syrian-Kurdish fighters close to the Iraqi border in late January 2018. The cell of four individuals is said to have been responsible for killing at least 27 Western hostages.

Also during 2018, IS continued their activities in areas outside their territorial control, perpetrating attacks sometimes after extensive surveillance activities. For example, on 25 July, IS claimed responsibility for a suicide attack followed by firearm assaults that killed over 200 people in al-Suwayda' in southern Syria, which at the time was already under Syrian regime control. IS attacks also targeted members of rival jihadist groups, such as *Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham* (HTS, 'Levant Liberation Committee') leaders in Idlib in July 2018. On the other hand, armed opposition groups in northern Syria reported that they detained IS members or dismantled IS cells, who had been involved in planting IEDs and kidnapping for ransom in different areas around Idlib.

In mid-July 2018, IS radically simplified its system of territorial entities, regrouping all Syrian provinces into a 'Levant province' (*wilayat al-Sham*) and all Iraqi provinces into an 'Iraq province' (*wilayat al-Iraq*). The apparent aim was to mitigate the reputational damage of being evicted from areas that IS had

previously declared its provinces.

Except for the Kurdish-held north-eastern part of its territory, Syria witnessed the rapid expansion of Syrian regime control in 2018, eventually limiting the territory held by the armed opposition to the region of Idlib and small portions of Aleppo and Hama governorates. Despite being declared de-escalation zones in the Astana talks in July 2017, the Syrian regime and its allied militias advanced on several rebel-held pockets, starting with eastern Ghuta near Damascus in March. *Jaysh al-Islam* (Army of Islam), which had controlled the area, was allowed to evacuate to the Idlib region. Similarly, in June 2018, an offensive was launched against opposition-held areas in southern Syria. The remaining opposition forces, which had already been fighting IS-linked factions in the area, surrendered to the regime by mid-July 2018. As a result, Syrian regime forces came in direct contact with IS-linked factions in the region, including *Jaysh Khalid bin al-Walid* ('Khalid bin al-Walid army'). These factions reacted by officialising their link to IS. On 10 July, a suicide attack in the area was claimed under the name of IS Hawran province, which ceased activities in late July 2018.

In September 2018, the Syrian regime seemed to prepare an offensive against rebel-held territories in northern Syria around Idlib. This was prevented by a 17 September agreement concluded in Sochi between Russia, Iran and Turkey, which stipulated the creation of a demilitarised zone along the frontline around Idlib, from which 'radical' rebels, including *Jabhat al-Nusra*, would be required to withdraw by mid-October 2018. The withdrawal would be monitored by joint Russian-Turkish forces.

Turkey consolidated its influence in northern Syria in 2018. The neighbouring country launched Operation Olive Branch in early 2018, during which Turkish troops supported by Syrian Arab armed opposition



groups took control of the region of Afrin from *Yekineyen Parastina Gel* (YPG, People's Protection Units) militias. In this area, the Arab armed opposition groups were organised, with Turkish support, to form an entity referred to as the Syrian National Army (*al-Jaysh al-Watani al-Suri*), whose stated aim has been to free Syria from the Syrian regime, IS and the YPG/PKK. The Syrian National Army is nominally linked to the Syrian Interim Government, which is based in Turkey.

Turkey tried to replicate this approach in the rest of the opposition-held territory in northern Syria by supporting the unification of the remnants of the Free Syrian Army under the umbrella of a National Liberation Front (*al-Jabha al-Wataniyya lil-Tahrir*) in late May 2018. The National Liberation Front welcomed the Sochi agreement of 17 September 2018 but stated that they would not hand over weapons or territory.

Turkish efforts at uniting the military factions of the Syrian armed opposition under the leadership of the Syrian Interim Government coincided with the attempt to legitimise territorial rule by HTS through the creation of a Syrian Salvation Government (*Hukumat al-Inqadh*), which was formed in Idlib region by a 'General Syrian Congress establishment board' in early November 2017. Nominally independent, its activities are strongly characterised by the influence of HTS, for example in the application of Islamic punishments.

In mid-February, two opponents of HTS, the *Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement* and the *Nur al-Din al-Zinki Movement* merged under the new name *Jabhat Tahrir Suriya* ('Syrian liberation front'). At the time of the creation of HTS, the *Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement* had merged with many groups opposing the former's creation. The *Nur al-Din al-Zinki Movement* had initially joined HTS but seceded from it in late July 2017 in protest of HTS' hostility towards *Ahrar al-Sham*. The creation of *Jabhat Tahrir Suriya* was followed by an immediate attack on its forces by HTS. Several mediation attempts between the groups could not prevent violence from breaking out at several points in 2018. In early August 2018, *Jabhat Tahrir Suriya* and other factions joined *al-Jabhat al-Wataniyya lil-Tahrir*.

The conflict between HTS and *Jabhat Tahrir Suriya* also concerns the status of foreign fighters in the enclave. The *Turkistan Islamic Party*, for example, stated repeatedly that it remained neutral in the conflict. In mid-November, HTS publicly denied rumours about the existence of divisions between nationalities among its members.

Despite publicly cutting ties with the *al-Qaeda* leadership, HTS continued to harbour *al-Qaeda* veterans in territory it controls in northwestern Syria. In addition, 2018 witnessed a restructuring of jihadist currents beyond HTS in Syria. In early February 2018, *Jabhat Ansar al-Din*, a non-aligned jihadist group and one of the founding members of HTS, re-established itself as an independent group. In late February 2018, several smaller groups of former HTS members loyal to the *al-Qaeda* leadership created a new entity, *Tanzim Hurras al-Din* (THD, 'guardians of the religion organisation'). The group has been dominated by prominent former members of *Jabhat al-Nusra* and *al-Qaeda* veterans, who were opposed to the severance of ties with *al-Qaeda* in 2016, when *Jabhat al-Nusra* renamed into *Jabhat Fath al-Sham* or left the organisation after *Jabhat Fath al-Sham* merged in HTS in early 2017. In 2018, THD focused on the local conflict, based on the media statements the group has released detailing military action against the regime. It is likely however that THD will hold stronger aspirations to conduct external attacks than

other *al-Qaeda* elements in Syria, as it is assessed that the leadership is likely to be loyal to wider *al-Qaeda* objectives.

In addition to *al-Qaeda* loyalists, THD is likely also to contain former IS members. Reportedly, significant numbers of IS fighters arrived in Idlib province in 2018, joining a variety of jihadist groups, such as *Ansar al-Tawhid* ('supporters of monotheism'), which emerged in March 2018 and entered short-lived cooperation with THD in April under the title *Hilf Nusrat al-Islam* ('Islam support alliance').

In mid-October, several jihadist groups opposed to HTS' position on the Sochi agreement, including *Jabhat Ansar al-Islam*, THD, *Jama'at Ansar al-Islam* and, probably, *Ansar al-Tawhid*, established a joint platform, the *Wa-harrid al-Mu'minin Operations Room* ('And encourage the believers' operations room). This formation tried to maintain a low profile and stay neutral in the conflict between the *Nur al-Din al-Zinki Movement* and HTS.

Egypt

In Egypt, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who ousted President Muhammad Mursi in 2013 and was elected president for the first time in 2014, was confirmed in office in presidential elections from 26 to 28 March 2018.

In response to the attack on a Sufi mosque in late November 2017, President al-Sisi declared that stability would be restored in the Sinai Peninsula within a period of three months. In early February 2018, the Egyptian government announced a massive military campaign against terrorists on the Sinai.



Also in February 2018, IS published a video in which it warned Egyptians against voting and urged Islamists to attack security forces and leaders.

Two days before the presidential elections, on 24 March, a bomb planted under a car exploded when the vehicle of the local

police chief passed in Alexandria, killing two policemen. The attack was not claimed; Egyptian state media attributed it to the Muslim Brotherhood.

IS Sinai province warned the Egyptian army to stay away from Sinai and threatened attacks in Cairo in a video published on 23 March 2018.

On 2 November, seven people were killed in a firearms attack on a bus carrying pilgrims to a Coptic monastery in al-Minya province approx. 250 km south of Cairo. IS claimed responsibility for the attack via its *Amaq News* outlet and a statement from IS Egypt province. Commenting on the attack, *al-Naba'*

advised Muslims to stay away from churches, army and police facilities, foreign embassies and places frequented by 'Crusader' nationals. A similar attack had taken place in the region in May 2017²⁷.

Three Vietnamese and one Egyptian were killed in a roadside bomb attack on a tourist bus near the pyramids of Giza on 28 December 2018. According to the Egyptian interior ministry, the following day, 40 suspected terrorists were killed in coordinated raids on three locations in Giza and northern Sinai. They were suspected of planning a series of attacks on public institutions, touristic sites, security forces and churches.

Arabian Peninsula

The humanitarian crisis in Yemen, labelled by the United Nations (UN) as the most severe worldwide, was further exacerbated by the on-going conflict between the Huthi rebels and the internationally recognised government headed by Abdu Rabbo Mansur al-Hadi. A Saudi-led military alliance named 'Decisive Storm' has supported the al-Hadi government since 2015, while the Huthi rebels allegedly have received increasing military support from Iran since 2014. Due to the foreign interventions, the conflict, which was initially triggered mainly by local grievances, has been increasingly perceived as a sectarian confrontation between Sunni and Shi'i forces for hegemony in the region.

In 2018, the advance of al-Hadi government-linked fighters supported by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as part of the Saudi-led coalition, on the Huthi-held Red Sea coastal city of al-Hudayda (Hodeida) threatened to disrupt the humanitarian aid flow into the country. In December, an agreement negotiated by the UN between the Yemeni government and the Huthis was signed in Stockholm, stipulating among other items the demilitarisation of al-Hudayda.

In the shadows of the civil war, *al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula* (AQAP) maintained a presence, in particular in the southern and eastern parts of Yemen. In mid-2018, the group reportedly had between 6 000 and 7 000 members. The group's activities in 2018 were mainly focused on internal activities, fighting at the same time the Huthi rebels, the Yemeni government and the forces of the Saudi-led coalition. AQAP continued trying to win support from local tribes and recruit their members. Its self-proclaimed role in the fight against the Huthis has allowed AQAP to create alliances with local tribes and win support in southern Yemen, in particular since the Huthis took control of Sana'a in 2015.

Despite the high numbers of AQAP fighters, however, the group's wing specialising in attacks on Western targets has reportedly been significantly reduced in recent years, probably as a result of both military action targeting its members and the competition with local IS affiliates. As a result, in 2018, the threat from AQAP to Western interests seemed diminished. Its broad local base, however, might allow the group to quickly mobilise forces to replenish its international wing should the leadership assess it opportune.



In addition, AQAP remained capable of inspiring lone actor attacks worldwide. Whilst propaganda output was very limited in 2018, there remains a significant volume of historic English-language material available online, including 17 issues of the group's *Inspire* magazine. These include incitement aimed at Westerners and practical guidance for lone actor operations.

In contrast to AQAP, IS affiliates in Yemen were said to count not more than a couple of hundred fighters in 2018 and to be located in roughly similar areas as AQAP. In July, IS clashed with AQAP in al-Bayda' governorate, reportedly after an AQAP convoy was shot at an IS checkpoint. In a statement released in early August, AQAP explained that IS had violated an agreement that would allow safe passage through each other's checkpoints.

²⁷ Another suicide attack on a church north of Cairo was thwarted on 11 August 2018, when the perpetrator reportedly was intercepted on his way to the planned attack location. In 2019, a bomb hidden in a bag in front of a church in the Nasr City district of Cairo on 5 January 2019 exploded during defusing, killing the bomb expert.

North Africa

In Morocco, two women aged 24 and 28 from Denmark and Norway were assassinated on 17 December 2018 while on a hiking tour near a popular tourist spot. A video circulating on social media showed the killing of one of the women. In another video, four alleged perpetrators of the assassination pledged allegiance to IS. One of the individuals declared they were about to act in response to the call of the IS leader and in support of IS fighters in Hajin, an enclave then still under IS control in Syria. IS did not formally claim responsibility for the killing. In recent years, in several instances, terrorist cells related to IS have been dismantled in Morocco. In contrast, the influence of *al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb* (AQIM) has decreased.

In Tunisia, the *Uqba bin Nafi' Battalion*, AQIM's branch in the country, claimed responsibility for a double IED attack on Tunisian soldiers on patrol on 4 October 2018 in Kasserine, in which one soldier was killed. After a first explosion targeting the patrol vehicle, a second explosion occurred when other soldiers had gathered around the damaged vehicle. Also in Tunisia, a Tunisian woman aged 29 detonated an explosive device attached to her body, on 29 October 2018, in the proximity of police officers in the centre of Tunis, killing herself and injuring 20 people. The perpetrator was known to have radicalised, but her motivation has remained unclear. The attack, the first suicide attack in Tunisia committed by a woman, was not claimed.

In Libya, the security situation continued to be gravely affected by the political split of the country: the western part centred around the nominal capital Tripoli is the seat of the internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA), while the eastern part is controlled by the Libyan National

Army (LNA) militia under Khalifa Haftar, nominally reporting to the government of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives and its government in al-Bayda'. In 2018, four major militias shared the control of Tripoli, thereby securing access to resources and assets officially under GNA control and excluding competing militias from outside the capital. In September, allied militias from Tarhuna, Misrata and Zintan tried to enter the city, leading to violent confrontations, which killed more than one hundred people and displaced thousands. The Tarhuna militia took control of the international airport²⁸.

Khalifa Haftar's stated aim has been to take control of Tripoli and his LNA has expanded its control significantly south and west in recent years²⁹. The LNA is composed of regular troops but also tribal militias and religiously motivated fighters. Rumours about Haftar's health in early 2018 sparked fears that a change in the LNA leadership might compromise its coherence and escalate political and military competition in the east of the country.

Libya's uncontrolled south has become an increasingly important factor in the destabilisation of the whole Sahara region and continued to be used by AQIM, which has built relations with local tribes and IS affiliates as a safe haven.

Since their expulsion from Sirte in 2016, IS affiliates have remained active and, in 2018, perpetrated significant attacks in all parts of the country. These included several large-scale attacks in Tripoli, such as on the High National Elections Commission



on 2 May, the National Oil Corporation on 10 September and the foreign ministry on 25 December. In the east of the country, a VBIED attack in Benghazi on 25 May was said by IS to have been perpetrated by a 'lone wolf' of the 'caliphate'. In southern Libya, on 23 November, an attack claimed by IS on a police station in Tazirbu in territory held by LNA forces killed nine people. Ten others were abducted; at least six of them were executed some days later.

Italy reported that there is a risk that terrorists infiltrate the illegal immigration flows, in particular those from Tunisia. Crossings from Tunisia often include safe delivery at the Italian coast that goes unnoticed by authorities. Furthermore, Italy pointed to the threat of infiltration of terrorists into Europe from Libya with the aim to carry out terrorist attacks in Europe.

²⁸ Another attempt to gain influence in Tripoli by violent means led to a renewed outbreak of violence in late January 2019.

²⁹ In January 2019, the LNA launched a large-scale attack on the Fezzan region in southern Libya. The campaign was officially motivated by the need to strike terrorist groups operating in the region, but reportedly also aimed to take control of the main areas of oil production, which thus far were under the control of the GNA.

West Africa

Despite regional and international efforts aimed to stabilise the region, terrorist violence escalated in multiple locations of the region in 2018. In addition, it was noted that terrorist groups, criminals and local militias in the Sahel region, while pursuing diverging goals, exchange expertise in attack *modi operandi* and explosives.


In 2018, the security situation in Mali continued deteriorating. Terrorist attacks targeted local regional and international forces. Local forces included the Malian military and the Mécanisme Opérationnel de Coordination (MOC), a mixed force consisting of Malian military forces and tribal militias that cooperate under an UN-brokered peace deal. Regional forces deployed in Mali consist of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, which has been established in early 2017 by Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauritania and Burkina Faso with support from Western donors, including the EU, to combat terrorism, organised crime and human trafficking. On the international level are the French military Operation Barkhane and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

The predominant terrorist entity in Mali and surrounding countries remained *Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin* (JNIM, 'group in support of Islam and Muslims'). This jihadist umbrella organisation was created in March 2017 and comprises AQIM's Sahara branch, *Ansar al-Din* (*Ansar Dine*, 'supporters of the religion'), *al-Murabitun* and the Fulani-dominated *Macina Liberation Front*³⁰. In early November 2018, the head of the *Macina Liberation Front* appeared for the first time in a video speech flanked by his fellow JNIM leaders, calling on the Fulani population in West Africa to join JNIM and threatening French forces in Mali.

JNIM showed increasing capabilities to carry out complex attacks in 2018. For example, an attack combining bombings and armed assault on 14 April 2018 targeted an international military camp near the airport of Timbuktu, Mali, killing one MINUSMA soldier. The attackers used vehicles and uniforms in UN and Malian military colours. JNIM claimed that the attack was in response to French operations and strongly rejected the allegation by the French commander of Operation Barkhane that a woman was among the attackers while acknowledging the non-combatant contribution of women to the struggle.

Amid widespread violence, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was re-elected as president of Mali in August 2018. Hundreds of voting centres in the northern and central regions, however, remained closed. The elections were used by JNIM to question the political and economic independence of Mali from France, granted 50 years earlier, accusing France of continuing to exploit Mali. Blaming democracy for all ills in Malian society, the organisation advocated Islamic *shura* (consultation), the redistribution of resources and the resistance of Western hegemony as solutions. The group accused France of killing innocent people in Mali with the aim of breaking the increasing resistance to its alleged neo-colonial project. On 29 July 2018, a day before the first round of the presidential elections, a bomb attack targeted a French military and MINUSMA base in Kidal province. JNIM claimed responsibility and vowed not to rest until the last French soldier had left Mali and Islamic law was implemented.

JNIM also targeted other G5 Sahel countries in an attempt to coerce them into abandoning their engagement. On 2 March 2018, the first anniversary of the announcement of JNIM's establishment, the French embassy, a French cultural centre and the Burkinabe army general staff in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, were



targets of a terrorist attack using a car bomb and assault weapons by at least eight heavily armed militants wearing army uniforms. In addition to the attackers, eight people were killed. JNIM claimed credit for the attack, alleging that it was in retaliation of French airstrikes in February. It warned the Burkinabe government to cease its cooperation with the G5 Sahel.

In Burkina Faso, terrorist attacks increased drastically in 2018, mainly in the northern and eastern part of the country. Many were the work of a jihadist group known as *Ansar al-Islam* (*Ansarul Islam*, 'supporters of Islam'), believed to be the Burkinabe offshoot of *Ansar al-Din* in Mali. The founder of *Ansar al-Islam*, who died in mid-2017 and was replaced by his brother, was a close ally of the leader of the *Macina Liberation Movement* in Mali.

The faction of *al-Murabitun* that refused to align with AQIM in 2015 and has since been known as the *Islamic State in the Greater Sahara* (ISGA) remained active in the border region between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso in 2018, clashing mainly with Tuareg militias supporting the government in Mali and military forces in Niger. The group has also been accused of multiple kidnappings for ransom, indicating the close interconnection between crime and terrorism in the region. For example, on 12 April, the group claimed the abduction of a school teacher in northern Burkina Faso, threatening with death any teacher using French in class. Despite its pledge of allegiance to IS in May

³⁰ Europol, TE-SAT 2018, p. 39.

2015, which was disseminated a year later through *Amaq News*, the faction's claims and videos have not been published through a dedicated IS media office or official IS channels. According to news reports, ISGA also occasionally cooperated with *Ansar al-Islam* in Burkina Faso. A Romanian citizen, kidnapped in April 2015 by the faction that was to become ISGA, remained in captivity in 2018. Also in 2018, a German aid worker and an Italian priest were kidnapped in western Niger in April and September, respectively.

In Nigeria, the jihadist militias jointly known as *Boko Haram* (Hausa for 'Western education is unlawful [in Islam]') continued operating in the north-eastern Borno and Yobe states as well as neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger in 2018. Large-scale attacks against a variety of civilian and military targets were carried out by all factions. For example, on 3 January 2018, a suicide bombing in a mosque during morning prayer in Gaboru, Borno state near the border with Cameroon, killed more than ten people. On Easter Sunday, 1 April 2018, unidentified fighters attempted to enter the capital of Borno state, Maiduguri. After being repelled by military forces, they attacked nearby villages, killing at least 25 civilians and one soldier. In addition, the practice observed in 2017 of using young women as suicide bombers continued in 2018. In one occurrence on 30 March, four teenage girls detonated themselves near Maiduguri, killing an additional woman.

The split between the two major factions of *Boko Haram*, which occurred in August 2016, continued in 2018. The faction that was recognised by the IS leadership as the group's 'West Africa province' continued to be active in the Lake Chad region and along the border between Nigeria and Niger. The *Boko Haram* faction led by Abubakar Shekau subsisted mainly in the border region with Cameroon.

Largely geographically separated—only potentially overlapping in south-central Borno—the two factions competed through their propaganda productions, in which both claimed to be part of IS. In videos published in 2018, IS West Africa province showed how the areas controlled by it in the Lake Chad region provided local residents with security and prosperity, which the group claimed was the reason for the global enemies of Islam to attack it. The Shekau faction published videos that used the IS label followed by the group's formal name adopted in 2015, *Jama'at Ahl al-Sunna lil-Da'wa wal-Jihad* ('group of Sunni people for preaching and jihad'). A topic emphasised by the Shekau faction was the implementation of the shari'a. IS West Africa province videos consistently used Arabic language or subtitles and were in line with the style and quality of IS videos from other regions. By contrast, Abubakar Shekau, in a video speech allegedly recorded in July 2018, spoke in Hausa without Arabic subtitles, suggesting that his intended audience was local. Whereas it was not always possible to attribute specific attacks to a particular faction with certainty, in general, IS West Africa province focused on military targets, whereas the Shekau faction is notorious for targeting civilians and, in particular, using female suicide bombers.

IS West Africa province came under military pressure in 2018. According to Nigerian military sources, several hundreds of fighters surrendered to authorities in Niger and Nigeria. In early January, hundreds of people held captive on islands in Lake Chad were able to flee to Monguno, reportedly as a result of military strikes against the militia.

IS West Africa province has nominally been headed by Abu Mus'ab al-Barnawi, a son of *Boko Haram* founder Muhammad Yusuf. The actual leader of the faction, however, was said to be Mamman Nur, the suspected

mastermind of the 2011 attack on the UN headquarters in Abuja, who reportedly also was behind the recognition of the faction by IS. According to local media reports, Nur was killed on 21 August 2018 by his own fighters, allegedly because they thought him to be too compromising, as for example when releasing a large number of abducted school girls in March 2018 without apparent concessions from the Nigerian government³¹. In late February, more than 100 girls had been abducted in a raid by IS West Africa province on a girls' boarding school in Dapchi, Yobe state.

This possible change in leadership seems to have resulted in an increase in violent activities by IS West Africa province. The group attacked Nigerian military bases on several occasions between September and the end of the year. For example, on 18 November, at least 40 Nigerian soldiers were killed in an attack on a military base in Metele, Borno state, claimed by IS West Africa province. On 28 December, IS West Africa province seized the fishing town of Baga. The attackers burnt down a naval base on the shores of Lake Chad and took weapons from a military camp. In addition, in September and October, respectively, the group released videos showing the killing of two midwives working for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), who had been abducted in March in Rann, Borno State. The group declared that the Nigerian government had refused to meet its demands.

³¹ Hamza Idris and Ibrahim Sawab, 'Factional Boko Haram leader Mamman Nur killed by own fighters', *Daily Trust*, 14 September 2018, <https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/factional-boko-haram-leader-mamman-nur-killed-by-own-fighters.html>.

Somalia and East Africa

In Somalia, *Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin* (HSM, 'mujahid youth movement'), a formal member of *al-Qaeda*, despite an intensive campaign of airstrikes targeting it, maintained its control over large stretches of land outside urban centres in the south-west of the country. It financed its activities by taxing and extorting local populations and businesses in territories under its control and beyond, including in Mogadishu. The continuing food crisis in Somalia was further aggravated by HSM's refusal to cooperate with humanitarian agencies. People suspected of such cooperation were accused of espionage. In territories under its control, HSM is said to have forced parents to hand over their children for indoctrination and military training. The group continued meting out harsh punishments to local residents under the pretence of implementing Islamic law.

HSM carried out a multitude of large-scale attacks predominantly on Somali security forces and forces of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) across the country. In Mogadishu, political institutions were the predominant targets, including the Somali presidential palace, which was attacked on 23 February and 14 July, killing at least 45 and 25 people, respectively. On 7 July, an HSM attack on the compound housing the


Somali interior and security ministries killed 20 people. Many of the attacks combined suicide bombings and armed assault.

On 1 October, HSM claimed responsibility for a VBIED attack on an EU armoured convoy carrying Italian military trainers in Mogadishu, killing two civilians.

HSM attacks also caused high numbers of civilian deaths. On 9 November, for example, VBIED explosions killed 53 people in Mogadishu. Two explosions occurred at a junction and a third near the Somalia Criminal Investigation Division and a hotel. The fourth explosion happened when emergency services arrived at the location. The attackers reportedly wore uniforms.

In 2018, tensions between HSM and an IS affiliate, led by Abdulqader Mu'min and said to be composed of about 200 fighters continued, with IS trying to extract funds from businesses already extorted by HSM. In mid-December 2018, the situation escalated into open violence. On 16 December, IS in Somalia claimed responsibility for killing 14 HSM fighters in the north-eastern Puntland region, alleging that the latter were preparing to attack it. In response, HSM accused IS of creating dissension among jihadists in the country and ordered its fighters to eliminate the 'disease' of IS in Somalia.

HSM-linked networks continued perpetrating small-scale terrorist




attacks in neighbouring countries, in particular those contributing to AMISOM. In the latter case, such attacks aimed to exert pressure on governments to withdraw their troops from Somalia. In addition, HSM sought new recruits and solicit funding by escalating tensions resulting from local grievances. Kenya, for example, suffered several assassinations in Muslim-majority regions along the coast and in the northeast bordering Somalia, the targets of which were mostly individuals identified with Kenya's political system, such as members of the Christian community and teachers. In contrast, since the 2015 attack on a Garissa University College, HSM had not perpetrated a major terrorist attack in the Kenyan highlands. This changed in 2019 with the attack on a hotel in Nairobi on 15 January³².

³² On 15 January 2019, a terrorist attack combining explosive devices and firearms targeted a hotel complex in Nairobi, Kenya. The attackers detonated an IED at the parking lot and carried out a suicide bombing at the hotel reception area. HSM claimed responsibility for the attack.

South Asia

Afghanistan continued to experience massive violence in 2018 with numbers of civilian casualties increasing, compared to 2017. On 20 January 2018, for example, an armed attack was committed on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul. The perpetrators were said to be six armed *Taleban* fighters who were killed by Afghan security forces. A statement claiming responsibility for the attack was issued on the official homepage of the *Taleban*. The attack claimed the lives of more than 30 people, including one German citizen.

Parliamentary elections, originally scheduled for October 2016 and initially postponed to 7 July 2018, were finally held on 20 October. Security concerns and political disputes prevented the elections from taking place in some parts of the country.



In the run-up to the elections, the *Taleban* reportedly killed 10 candidates running for parliament and carried out multiple attacks on election rallies and candidates. For example, on 17 October, a candidate was assassinated when a bomb hidden in a sofa detonated in his campaign office. The *Taleban* warned teachers and students not to participate in elections or allow their schools to be used as polling centres.

On 18 October, the heads of Kandahar police and intelligence were killed in an insider attack, when a bodyguard

opened fire after a meeting with US military. In its claim of responsibility, the *Taleban* stated that both the Afghan and US officials had been the targets of the attack. As a result of the assassination, elections in Kandahar were postponed by a week.

In 2018, the *Taleban* continued attempting to establish themselves as political actors. In a statement released in mid-August, they urged direct negotiations with the USA, thereby bypassing the Afghan government, to achieve a withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan.

In June, the *Taleban* announced a three-day ceasefire on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr, after a unilateral ceasefire for the period had been declared by the Afghan government. An offer by the Afghan government to prolong the ceasefire, however, was rejected. On 16 June, a VBIED detonated in Nangarhar province at a gathering that comprised *Taleban* and Afghan forces, killing at least 20 people. The attack was claimed by IS Khorasan province through an *Amaq News* statement.

IS Khorasan province continued to hold some territory in the eastern Nangarhar province on the border with Pakistan, where it had emerged publicly in 2015. The group also claimed responsibility for a substantial number of large-scale attacks in urban areas across the country in 2018. Most of these attacks targeted civilians, including an attack on a voter registration centre in Kabul on 22 April, which killed at least 57 people; two coordinated suicide attacks in Kabul on 30 April, killing at least 29 people, including ten journalists; an explosive and firearm attack on a midwife training centre in Jalalabad on 30 July; and a suicide attack on 5 September on a sports club in Kabul, which killed 26 people, among others. On 15 July, a suicide attack targeting Rural Development Ministry staff was claimed by IS,

which alleged that 60 people had been killed and that French nationals were among the wounded.

IS Khorasan province also continued targeting Shi'is and other Muslim communities. On 3 August, two suicide bombers wearing burqas attacked a Shi'i mosque in Gardez, Paktia province, killing at least 39 people. On 15 August, a suicide bomber attacked Shi'i university students in Kabul, killing 34 people. On 20 November, at least 50 people were killed, when a suicide attacker detonated his bomb amid a religious gathering marking the birthday of Prophet Muhammad in Kabul. No group claimed responsibility for the latter attack.

In addition, a self-proclaimed IS Khorasan province commander in Jawzjan province in western Afghanistan, who had pledged allegiance to IS in 2015 after being expelled by the *Taleban*, managed to defend his faction's control over two districts in the province despite several attempts by local *Taleban* forces to evict them in early 2018. The IS commander was killed on 5 April in an airstrike in neighbouring Faryab province. His faction, which was said to contain 300 to 400 fighters, was at first able to find a replacement but was eventually eliminated by the *Taleban* in early August 2018 after a month of fighting.

3/

Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism



Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist attacks occurred exclusively in France, Spain and the UK

Dissident Republican groups continued to pose a significant threat in Northern Ireland

Separatist terrorist activity in Spain remained at low levels

The number of attacks by ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorists in the European Union (EU) declined significantly from 137 in 2017 to 83 in 2018. As for previous years, attacks occurred exclusively in France, Spain and the UK. In addition, law enforcement agencies in six EU Member States arrested a total of 30 individuals on charges related to ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist activity.

UK – Dissident Republican (DR) groups

In 2018, Dissident Republican (DR) groups continued to pose a significant threat to security in Northern Ireland. The threat principally emanated from the New Irish Republican Army (NIRA), the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), *Arm na Poblachta* (ANP, Army of the Republic) and *Óglaigh na hÉireann* (ONH, Warriors of Ireland) which split into two factions. All groups remained opposed to the current peace process and continued to be firmly committed to the use of violence to achieve their objective of a united Ireland.

DR groups maintained their access to a range of firearms and explosives and kept planning and executing

attacks, albeit with hampered capability compared to previous years. The attacks involved firearms or improvised explosive devices (IEDs), such as pipe bombs, but the use of larger and potentially more destructive devices was not observed in 2018. Police, corrections officers and members of the armed forces remained primary targets. However, there was just one actual attack against police in 2018, using firearms.

Members of DR groups continued to be involved in organised criminal activities, including drug dealing, extortion, fuel laundering³³ and murder. DR groups also sought to exert control in their own communities by continuing to commit extremely violent paramilitary-style attacks.

Spain – Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) and Resistencia Galega

Separatist terrorist activity in Spain remained at low levels in 2018, following a declining course since

³³ 'Fuel laundering' is removing the dye from low-price dyed fuel and selling it illegally at the higher price of undyed fuel.



2013. *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* (ETA, Basque Fatherland and Liberty) has not committed any terrorist attacks since August 2009 and in May 2018 it released a statement in which it announced its decision to disband and dismantle all its structures. Spanish authorities, however, continued to carry out operations against the group. In 2018, three weapons and explosives caches were discovered and an investigation into documents received from France led to the solving of 300 cases of ETA-related attacks. In contrast, *Resistencia Galega* maintained its commitment to armed struggle to achieve its ends in 2018. The group, however, has not committed terrorist attacks since October 2014 and its leadership remained under pressure to avoid arrest.

In 2018, violent separatist activism in Spain mainly manifested itself in the form of street violence, predominantly against communication and transportation infrastructure. While this caused minor damage, no casualties were reported. The main perpetrator of these attacks was the *Ernai* group, which is related to ETA and has links to Basque radical left-wing parties. The aims of *Ernai* and the linked parties remained the establishment of an independent Basque state and total amnesty for imprisoned ETA members.

Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK)

In 2018, no terrorist attacks by the *Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan* (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party) were reported in the EU. Nevertheless, a number of EU Member States pointed out that the PKK maintained an apparatus in Europe, which provided logistical and financial support to *Hezen Parastina Gel* (HPG, People's Defense Forces) and carried out propaganda and recruitment activities. In early 2018 for example, two individuals were convicted of being leading members of PKK structures in Germany.


To sustain the organisation running, PKK members and sympathisers in the EU raised funds through the annual *kampanya* (fundraising campaign) and collecting membership fees, selling publications and extorting Kurdish business owners. In this context, a Belgian court convicted four people in 2018 of participating in a *kampanya*. Turkish authorities also reported that PKK members were involved in various forms of serious organised crime and particularly in drug smuggling and dealing, migrant smuggling, trafficking in human beings and money laundering.

In 2018, the situation in Turkey and Syria—in particular the Turkish intervention in Afrin, Syria at the beginning of the year—impacted Kurdish activism in Europe, resulting in a number of protest events. These were largely peaceful, despite some sporadic clashes with Turkish counter-protesters. Tensions between Kurds and nationalist Turks in the EU generally increased. In Germany, there was a significant rise in the number of offences against Turkish facilities (associations, mosques, shops etc.). In March 2018, a mosque in Lauffen, Baden-Württemberg, was subject to an arson attack and six PKK-affiliated individuals were arrested on suspicion of being involved. Websites linked to the PKK described the attack as an act of vengeance for Afrin.

In this context, ties between left-wing extremist and Kurdish organisations grew stronger in several European countries, reinforcing existing solidarity between the groups. It was reported that groups and individuals of the far left-wing scene joined the Kurdish activists in their protests.


attacks arrests

Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of arrests for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism 2014-2018.



Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of suspects arrested for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism in EU Member States in 2018.

attacks arrests



4/

Left-wing and anarchist terrorism



Left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks were reported exclusively by Greece, Italy and Spain

The use of IEDs with low risk of apprehension was preferred

The number of adherents of anarchist extremism appears to have remained stable

Anarchists justified their violent acts by referring to police activities, solidarity with imprisoned terrorists, political and societal issues

Terrorist attacks and suspects arrested

In 2018, a total of 19 completed, failed and foiled attacks related to left-wing and anarchist terrorism occurred in the European Union (EU) – a slight decrease for the second consecutive year (27 in 2016, 24 in 2017). The number of arrests remained on the same level (36 in 2017, 34 in 2018). All attacks and the vast majority of arrests were reported by Greece, Italy and Spain. The three countries continued to be the epicentre of left-wing and anarchist terrorist activity in the EU.


As in previous years, terrorist groups active in the aforementioned countries exclusively belonged to the anarchist sphere and demonstrated similar ideological and operational traits. Anarchist terrorists mainly used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in attacks with a low risk of apprehension. They continued to select their targets among those they traditionally consider as enemies, such as the police, the judiciary, the (far) right-wing parties and the media. The current political agenda, such as the issue of migration, also played a role in their target selection.

In 2018, there appeared to be no direct contact or operational coordination between anarchist terrorists in Greece, Italy and Spain, apart from

online expressions of solidarity. The Internet remained the main platform for claiming responsibility, spreading propaganda and attempting to internationalise their scope. Despite their ideology's limited public appeal, the number of adherents of anarchist extremism appears to have remained stable.

In Greece, no notable change in the frequency and intensity of the anarchist terrorist activity occurred in 2018. Anarchist militants carried out six attacks and a total of 20 individuals were arrested. Nineteen of the arrestees were involved in a ring that financially supported imprisoned members of terrorist groups: they used fake identity cards to perform transactions via money transfer value systems and, thus, provide the funds to the recipients.

The six attacks that occurred in 2018 in Greece were carried out against a range of targets including the police, the judiciary and the media. On 26 February, for example, the previously unknown *Enoples Epanastatikes Dymameis* (Armed Revolutionary Forces) group attacked a police station in Athens with a hand grenade, causing the injury of a passer-by. Judicial authorities were targeted on two occasions: on 24 March members of the *Kiklos Assimetrou Mitropolitikou Polemou/Federazione Anarchica Informale – Fronte Rivoluzionario Internazionale* (Circle of Asymmetric Metropolitan Warfare/



Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of arrests for left-wing and anarchist terrorism from 2014 to 2018.

Informal Anarchist Federation – International Revolutionary Front) placed an IED outside the premises of the Athens Public Prosecution Office; and on 13 November, an IED that did not explode was placed by unknown perpetrators in a motorcycle that was parked outside the residence of a high-ranking prosecutor in Athens. Members of *Omada Laikon Agoniston* (Group of Popular Fighters) used an IED to attack the headquarters of a TV station in Athens and damaged the façade of the building. Of note was also the explosion outside a church in central Athens on 27 December that resulted in the injury of two people and for which the *Individualidades Teniendo a lo Salvaje* (Individuals Tending to the Wild) group claimed responsibility with a text published on the Internet.

In Italy, anarchist terrorist groups and individuals continued their activities following known patterns. The 10 attacks that occurred in 2018 were consistent with the *modi operandi* and intensity seen over the previous five years. The *Federazione Anarchica Informale/ Fronte Rivoluzionario Internazionale* (FAI/FRI, Informal

Anarchist Federation/International Revolutionary Front) is considered to be the most dangerous group. It is infamous for its campaigns against Italian and foreign targets, predominantly using IEDs, including victim-operated IEDs (VOIED, e.g. parcel bombs). It pursues an anarchist agenda with a view to internationalise its activity and its members tend to claim responsibility for the attacks using various ‘cell’ names. For example, the *Haris Hatzimihelakis Cell/ black international (1881/2018)*³⁴ claimed responsibility for an attack on the headquarters of the Lega political party in Villorba (near Treviso) on 12 August 2018. The perpetrators apparently attempted to cause fatalities among the police by placing two IEDs, one of which was scheduled to explode after the arrival of the first responding officers. An arson attack damaging the entrance of the robotics laboratories of the Italian Technology Institute on 24 December 2018 was claimed in the name of the *FAI/FRI Immediate Action Group*.





³⁴ Haris Hatzimihelakis is a convicted member of the Greek anarchist terrorist group Conspiracy Cells of Fire/ FAI/FRI.

Other anarchist terrorist groups in Italy targeted premises belonging to parties and groups from the right and far right of the political spectrum. This was reportedly due to the position of these parties on the issue of migration. On 20 February, unknown perpetrators threw two improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) – in this case Molotov cocktails – at the entrance of the office of the right-leaning group *Azione Universitaria*. A group calling itself *Brigata Belgrado Pedrini* claimed responsibility for the attack by posting a message online. On 13 October, a rudimentary IED caused damage to the façade of the offices of the Lega political party in Ala (near Trento). Although no group claimed responsibility for the attack, the *modus operandi* pointed to anarchist militants based in Trento. On 7 May, an IED exploded at the entrance of the building of the *CasaPound* far-right political party in Trento. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.

In Spain, left-wing and anarchist terrorist activity remained low in 2018, a fact reflected in the number of both attacks and arrests. Three arson attacks were attributed to left-

Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of suspects arrested for **left-wing and anarchist terrorism** in EU Member States in 2018.

attacks  arrests 



wing and anarchist militant groups or individuals, all of which were carried out against private companies. In addition, the three arrests carried out by the Spanish authorities were related to left-wing terrorist activity outside Spain, in execution of international arrest warrants.

The Syrian issue remained relevant to the extreme left-wing and anarchist milieu. The conflict has in the past attracted a small number of European left-wing and anarchist extremists who travelled to the country in order to fight alongside Kurdish militias. The impact of their participation in combat activities on EU security has yet to be assessed. In Slovakia and Czechia, left-wing and anarchist extremists staged demonstrations outside the premises of Turkish diplomatic missions in protest against Turkish policies in northern Syria.

Left-wing terrorist groups in the EU appear to have ceased their operational activities. In Turkey, however, groups such as the

Marxist-Leninist *Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi* (DHKP-C, Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front) retained their intent and capability to carry out violent attacks. In 2018, authorities in Turkey arrested numerous DHKP-C members and seized large amounts of explosives and weapons in a number of police operations. DHKP-C members remained present in several EU countries to provide logistical support for operations on Turkish soil and/or to avoid being arrested in their home country. In Spain, for example, two individuals were arrested in execution of international arrest warrants issued by Turkey on charges related to their participation in DHKP-C.

Violent extremist activities

In 2018, no significant change occurred regarding the violent activities of left-wing and anarchist extremists. Groups and individuals of

the anarchist movement continued to be more violent than those of the extreme left-wing and pose a threat to the public order of several EU Member States. Their activity was consistent with trends observed across Europe. Namely, they formed unstructured groups operating in and around specific urban areas; participated in rallies and protests during which they attempted violent acts; collected funds for imprisoned like-minded people; and occasionally carried out attacks using IIDs.

Anarchists justified their violent acts by referring to typical themes of their ideology, such as police activities, squat evictions and solidarity with imprisoned terrorists. Trending political and societal issues were also used as pretexts for launching attacks. Migration continued to be central in the anarchist rhetoric, in particular in conjunction with the rivalry between anarchists and the far right. In this context, left-wing and anarchist extremists tended to become more



violent when confronted with right-wing extremists in counter-protests and rallies.

In addition to targeting members of the far right, anarchists also attacked law enforcement premises and personnel; banks and other financial institutions; public property; and private businesses. The attacks largely occurred during large demonstrations and rallies, in which anarchist extremists used the crowd as a cover in order to carry out violent acts. These included throwing Molotov cocktails and stones as well as physical assaults against the police. In France, left-wing and anarchist extremists exploited the fact that police forces were concentrated in Paris due to the *gilets jaunes* protests and carried out violent activities in provincial cities with smaller police presence. In Germany, a number of violent incidents occurred when law enforcement cleared the Hambacher Forst forest area that was occupied by members

of the left-wing and anarchist movement. Several police officers were injured and numerous protesters were arrested in the course of the clearing. In addition, an increase in the number of criminal offences, such as arson and damage, was recorded in the country and is believed to be linked to the specific police operation.

Left-wing and anarchist extremists made use of the Hambacher Forst as a setting for international networking. Dutch activists, for example, visited the area in March 2018 and received ideological and operational training. Furthermore, members of the violent anti-fascist movement were reported to be cooperating in the Nordic countries, with Swedish, Norwegian and Danish activists coordinating activities in Sweden. Likewise, Greek left-wing and anarchist extremist groups and individuals continued to interact extensively with the international anarchist community and maintained links with members of other organisations outside Greece.

Left-wing and anarchist extremists in the EU also sought out high-profile events with extensive media coverage. In September 2018, for instance, they staged attacks against the police during the Summit of EU Heads of State and Government in Salzburg (Austria). Furthermore, a number of protests took place in Brussels (Belgium) during EU summits.

5/

Right-wing terrorism



The right-wing extremism scene varies significantly between and within EU Member States

One right-wing terrorist attack was reported in 2018 in the EU

Escalation of extreme right-wing sentiments across Europe resulted in increase of arrests

Despite the increase of extreme right-wing sentiments across Europe, only one right-wing terrorist attack in the EU was reported in 2018. In Italy, a man carried out a shooting spree on 3 February in Macerata. During the attack, which lasted for two hours, he wounded six people whom he thought were Africans. The suspect was charged with multiple counts of attempted murder. The incident occurred after the murder of an Italian teenager, in connection with which three Nigerian suspects were arrested. In 2017, the perpetrator had run unsuccessfully for local elections for the anti-migrant *Lega Norte* (Northern League).

A total of 44 people were arrested in Czechia, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands on suspicion of offences related to right-wing terrorism. Attack preparation and attempts to commit a terrorist act were the most frequently reported offences. Additionally, 15 individuals were charged in Slovakia with right-wing extremist (RWE) activities. The suspects created a formal group called *Felvideki Harcosok* (Hungarian for 'Upland Warriors') and displayed modified fascist symbols during sports events on flags, banners and tattoos. The group expressed hatred towards ethnical minorities via social media.


While the vast majority of right-wing extremist groups across the EU have not resorted to violence, they nevertheless help entrench a climate of fear and animosity against minority groups. Such a climate, built on xenophobia, anti-Semitic, Islamophobic and anti-immigration sentiments, may lower the threshold for some radicalised individuals to use violence against persons and property of minority groups.

The right-wing extremism scene varies significantly between and within EU Member States. Factions include National Socialist and neo-Nazi groups, revisionist individuals and groups, racist and anti-Semitic groups and skinhead and right-wing extremist hooligan groups. In Czechia, for example, the right-wing extremist scene is mainly represented by the *Generace Identity* (Generation of Identity) movement and the newly established *Národní a sociální fronta* (National and Social Front). Paramilitary groups and so-called home-defence groups were also active in Czechia, but their activities were in decline.

The right-wing extremist scene in Germany is characterised by a high affinity for weapons and explosives and is composed of neo-Nazi elements, *Kameradschaften* (comradeships), loose networks

attacks arrests

Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of arrests for right-wing terrorism from 2014 to 2018.



of right-wing extremists from different sub-cultures, the so-called 'intellectual right' and right-wing populist/extremist political parties. Notable examples include the *Revolution Chemnitz* group and the *Reichsbürgerbewegung* (Reich Citizens movement). Issues related to immigration policies and offences allegedly committed by migrants repeatedly mobilised significant numbers of people from the right-wing spectrum. On 26 August 2018, a German national was fatally stabbed during violent clashes in Chemnitz, Saxony. A Syrian and an Iraqi national, both asylum seekers, were arrested as a result. In reaction to the stabbing, demonstrations and vigils were held in Chemnitz, Saxony and throughout Germany. Two weeks later, a group of at least 15 right-wing extremists, including members of the *Revolution Chemnitz* group, attacked several individuals from a migrant background. In February 2018 a Reichsbürger fired several shots at an accommodation for asylum seekers in Kaiserslautern and put up considerable resistance at his arrest, injuring two police officers.

Migration is also a major theme for Italian right-wing extremist groups. The presence of refugee centres in Italy and the influx of immigrants fuels right-wing extremism in the country.


In the Netherlands, perceived Islamisation of the country and loss of Dutch identity are important drivers for right-wing extremists. Known groups include *Pegida* (from the German *Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes*, Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident), *Voorpost* (Forepost) and *Rechts in verzet* (Right-Wing Resistance). However, the right-wing extremist scene in the Netherlands is fragmented and has remained relatively small, with only one group, the anti-Semitic and anti-democratic *Erkenbrand*, reported to have increased membership numbers in 2018.

Right-wing extremists in the Netherlands increasingly encouraged and glorified violence against Muslims and the government and the majority of protests and demonstrations targeted mosques. However, there have been no reports of violent

attacks in 2018. Some groups appear to have gained enough confidence to organise demonstrations in traditionally left-wing cities such as Amsterdam and Nijmegen, increasing the likelihood of clashes with far-left counter-demonstrators.

The Netherlands reported that some Dutch groups, e.g. *Pegida*, maintain relationships with partner organisations in Belgium, Germany and the UK and participate in each other's demonstrations. Similar international contacts between right-wing extremists are also seen elsewhere in the EU. The Austrian *Identitäre Bewegung* (Identitarian Movement) collaborated with its counterparts in Europe with the aim of countering their perceived Islamisation of the Western world. In the same way, Polish right-wing extremist groups are focused on developing contacts with peer groups abroad. In Portugal, *Blood and Honour*, *Portugal Hammer Skins* and the recently emerged neo-Nazi political party *Nova Ordem Social* (New Social Order) are active at both national and international levels. Moreover, the right-wing extremist music scene in

Number of failed, foiled, or completed attacks and number of suspects arrested for right-wing terrorism in EU Member States in 2018.



various EU Member States attracted followers from across the EU and beyond.

In Sweden, the right-wing extremist organisation *Nordiska Motståndsrörelsen* (NMR, Nordic Resistance Movement) remained the most prevalent organisation in the milieu. It is a pan-Nordic movement and has affiliates in Denmark, Finland and Norway, although the NMR's main base and leadership is located in Sweden. Since 2015, the NMR has pursued political ambitions and in September 2018 fielded candidates for the Swedish general elections. The organisation failed to gain any seats on the national, regional or local level. During the past few years, individuals outside the traditional right-wing extremist scene who share a common xenophobic ideology – whilst not committing ideologically motivated crimes – have become more prevalent in Swedish society. This has manifested itself, *inter alia*, in the increased popularity of alternative online news sites and the formation of

a loosely formed alt-right movement. The majority of activism in support of these ideas is legal and Internet-based.

A number of right-wing extremists were convicted in Sweden of ideologically motivated crimes, mainly physical assault, property damage, illegal possession of narcotics and offences against the Knives Act³⁵. There are also reported ties between the right-wing extremist scene and outlaw motorcycle gangs, which in turn are involved in organised crime in Sweden.

The UK also reported high levels of rhetoric promoting violence and terrorist tactics in right-wing extremist circles. The last two years have seen a shift to right-wing extremist groups attracting a much younger demographic. In September 2018, two 15-year-olds, who were assessed to hold right-wing extremist views, were arrested on suspicion of

being involved in the commission, preparation and instigation of terrorist acts. More recently, in December 2018, a 17-year-old linked to the Sonnenkrieg Division³⁶ pleaded guilty to two counts of encouraging terrorism.

Switzerland reported that right-wing extremists maintain a low profile in the country and that very few incidents have been recorded (potentially due to under-reporting).

In Greece, the main targets of right-wing extremists were anarchist/anti-authoritarian individuals and groups. In 2018, *modi operandi* included the use of low-impact improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) against premises associated with individuals with leftist/anarchist ideologies.

³⁵ Swedish law prohibits the carrying of knives in public areas.

³⁶ Assessed to follow a similar ideology to the far-right group National Action (UK).

6/ Single-issue terrorism

In 2018, one attack was classified as single-issue terrorism in the European Union (EU). It targeted a butcher's shop in Athens (Greece) in late December. The attack was perpetrated with the use of an improvised incendiary device (IID) and an animal-rights extremist group named *Mavroprasini Midenistes* (Black-green Nihilists) claimed responsibility for the attack. This was the first single-issue terrorist attack reported in the EU since 2014.

The threat from single-issue activism continued to be predominantly related to animal rights and environmentalism and was largely limited to online campaigns and non-violent demonstrations by

decentralised groups without strong cohesion. More dynamic actions included the blocking of access to buildings or infrastructure (e.g. animal farms or mines); freeing animals; and threats against land owners. In the UK, the animal rights movement also targeted supermarkets supplying meat and dairy products, clothing chains using fur and leather and travel agencies involved in the transportation of animals. In addition, a number of minor violent acts occurred in 2018, mainly involving criminal damage to butcher shops and abattoirs, wind turbines and private businesses involved in infrastructure construction.



For 2018 the first single-issue terrorist attack in the EU since 2014 was reported

Single-issue activism continued to be largely limited to online campaigns and non-violent demonstrations by decentralised groups

Annexes

annex 1

Amendments to National Legislation on Terrorism in 2018

Austria

On 1 October 2018 a number of provisions, which align the Austrian legislation with the requirements of Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, came into force. Most notably, the criminal offence of ‘travelling for purpose of terrorism’ was introduced as Section 278g of the Austrian Criminal Code. Furthermore, a number of cybercrime offences were added to the list of possible terrorist offences in Section 278c of the Austrian Criminal Code. The maximum punishment for all varieties of the offence ‘membership in a terrorist association’ was set at 15 years of imprisonment. Finally, a specific group of victims of terrorist attacks was established and invested with rights slightly exceeding the usual victim rights in the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.

Finland

A number of amendments were made to Chapter 34a of the Criminal Code of Finland, which concerns terrorist offences. All amendments were required by the Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA. The main amendments, which entered into force on 15 November 2018, include the following:

Section 1 on offences committed with terrorist intent was broadened to include a provision on aggravated damage to data, aggravated interference with communications and aggravated interference with a data system (Paragraph 4). These offences will be punished by an imprisonment sentence of four months to seven years. A new Section 1a was included on offences involving the production, purchase, possession and other listed activities related to radiological weapons committed with terrorist intent. These offences will be punished by an imprisonment sentence of four months to eight years. Other provisions were, consequently, modified to reflect these amendments.

The provision on training for the commission of a terrorist offence (Section 4b) was amended with the criminalisation of self-studies. The restrictions on the offender and the destination in the provision on travelling for the purpose to commit a terrorist offence (Section 5b), were abolished. As a result, it is now an offence to travel to another country with terrorist intent. It is also criminalised to return or to travel to Finland with terrorist intent.

A new Section 5c was introduced which criminalises the promotion of travelling for the purpose to commit a terrorist offence. Such offences are subject to a fine or a term of imprisonment up to one year. Financing of such promotion was criminalised with amendments made to the provision on financing of terrorism (Section 5).

Lithuania

Amendments to Articles 250, 250 and 252 of the Lithuanian Criminal Code were changed by the Law of the Seimas (Lithuanian Parliament) of the Republic of Lithuania No. XIII-1682. These amendments entered into force on 12 December 2018. Most importantly, Article 250 (2) was reworded and a new fragment concerning electronic data was added.

A new paragraph, Paragraph 75, concerning information promoting or inciting terrorist crimes was added to Article 2 of the Law on Provision of Information to the Public. Parts of Article 19 (1) concerning information not to be published were rephrased. Changes were also introduced in Articles 22, 31 and 33, to make reference to a relation with organised criminal groups in the past.

Changes were further made to the Law on Public Procurement Conducted in the Area of Defence and Security. Article 34, which concerns the conditions under which suppliers’ participation in procurement is restricted and forbidden, was changed to include persons who in the last five years were convicted for a terrorist crime or a crime related to terrorist activity.

Article 26 of the Law on Management Companies of Collective Investment Undertakings Tailored for Professional Investors was amended to include the possibility to prevent a person who violated the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing and was given an administrative penalty (or other measure of influence) within less than

three years, from being a member of the management or supervisory body of such undertakings. Similarly, amendments were made to Article 12 of the Law on Collective Investment Undertakings for Informed Investors, which concerns the acquisition, transfer of qualified statutory capital and (or) voting rights and requirements for owners of qualified share of statutory capital and (or) voting rights.

With regard to the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, changes were made to Articles 2 and 14 (Enhanced customer due diligence), changing the former reference to 'politically exposed natural persons' to 'politically vulnerable (affected) persons'. Further changes were introduced to Articles 2, 15 and 25 of the same law.

Article 33 of the Law on Administration of Taxes, was changed to include a reference to the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing regarding the notion of the 'beneficiary of benefit'. A new paragraph to Article 12 of the Law on State-Guaranteed Legal Aid was added to include the victims of criminal acts of terrorism to the 'Persons Eligible for Secondary Legal Aid Regardless of the Property and Income'. Articles 10 ('Loyalty to the State of Lithuania') and Article 59 ('Compensation in cases of death or health impairment of an officer or cadet') of the Internal Service Statute of the Republic of Lithuania were reworded. Article 10 now provides that those who 'participate or participated in activities of terrorist organisation or terrorist group [...] shall be deemed disloyal. Article 171 (1) of the Law on Collective Investment Undertakings,

which establishes the grounds and the procedure for applying measures of influence, now indicates that such measures shall be applied in the event that a management company or investment company fails to comply with the requirements of the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing.

Amendments were also made to the Law on the Protection of Objects of Importance to Ensuring National Security. Persons related to international terrorist organisations (Article 11) and persons who have participated in the activities of a terrorist organisation or a terrorist group (Article 17) are considered not to be in compliance with interests of national security or may not hold the positions specified in the 'List of Positions'.

Finally, changes were introduced in the Decision 'On Implementation of the Law on Radiation Protection' (section 1.3) and in the Schedule for the Procedure of Establishing Threat Level of a Terror Act, Announcement Thereof and Readiness (sections 2, 10, 11 and annex 1).

Luxembourg

Through the Law of 27 June 2018, amendments were made to the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), to the Law of 30 May 2005 on the protection of private life in the field of electronic communications and to the Law of 27 February 2011 on electronic communications networks and services.

Article 39(1) of the CCP was modified to include a possibility to extend (with the authorisation of an investigating judge) the initial retention period of

24 hours, with an additional retention period of 24 hours for persons suspected of crimes against the security of the State, terrorism or financing of terrorism, before being brought before an investigating judge.

Article 65 of the CCP was amended to allow house searches at any time of the day or night for terrorist or terrorist financing offences and crimes against the security of the State; for all other offences, and except where there is an *in flagranti* situation (*en cas d'infraction flagrante*), searches can only be conducted upon order of an investigating judge between 6:30 and 24:00. Two new sections (Livre premier, Titre II, Chapitre XI et XII) were introduced to allow the judicial police to use a pseudonym in electronic communications.

Slovakia

As of 1 July 2018, a new definition of terrorism was introduced in the Slovak Criminal Code. The previous definition was redrafted and new provisions on terrorism-related acts were added. Such acts include participation in terrorist activities, terrorism financing and travelling for the purpose of terrorism, for which specific definitions were laid down.

Terrorism-related definitions can now be found in Sections 419 (Terrorist Attack), 419b (Certain Forms of Participation in Terrorism), 419c (Terrorism financing) and 419d (Travel for the Purpose of Terrorism) of the Criminal Code.

Sweden

By amendments in Swedish legislation, which entered in to force on 1 September 2018, there has been a widening of the scope of several criminal statutes in the area of terrorism. The new legislation implies *inter alia* the following.

The provision in Section 3 of the Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist Offences (2003:148), the Terrorist Offences Act – which states which acts constitute terrorist offences under certain Circumstances under Section 2 of the same Act – was expanded to essentially also cover gross breach of data.

The penal provision in the Recruitment Act on training was expanded and a special criminal liability was introduced for ‘self-study’.

A penal provision on travel in Section 5b of the Recruitment Act was expanded to also cover travel to countries of citizenship (not Sweden).

The penal provisions on financing of terrorism were expanded to cover not only financing of particularly serious crime, but also financing of complicity in particularly serious crime or attempts, preparation or conspiracy to commit such crime.

Finally, the new legislation also implies that jurisdiction was expanded in certain cases.

The purpose of the legislation is to ensure that Sweden has legislation consistent with the Directive (EU) 2017/541 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision

2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA and the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.

United Kingdom

The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act (SAMLA) 2018 achieved Royal Assent on 23rd March 2018. It will enable the UK to continue to implement UN sanctions regimes and to use sanctions to meet national security and foreign policy objectives. This will allow anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures to be kept up to date, help to protect the security and prosperity of the UK and continue to align the UK with international standards.

It provides a framework for allowing, where appropriate, sanctions currently implemented through the EU to take effect in the UK. This includes counter-terrorism sanctions. It also provides for the UK to exercise sanctions powers autonomously, replacing the powers contained in the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010.

SAMLA is currently divided into three parts:

- › Part 1 (sections 1 – 48) provides powers to create sanctions regimes and contains procedures relating to the review of sanctions.
- › Part 2 (sections 49 to 51) provides powers to create anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regulations and contains provisions relating to registers of beneficial owners of overseas entities and beneficial owners of companies registered in British Overseas Territories.

- › Part 3 (sections 52 to 65) contains general provisions supporting Parts 1 and 2 of the Act, including definitions. The Act also has 3 Schedules.

Schedule 1 makes further provision about regulations which impose trade sanctions. Schedule 2 makes further provision about regulations for the purposes of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing and relates to section 49 in Part 2 and schedule 3 makes consequential amendments to other legislation.

Currently sections 1 – 48, 50 – 65 and Schedule 1 and 3 are in force. The following provisions are not yet in force and will be given effect at a later date;

- › Section 49, which enables Ministers to make regulations about money laundering and terrorist financing.
- › Section 51, which requires the Secretary of State to provide all reasonable assistance to the Governments of British Overseas Territories to enable them to establish publicly accessible registers of beneficial ownership of companies and, no later than 31 December 2020, prepare a draft Order in Council requiring the Government of any such Territory that has not introduced such a register to do so.
- › Schedule 2, which provides further detail on the scope of the regulations that can be made under section 49.

annex 2

Overview of the foiled, failed and completed attacks in 2018 per EU Member State and per affiliation

This annex contains statistical information on the terrorist attacks (foiled, failed and completed) in 2018 in the EU as reported to Europol. It highlights key figures and, where relevant, compares those with the figures for previous years.

Member State	Jihadist terrorism	Left-wing terrorism	Right-wing terrorism	Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism	Single-issue terrorism	Not specified	Total
Belgium	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
France	10	-	-	20	-	-	30
Germany	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
Greece	-	6	-	-	-	-	7
Italy	1	10	1	-	1	-	13
Netherlands	4	-	-	-	-	1	4
Spain	1	3	-	7	-	-	11
Sweden	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
United Kingdom	4	-	-	56	-	-	60
Total	24	19	1	83	1	1	129

- › In 2018, nine EU Member States reported terrorist attacks in 2018. The total number of the attacks decreased after a sharp spike in 2017 (205);
- › 13 victims died as a result of terrorist attacks and 53 people were injured (in 2017, 68 and 844 respectively);
- › Terrorist attacks specified as ethno-nationalist and separatist³⁷ continued to represent the largest proportion (more than 60 %), however declined significantly compared to 2017 (137);
- › The number of foiled, failed and completed jihadist terrorist attacks decreased compared to 2017, from 33 to 24. The number of reported foiled terrorist attacks considerably outnumbered the completed attacks (16 out of 24);
- › France (7), Germany (2), Italy (1), the Netherlands (2), Sweden (1) and the UK (3) reported successfully disrupted jihadist terrorist plots;
- › The Netherlands reported jihadist attacks after a long period of having been unaffected by the phenomenon. Notable decrease in jihadist attacks in the UK (14 in 2017, 4 in 2018);
- › The number of left-wing affiliated terrorist attacks continued to slightly decrease for the third consecutive year (from 27 in 2016, to 24 in 2017 and 19 in 2018). Three countries remain the epicentre of left-wing and anarchist terrorist activity in the EU;
- › A decrease in completed right-wing attacks compared to 2017 (previous year five right-wing attacks were reported by the UK);
- › The first single-issue terrorist attack in the EU since 2014 was reported.

³⁷ 56 attacks reported by the UK were acts of security-related incidents in Northern Ireland.

annex 3

Arrests in 2018 per EU Member State and per affiliation

This annex contains statistical information on terrorist arrests in 2018 in the EU as reported to Europol. It highlights key figures and, where relevant, compares those with the figures for previous years.

Member State	Jihadist terrorism	Right-wing terrorism	Left-wing terrorism	Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism	Singe-issue terrorism	Not specified	Total
Austria	35	-	-	-	-	-	35
Belgium	17	-	-	-	-	149	166*
Bulgaria	14	-	-	-	-	-	14
Czechia	-	1	-	-	1	-	2
Denmark	3	-	-	-	-	-	3
France	273	32	3	2	-	-	310
Germany	43	8	-	5	-	3	59
Greece	2	-	20	-	-	-	22
Italy	40	1	8	2	-	5	56
Luxembourg	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
The Netherlands	45	2	-	1	-	1	49
Poland	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
Slovakia	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Slovenia	-	-	-	-	1	1	2
Spain	29	-	3	20	-	-	52
Sweden	7	-	-	-	-	-	7
Romania	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	-	273	273**
Total	511	44	34	30	3	434	1056

*17 arrests were contributed by Belgium in line with TE-SAT methodology. 149 arrests were contributed with no affiliation specified; however, the majority were related to jihadist terrorist activities. A total number of terrorist arrests in Belgium is 166.

**The UK contributed 273 arrests were not disaggregated by type of terrorism, and do not include 148 arrests made in Northern Ireland.

- › In 2018, 18 EU Member States reported a total of 1056 individuals arrested for terrorism-related offences. Compared to previous year, the overall number of arrestees remained highest in France and in the UK (in 2017, 411 and 412 respectively out of 1219 individuals arrested);
 - › Most arrests were made on suspicion of preparing or attempting to commit a terrorist act; and a membership of a terrorist group, including while being abroad; also terrorism financing;
 - › Similar to 2017, arrests for jihadist terrorism represented the largest proportion of the total arrests for terrorism-related offences in the EU (705 out of 1219 in 2017);
 - › The number of arrests for left-wing terrorist offences remained on the same level (36 in 2017), similar to the arrests for separatist terrorist offences (30 in 2017);
 - › The number of individuals arrested in relation to right-wing terrorist offences continued to increase for the third consecutive year (12 in 2016, 20 in 2017, 44 in 2018).
-

annex 4

Convictions and penalties

This annex contains statistical information on the concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences in 2018 as reported to Eurojust. It highlights some key figures and, where relevant, compares those with the figures for previous years.

table / Number of individuals in concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences per EU Member State in 2016, 2017³⁸ and 2018³⁹, as reported to Eurojust

Member State	2016	2017	2018
Austria	26	18	36
Belgium	136	85	80
Bulgaria	-	-	1
Czechia	-	8	7
Denmark	8	4	6
Estonia	2	2	-
Finland	4	2	1
France	66	120	141
Germany	30	34	57
Greece	3	19	22
Hungary	2	-	3
Italy	11	23	15
Lithuania	1	2	10
The Netherlands	42	46	37
Poland	-	4	-
Portugal	1	1	-
Slovenia	1	-	1
Spain	154	69	120
Sweden	4	3	1
United Kingdom	89	125	115
Total	580	565	653

³⁸ The data for the previous years corresponds to the data reported in the respective TE-SAT reports.

³⁹ Eurojust received contributions containing information on terrorism-related court decisions in 2018 from the following EU Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK.

If a verdict pronounced in 2018 was appealed and the appeal was concluded before the end of the year, Eurojust reported only on the latest/final verdict.

- › In 2018, 17 EU Member States reported a total of 653 individuals who were convicted or acquitted of terrorist offences. Nine of those individuals appeared twice before the court in Greece in 2018 in the framework of different criminal proceedings and one appeared three times. As a result, the total number of verdicts pronounced for terrorism-related offences in 2018 was 664.
- › In 2018 there were 94 female defendants in the concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences, which is an increase compared to 2017 (66 female defendants).
- › France reported the highest number of individuals in concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences (141), followed by Spain (120), the UK (115) and Belgium (80)⁴⁰.

⁴⁰ The UK contribution includes proceedings on offences under anti-terrorism legislation, as well as other offences assessed to be terrorism related. Similar to previous years, the UK data for 2018 refers only to convictions.

table / Number of verdicts in 2018 per EU Member State and per type of terrorism, as reported to Eurojust.

Member State	Jihadist terrorism	Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism	Left-wing terrorism	Right-wing terrorism	Not specified	Total
Austria	35	1	-	-	-	36
Belgium	76	4	-	-	-	80
Bulgaria	1	-	-	-	-	1
Czechia	1	-	5	-	1	7
Denmark	5	-	-	-	1	6
Finland	1	-	-	-	-	1
France	123	18	-	-	-	141
Germany	38	2	-	17	-	57
Greece	-	-	33	-	-	33
Hungary	2	-	-	-	1	3
Italy	15	-	-	-	-	15
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	10	10
The Netherlands	32	-	-	5	-	37
Slovenia	1	-	-	-	-	1
Spain	68	40	8	-	4	120
Sweden	1	-	-	-	-	1
United Kingdom*	-	-	-	-	115	115
Total	399	65	46	22	132	664

* The data provided by the UK was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore marked as 'Not specified' and not included in the numbers below.

- › In 2018 the vast majority (399) of verdicts in the EU Member States were pronounced in relation to jihadist terrorist offences confirming a trend that started in 2015.
- › Courts in France, Belgium and Spain rendered the highest number of verdicts concerning jihadist terrorism in 2018 (123, 76 and 68 respectively). Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, Slovenia and Sweden reported only verdicts for jihadist terrorism in 2018.
- › Convictions for right-wing terrorist offences (22) increased in 2018 compared to 2017 (4). In 2018 such convictions were handed down in Germany (17) and the Netherlands (5).
- › A higher number of verdicts were also issued for left-wing terrorist offences (46 in 2018 as compared to 36 in 2017). The majority of them were reported by Greece (33); courts in Spain and Czechia also heard left-wing terrorism cases resulting in eight and five verdicts, respectively.
- › The number of verdicts for separatist terrorist offences increased compared to 2017 (65 in 2018 compared to 49 in 2017). As in previous years, the majority of separatist terrorism cases were adjudicated in Spain.
- › The majority (64) of the female defendants were tried for jihadist terrorist offences, which also presents an increase compared to 2017 (42).
- › Similar to 2017, the highest average prison sentence was ordered for left-wing terrorist offences and increased from ten to sixteen years. The average prison term for separatist and right-wing terrorist offences increased from four to eight and six years respectively. As in the past two years, the average prison sentence for jihadist terrorist offences remained five years.

table / Number of verdicts, convictions and acquittals per EU Member State in 2018, as reported to Eurojust.

Member State	Convictions	Acquittals	Total	Acquittals In %
Austria	27	9	36	25%
Belgium	68	12	80	15%
Bulgaria	1	-	1	0%
Czechia	1	6	7	86%
Denmark	6	-	6	0%
Finland	1	-	1	0%
France	136	5	141	4%
Germany	55	2	57	4%
Greece	31	2	33	6%
Italy	15	-	15	0%
Lithuania	10	-	10	0%
The Netherlands	32	5	37	14%
Slovenia	1	-	1	0%
Spain	85	35	120	29%
Sweden	1	-	1	0%
United Kingdom*	115	-	115	-

* The UK data for 2018 refers only to convictions and is not included in the calculations of percentages.

- › No acquittals for terrorist offences were pronounced in the concluded court proceedings in eight of the EU Member States that reported verdicts for terrorist offences in 2018. Successful prosecutions resulting only in convictions were concluded in Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Slovenia and Sweden; also France, Germany and Greece had very low percentage of acquittals securing convictions for the vast majority of those tried for terrorist offences in 2018⁴¹.
- › Similar to 2017, all prosecutions for right-wing terrorist offences in 2018 resulted in convictions. The percentage of convictions among the verdicts for jihadist terrorism in 2018 remained very high (89 %, same as in 2017). The conviction rate for separatist terrorist offences remained the same as in 2017 (71 %, while that for left-wing offences decreased slightly (from 72 % in 2017 to 70 % in 2018)⁴².

⁴¹ Eurojust considers it one verdict if an individual is convicted of more than one terrorist offence within the same proceeding, or convicted of a terrorist offence and acquitted of another offence. If an individual is acquitted of a terrorist

offence and convicted of another offence, the verdict is included in the overview as acquittal of terrorism.

⁴² The data provided by the UK was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore not used to calculate the conviction rate.



annex 5

Europol counter terrorism activities

First-line investigative support: the European Counter Terrorism Centre

Recent developments that include the completed terrorist attacks and a substantial number of failed and foiled attacks, combined with the existence of large numbers of potentially violent jihadist extremists in the EU, indicate that the terrorist threat towards the EU is high. Despite the setback of IS in Iraq and Syria the severity of the threat in the EU may even increase, in relation to returning foreign terrorist fighters and their children and wives who may all pose a danger to the security of EU Member States, but also as this setback could mean that IS will focus even more on the West. Addressing the challenges and making full use of the available Counter Terrorism opportunities is key to countering terrorism effectively.

To ensure an effective response to the constantly changing developments in terrorism, the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) was established at Europol, under

the authority and direction of the European Council. It builds further on the already existing tools and counter terrorism networks of Europol, but includes a number of new features. These aim at enhancing the counter terrorism capabilities and at better facilitating information exchange among counter terrorism authorities, to bring cross-border cooperation in this field to a new level.

The ECTC is designed as a central hub in the EU in the fight against terrorism. In fact, it is the single point in the EU where counter terrorism operational information from law enforcement from all EU Member States, but also from third parties, is brought together for analytical purposes. Specialised teams of counter terrorism analysts and experts work on this information to construct the wider EU perspective on counter terrorism phenomena for both operational and strategic goals. To ensure efficient information exchange, the ECTC benefits from an excellent network of counter terrorism officers throughout the EU and beyond.

The principal task of the ECTC is to provide operational support upon EU Member States' request for ongoing investigations. The ECTC can assist

by cross-checking live operational data with the already available data at Europol, quickly bringing financial leads to light and by analysing all available investigative details to assist in compiling a structured picture of the terrorist network. If a major terrorist event were to occur, the ECTC can contribute to a coordinated response. Different teams are available for this purpose, often combined with counter terrorism experts temporarily seconded from EU Member States, depending on the nature of the event.

To provide direct operational support and to also contribute to a coordinated response if major terrorist attacks or threats were to occur, the ECTC applies a scalable approach where other teams can be activated depending on the need. The Europol Emergency Response Team (EMRT) is an example of this. This team comprises Europol experts and analysts with relevant backgrounds and experience to support emerging investigations on a 24/7 basis.

Europol Information System

One of Europol's core databases is the Europol Information System (EIS). Through this system, EU Member States directly share and retrieve information, including on suspects, means of communication, financial accounts and firearms, etc. connected with serious and organised crime and terrorism.

The EIS offers first-line investigative support, as this reference system allows EU Member States to quickly identify whether or not information relevant to them is available in one of the EU Member States or with non-EU countries or organisations.

In case of a positive hit, more information may then be requested through the contributor's Europol National Unit.

At the end of 2018, the EIS held information on 63 353 individuals linked to terrorism (the vast majority linked to the foreign terrorist fighter (FTFs) phenomenon), provided by 34 different contributors.

Further in-depth analysis: Counter Terrorism Analysis Work File and Analytical Projects

For a more in-depth analysis, the ECTC works with the counter terrorism analysis work file (AWF). This file provides the framework

for operational analytical support with the EU Member States and non-EU partners. As a result, the number of data categories that are permitted to be stored and processed is broader than in the EIS (within the counter terrorism AWF, there is focused analysis on certain counter terrorism phenomena). Existing and emerging terrorist phenomena are handled within separate files, known as Analysis Projects (APs). In these highly secure environments the information is collected, cross-matched and analysed. This is done by dedicated teams of counter terrorism analysts and counter terrorism experts. Within counter terrorism, a major AP is the topic of 'travellers', which deals with foreign terrorist fighters. The amount of data on foreign terrorist fighters within the AP Travellers increased substantially in 2018 as a result of the concerted efforts of EU Member States with the assistance of Europol.

In December 2017, the ECTC opened a new AP on Core International Crimes which is related to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide⁴³.

The ECTC uses an integrated approach meaning that data inserted in one system is automatically cross-checked against all other databases at Europol to close intelligence gaps. In addition, regular manual checks are carried out.

⁴³ The AP on Core International Crimes works together closely with the Genocide Network, also known as the European Union Network for Investigation and Prosecution of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, hosted by Eurojust.

Information exchange: SIENA

In an organisation like Europol, with its main focus on information exchange, the secure and swift transmission of data is essential, especially when it comes to counter terrorism data. Information from a Member State must reach Europol and vice versa, without the risk of interception. To facilitate this information exchange, the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) was designed and has been in use for a number of years by EU Member States, Europol and third parties that have operational cooperation agreements with Europol.

A dedicated area has been created within SIENA especially for counter terrorism authorities. This means that counter terrorism authorities now have the possibility to send information directly to Europol or other counter terrorism authorities. Until recently, countries could only use SIENA to send their contributions on terrorism to Europol indirectly, through the Europol National Unit and Liaison Bureau. The extended infrastructure now also allows counter terrorism authorities from different countries to directly exchange information among themselves, with optional involvement of Europol. Involvement of Europol is recommended to avoid that possible links to other EU Member States and third partners remain undiscovered, as well as to identify potential links between organised crime and terrorism.

In practice, this means that every counter terrorism officer in the EU Member States can check the EIS from their own computers and directly send information to, or receive information from, the Analysis Projects. The options described for sharing information are at the discretion of the Member State.

European Union Internet Referral Unit

The EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU) coordinates EU efforts to tackle access to online terrorist propaganda and delivering operational support to high profile CT cases. The unit is developing an agile operational support model, in order to further enhance ECTC rapid response to terrorist attacks and expand the EU law enforcement toolbox, especially in niche technical capabilities. The EU IRU keeps abreast with the innovation employed by terrorist groups to exploit the online environment, for the purpose of disseminating terrorist propaganda, recruitment to terrorist organisations and the planning and execution of terrorist attacks. By the end of 2018, the EU IRU supported 222 operations and delivered 339 operational products. It also assessed in total 87 819 pieces of content, which triggered 85 477 decisions for referral, with a success rate of removal of 84.85 % since it was setup in July 2015.

Terrorism Finance Tracking Programme

The ECTC uses a number of tools to help detect the financing of terrorism, one of the best known is the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme (TFTP). The TFTP was established following an EU-US agreement adopted by the European Parliament in 2010.

Relevant information obtained through the TFTP is provided by the US Department of the Treasury to Europol, competent authorities of EU Member States and Eurojust either spontaneously by the US, or upon request, pursuant to Article 9 or Article 10 of the Agreement respectively, with the aim of combating terrorism and terrorist financing.

TFTP has proven to be a valuable tool in terrorism-related investigations, it enhances the ability to map out terrorist networks, often by filling in missing links in an investigative chain. It is used to track terrorist money flows, allowing authorities to identify and locate operatives and their financiers and assists in broader efforts to uncover terrorist cells.

Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear and explosives

Europol is a key partner in the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) and Explosives field, working together with the national

competent authorities (from EU Member States and non-EU countries) and liaising, assisting and jointly promoting activities and training with the European Commission and other relevant international organisations in these areas of expertise.

The European Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Units Network, with its EOD and CBRN expert working groups continues to be facilitated and actively supported by Europol. This network is one of the main achievements stemming from the EU Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives.

A new platform for the European Explosives Ordnance Units Network on the Europol Platform of Experts (EPE) has become the main communication channel enabling already more than 300 European bomb technicians and CBRN experts to swiftly, efficiently and directly share knowledge, best practices and technical information on recent cases and incidents.

The bomb-making process, potential recipes for the harmful use of explosives precursors, as well as potential new threats using CBRN materials, are monitored daily and cross-checked by Europol's ECTC experts. Information is shared with experts and relevant units within the EU Member States and non-EU countries.

Europol assessments, strategic reports and expertise are also timely in detecting security gaps and feeding the EU Policy Cycle through effective cooperation with the European Commission.

In October 2017, the European Commission issued a new Action Plan to enhance preparedness against



CBRN security risks, enhancing Europol's role as a key player in CBRN security.

The ECTC – Strategy CBRN and Explosives Team also assists EU Member States operationally, both with counter terrorism and serious and organised crime investigations. This includes having Europol staff appointed as court experts.

The Counter Terrorism Joint Liaison Team

The Counter Terrorism Joint Liaison Team (CT JLT) was established by the EU Member States to improve the speed and quality of CT cooperation. It functions as a platform for the swift exchange of operational information and actionable intelligence among dedicated counter terrorism experts and analysts from the EU Member States, associated non-EU countries and Europol. The CT JLT facilitates

generating added value to all shared CT cases, acting as a force multiplier to individual counter-terrorism efforts by EU Member States and Third Parties.

Team of rotating Guest Officers at immigration hotspots

Europol provided support to Italy and Greece by deploying short-term Seconded National Experts (Guest Officers) at hotspots on the eastern Aegean islands and in southern Italy. Up to 50 of these Guest Officers are deployed on rotation in order to strengthen the security checks on the inward migration flow, in order to identify suspected terrorists and criminals, thus providing additional security checks.

There is no concrete evidence that terrorist travellers systematically

use those flows of refugees to enter Europe unnoticed, but it is indisputable that some terrorists have entered the EU posing as a refugee⁴⁴, as was seen in the Paris attacks of 13 November 2015.

To counter this threat, Europol has recently approved the recruitment of up to 200 counter terrorist and other investigators for deployment to migration hotspots in Greece and Italy.

European Cybercrime Centre

Launched in January 2013 the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) delivers high-level technical, analytical and digital forensic expertise to support investigations by EU Member States and non-EU countries in cases of convergence of cyber and terrorism.

⁴⁴ Europol, *Changes in modus operandi of Islamic State (IS) revisited*, 2016.

annex 6

Methodology

The TE-SAT was established in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the USA, as a reporting mechanism from the Terrorism Working Party (TWP) of the Council of the EU to the European Parliament. In 2006 Europol replaced the TWP. The methodology for producing this annual report was developed by Europol and endorsed by the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council on 1 and 2 June 2006.

The content of the TE-SAT is based on information supplied by EU Member States, some non-EU countries and the partner organisation Eurojust, as well as information gained from open sources.

In accordance with ENFOPOL 65 (8196/2/06), the TE-SAT is produced annually to provide an overview of the terrorism phenomenon in the EU, from a law enforcement perspective. It seeks to record basic facts and assemble figures regarding terrorist attacks and arrests in the EU. The report also aims to present trends and new developments identified from the information available to Europol.

The TE-SAT is a situation report which describes and analyses the outward manifestations of terrorism, i.e. terrorist attacks and activities. It does not seek to analyse the root causes of terrorism, neither does it attempt to assess the impact or effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies and law enforcement measures taken, although it can serve to illustrate some of these.

This edition of the TE-SAT has been produced by Europol in consultation with the TE-SAT Advisory Board, composed of representatives of the past, present and future Presidencies of the Council of the EU, i.e. Austria, Romania and Finland (the 'troika'), along with permanent members,

representatives from France and Spain, EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN), Eurojust, the office of the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator (EU CTC), and Europol staff.

For the preparation of this report, Europol collected qualitative and quantitative data on terrorist offences in the EU and data on arrests of people suspected of involvement in those offences, provided or confirmed by EU Member States. Similar data were collected, when available, of offences in which EU interests were affected outside of the EU. As in previous years, Eurojust collected data on the number of court proceedings in each Member State, the number of individuals in concluded court proceedings, the number of convictions and acquittals, the type of terrorism, the gender of defendants, the penalties imposed, as well as the type of verdicts – final or pending judicial remedy. Eurojust contributed data on convictions and penalties for terrorist offences in EU Member States and relevant amendments in national legislation on terrorism.

Included as arrests are those judicial arrests warranted by a prosecutor or investigating judge, whereby a person is detained for questioning on suspicion of committing a criminal offence for which detention is permitted by national law. The fact that the person may subsequently be provisionally released or placed under house arrest does not impact the calculation of the number of arrests.

The definition of the term terrorist offences is indicated in the Directive (EU) 2017/541 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council

Decision 2005/671/JHA, which all EU Member States have implemented in their national legislation. This Directive specifies that terrorist offences are intentional acts which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation when committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing an act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.

In cases in which the wording of Directive 2017/541 leaves room for interpretation, the TE-SAT 2019 respects EU Member States' definitions of terrorist offences on their territories. At times, it can be difficult to assess whether a criminal event should be regarded as an act of terrorism or as an act of extremism. Contrary to terrorism, not all forms of extremism sanction the use of violence. Nevertheless, extremism as a phenomenon may be related to terrorism and exhibit similar behavioural patterns. Therefore, the TE-SAT 2019 mentions criminal acts with the potential to seriously destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country, when they were reported by the EU Member States as extremism, in an effort to provide a clearer picture of the phenomenon and its relation to terrorism. However, these cases were not considered in the statistical data of this report, which exclusively reflect incidents reported as terrorism by EU Member States.

The EU Council Decision of 20 September 2005 (2005/671/ JHA),

on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences, obliges EU Member States to collect all relevant information concerning and resulting from criminal investigations conducted by their law enforcement authorities with respect to terrorist offences and sets out the conditions under which this information should be sent to Europol. Europol processed the data and the results were cross-checked with the EU Member States. In cases of divergences or gaps, the results were corrected, complemented and then validated by the EU Member States.

Eurojust also collected data on prosecutions and convictions for terrorist offences on the basis of the aforementioned EU Council Decision. The data used in this report concerns relevant court decisions and legislation amendments in 2018. Due to the specifics of reporting, Member States submit information on both final and non-final decisions. Therefore, reference is also made to those decisions pending judicial remedy. Verdicts from 2018 on which an appeal is pending are included in the reporting as pending judicial remedy. In cases where a verdict pronounced in 2018 was appealed and the appeal was concluded before the end of the year, Eurojust counted the proceeding as one. Eurojust's contribution was verified with the EU Member States that provided relevant data.

Types of terrorism

The TE-SAT categorises terrorist organisations by their source of motivation. However, many groups have a mixture of motivating ideologies, although usually one ideology or motivation dominates. It is worth noting that a categorisation of individuals and terrorist groups

based on the ideology or goals they espouse should not be confused with motivating factors and the paths to radicalisation. The underlying causes that lead people to radicalisation and terrorism must be sought in the surroundings (structural factors) and personal interpretations (psychological factors) of the individual. The choice of categories used in the TE-SAT reflects the current situation in the EU as reported by EU Member States. The categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Jihadist

Jihadist terrorist acts are those that are committed out of a mind-set that rejects democracy on religious grounds and uses the historical comparison with the crusades of the Middle Ages to describe current situations, in which it is believed that Sunni Islam is facing a crusader alliance composed of Shi'is, Christians and Jews.

Right-wing

Right-wing terrorist organisations seek to change the entire political, social and economic system on an extremist right-wing model. A core concept in right-wing extremism is supremacism or the idea that a certain group of people sharing a common element (nation, race, culture, etc.) is superior to all other people. Seeing themselves in a supreme position, the particular group considers it is their natural right to rule over the rest of the population. Racist behaviour, authoritarianism, xenophobia and hostility to immigration are commonly found attitudes in right-wing extremists. Right-wing terrorism refers to the use of terrorist violence by right-wing groups. Variants of right-wing extremist groups are the neo-Nazi, neo-fascist and ultra-nationalist formations.

Left-wing and anarchist terrorism

Left-wing terrorist groups seek to replace the entire political, social and economic system of a state by introducing a communist or socialist structure and a classless society. Their ideology is often Marxist-Leninist. A sub-category of left-wing extremism is anarchist terrorism which promotes a revolutionary, anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian agenda. Examples of left-wing terrorist groups are the Italian *Brigate Rosse* (Red Brigades) and the Greek Revolutionary Organisation 17 November.

Ethno-nationalism and separatism

Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups are motivated by nationalism, ethnicity and/or religion. Separatist groups seek to carve out a state for themselves from a larger country or annex territory from one country to that of another. Left- or right-wing ideological elements are not uncommon in these types of groups. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Basque ETA and the Kurdish PKK organisations fall into this category.

Single-issue

Single-issue extremist groups aim to change a specific policy or practice, as opposed to replacing the whole political, social and economic system in a society. The groups within this category are usually concerned with animal rights, environmental protection, anti-abortion campaigns, etc. Examples of groups in this category are the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF).

annex 7

Acronyms

AF	al-Abd al-Faqir
ALF	Animal Liberation Front
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ANP	Arm na Poblachta, Army of the Republic
AP	Analysis Project
AQIM	al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AWF	Analysis work file
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CIRA	Continuity Irish Republican Army
CT JLT	Counter Terrorism Joint Liaison Team
DDoS	Distributed Denial of Service
DHKP-C	Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/ Front
DR	Dissident Republican
EC3	European Cybercrime Centre
ECTC	European Counter Terrorism Centre
EFP	explosively formed projectile
EIS	Europol Information System
ELF	Earth Liberation Front
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPE	Europol Platform of Experts
ETA	Euskadi ta Askatasuna Basque Fatherland and Liberty
EU	European Union
EU INTCEN	EU Intelligence Analysis Centre
FAI/FRI	Federazione Anarchica Informale/Fronte Rivoluzionario Internazionale
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombian Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces
FTF	foreign terrorist fighter
GNA	Informal Anarchist Federation/International Revolutionary Front
HME	Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin Group in support of Islam and Muslims
HPG	Kosovo Force
HSM	The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
HTS	Nordiska Motståndsrörelsen Nordic Resistance Movement
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IED	improvised explosive device
IID	improvised incendiary device
IS	so-called Islamic State
ISGA	Islamic State in the Greater Sahara

JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
JNIM	Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin Group in support of Islam and Muslims
LNA	Libyan National Army
MINUSMA	The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MOJWA	Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
NIRA	New Irish Republican Army
NMR	Nordiska Motståndsrörelsen Nordic Resistance Movement
ONH	Óglaigh ná h'Éireann Warriors of Ireland
Pegida	Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan Kurdistan Workers' Party
RWE	Right-wing extremists
SAMLA	Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act
SIENA	Secure Information Exchange Network Application
TATP	triacetone triperoxide
TE-SAT	European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
TFTP	Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme
THD	Tanzim Hurras al-Din Guardians of the religion organisation
TWP	Terrorism Working Party
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UCC	United Cyber Caliphate
UN	United Nations
SGC	supporter-generated content
VBIED	vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
VOIED	victim-operated improvised explosive device
YPG	Yekineyen Parastina Gel People's Protection Units

TE
SAT

PHOTO CREDITS

Europol: pages 5, 74 and 77.

Shutterstock: pages 18, 19, 22, 24, 26, 33, 34, 36, 38, 54 and 59.



European Union
Terrorism
Situation and
Trend Report
2019

ISBN 978-92-95209-76-3
DOI 10.2813/788404
QL-AJ-19-001-EN-N



www.europol.europa.eu

