

11



MEDIA-MADE CRIMINALITY: THE REPRESENTATION OF CRIME IN THE MASS MEDIA

Robert Reiner

CRIME IN THE MEDIA: SUBVERSION, SOCIAL CONTROL, OR MENTAL CHEWING GUM?

'In contemporary Britain, the average three- or four-year old now watches a screen for around five hours each day, and more than 50 per cent of three-year-olds have a TV set in their bedrooms . . . Is there really hard scientific evidence that watching television affects how children communicate? Well yes—and the evidence grows steadily' (Winston 2004). In this *Guardian* article, and an accompanying TV documentary, Lord Winston summarized what he claimed was an experiment that 'finally proves' that children imitate violent images. The experiment was a re-creation of the classic social psychological effects research that is summarized later in this chapter.

Lord Winston's article illustrates a long-standing concern about mass media representations of crime, deviance, and disorder. It has long been feared that the media are a significant cause of offending, and are fundamentally subversive. This has been a constantly recurring aspect of the 'history of respectable fears' that Geoffrey Pearson has traced back through the last few centuries (Pearson 1983).

A contrasting concern about media representations of crime has worried liberals and radicals (Wykes 2001). To them the media are the cause not of crime itself but of exaggerated public alarm about law and order, generating support for repressive solutions (Gerbner 1970, 1995). In their ideal-typical form these perspectives are polar opposites, sharing in common only their demonization of the media. Each has generated huge research industries conducting empirical studies of media content, production, and effects (Carrabine *et al.* 2002: ch. 5, 2004: ch. 18; Brown 2003; Jewkes 2004; Greer 2005).

The difficulties in rigorously establishing straightforward causal relationships between images and effects have ovoked the canard that media researchers are blinkered by libertarian prejudices. For example, Melanie Phillips has claimed that 'for years,

media academics have pooh-poohed any link between violence on screen and in real life' because 'media images . . . merely provide "chewing gum for the eyes"' (Phillips 1996). This is a caricature of the media research on effects. A more sophisticated criticism of the effects research is that 'repeated failures to find anything much out would . . . suggest that the wrong question was being asked' (Brown 2003: 28). But as the Winston article cited above demonstrates, 'the effects debate refuses to go away' (ibid.).

This chapter reviews the broad contours of empirical research, theorization, and policy debates about crime and the media. It is organized in terms of three interrelated issues that have been the primary foci of research: the *content*, *consequences*, and *causes* of media representations of crime. These are phases of an intertwined process that can only be separated artificially: texts, audiences, and authors are interdependent, and their separation is only a presentational device.

THE CONTENT OF MEDIA IMAGES OF CRIME

PROBLEMS OF CONTENT ANALYSIS

As defined by one leading practitioner, 'content analysis is a method of studying and analyzing communications in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring certain message variables, . . . free of the subjective bias of the reviewer' (Dominick 1978: 106–7). Dominick concedes that 'inferences about the effects of content on the audience are, strictly speaking, not possible when using only this methodology. More importantly, the findings of a particular content analysis are directly related to the definitions of the various content categories developed by the researcher' (ibid.).

There are major problems with the claim that traditional content analysis is 'objective'. While the categories used to quantify 'certain message attributes' may be free of 'subjective bias' they are not randomly plucked out of thin air, nor do they miraculously reflect a structure of meaning objectively inherent in the texts analysed. They always embody theoretical presuppositions by the researcher about criteria of significance. Moreover, while content analysis indeed cannot justify 'inferences about the effects of content on the audience', the categories selected for quantification usually presuppose some theory about likely consequences. Meticulously counting units of 'violence' is not a form of train-spotting for sadists but motivated by concern that exposure to these images carries risks such as desensitization, or heightened anxiety. Thus the 'objectivity' of traditional content analysis lies in the precision of the statistical manipulation of data, but the categories used necessarily presuppose some theory of meaning, usually about likely consequences (Sparks 1992: 79–80).

There is a further fundamental problem with traditional content analyses. What the researcher codifies as instances of the 'same' image may have very different meanings

within particular narrative genres and contexts of reception. How viewers interpret images of 'violence', for example, is not just a function of the amount of blood seen or number of screams heard. The same physical behaviour, for instance a shooting, means different things in different genres, say a Western, a war film, a contemporary cop show, or news bulletins. It will be interpreted differently if the violence is perpetrated on or by a character constructed in the narrative as sympathetic. How audiences construe violence will vary according to how they see their own position vis-à-vis the narrative characters, quite apart from any preferred reading intended by the creators or supposedly inscribed in the narrative (Livingstone *et al.* 2001). For example, to black audiences, Rodney King, whose beating by Los Angeles police officers was captured on an amateur videotape, was a victim of police racism, while to many white police officers he appeared to be a threatening deviant who invited the beating (Lawrence 2000: 70–3).

These problems do not mean that quantification can or should be avoided, but they refute the claims of positivist content analysis to quantify a supposed objective structure in texts. Counting features of texts should be self-consciously seen as based on the observer's frame of reference, according to explicit criteria. Results must be interpreted reflexively and tentatively as one possible reading. As such, they can yield valuable insights and questions about the significance of trends and patterns.

CONTENT ANALYSIS: A REVIEW OF RESULTS

Crime and criminal justice have long been sources of popular spectacle and entertainment, even before the rise of the mass media. This is illustrated by the genre of criminal biography and pre-execution confessions and apologies, of various degrees of authenticity, which flourished in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Faller 1987; Rawlings 1992; Durston 1997). Similar accounts continue to the present day, filling the 'true crime' shelves of bookshops (Rawlings 1998; Peay 1998; Wilson 2000: ch. 4; Biressi 2001), and they have been joined by the many volumes retelling the exploits of legendary cops as if they were fictional sleuths (e.g. Fabian 1950, 1954). In overtly fictional crime narratives, ultra-realism (often a quasi-documentary style of presentation) has been the predominant style.

The fact/fiction distinction has become ever more fluid, with the emergence of what is usually referred to as 'reality' television or 'infotainment' (Fishman and Cavender 1998; Surette 1998: 70–80; Beckett and Sasson 2000: 111–16; Leishman and Mason 2002: ch. 7). There has been the growth of programming such as *Crimewatch UK* that re-creates current cases, often with an avowed purpose of solving them (Dobash *et al.* 1998; Jewkes 2004: ch.6). Fly-on-the-wall footage of actual incidents has proliferated in documentaries like Roger Graef's pioneering 1982 Thames Valley Police series (Gregory and Lees 1999), and entertainment programming based on real cops in action, for example *Cops* (Doyle 1998; Kooistra *et al.* 1998). Live newscasts of particular occurrences are increasingly common, such as the O. J. Simpson car chase and subsequent trial (Brown 2003: 56–60). Film footage of criminal events in process is frequently used in news broadcasts, like the amateur video capturing the beating by

Los Angeles police of Rodney King (Lawrence 2000), or the CCTV shots of Jamie Bulger being led away by his killers (Jewkes 2004: 56–7). The police in turn resort to the media as a part of criminal investigations (Innes 1999, 2001, 2003), as well as to cultivate support more generally (Mawby 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003). The media and criminal justice systems are penetrating each other increasingly, making a distinction between ‘factual’ and ‘fictional’ programming ever more tenuous (Manning 1998; Ferrell 1998; Tunnell 1998; Brown 2003). The implications will be explored further in the conclusions, but I will turn next to a consideration of the results of content analyses.

Deviant news

Crime narratives and representations are, and have always been, a prominent part of the content of all mass media. The proportion of media content that is constituted by crime items clearly will depend on the definitions of ‘crime’ used. Richard Ericson and his colleagues adopted an exceptionally broad definition of deviance for their penetrating study of newsmaking in Toronto (Ericson *et al.* 1987, 1989, 1991): ‘the behaviour of a thing or person that strays from the normal . . . not only . . . criminal acts, but also . . . straying from organisational procedures and violations of common-sense knowledge’ (Ericson *et al.* 1987: 4). When defined so widely deviance is the essence of news, ‘the defining characteristic of what journalists regard as newsworthy’ (*ibid.*). Stories about crime in the narrower sense of violations of criminal law are a more limited proportion of news, varying according to medium (e.g. radio, television, or print journalism) and market (e.g. ‘quality’ or ‘popular’ journalism).

Unsurprisingly, given their broad definition, Ericson *et al.* found that a high proportion of news was about ‘deviance and control’, ranging from 45.3 per cent in a quality newspaper to 71.5 per cent on a quality radio station (Ericson *et al.* 1991: 239–42). Contrary to most other studies, they found that ‘quality’ broadcasting outlets had *more* deviance stories, because of ‘their particular emphasis on deviance and control in public bureaucracies’ (*ibid.*).

Ericson *et al.* also used a broad concept of ‘violence’, in which ‘“state violence” and “state terrorism” were conceptualised in the same way as various acts of violence by individual citizens’ (*ibid.*: 244). They included stories, for example, about ‘harms to health and safety such as impaired driving, unsafe working environments, and unsafe living environments’ (*ibid.*). This covered concerns that are more characteristic of ‘quality’ than ‘popular’ news outlets, but nonetheless Ericson *et al.* found that in each medium more attention was paid to violence by popular than by quality journalism. Broadcast news gave more prominence to stories of violence than print (*ibid.*: 244–7).

Ericson *et al.* adopted an equally wide-ranging concept of ‘economic’ deviance, including ‘questionable business practices . . . legal conflict over property . . . and social problems related to economic matters’ (*ibid.*: 247). ‘The reporting of economic crimes was rare in all news outlets . . . Much more common in all news outlets were reports of violation of trust, with or without criminal aspects or criminal charges being laid’ (*ibid.*). The reporting of white-collar crime tends to be concentrated in ‘quality’ newspapers and is often restricted to specialist financial pages, sections, or newspapers

(Stephenson-Burton 1995: 137–44), framed in ways that mark it off from ‘real’ crime unless they are sensational celebrity-style stories that are treated as a form of ‘infotainment’ (Tombs and Whyte 2001; Levi 2001, 2006).

Overall, Ericson *et al.* found that whilst the pattern of reporting varied in complex ways according to media and markets, stories about deviance and control in a broad sense were the staple, defining feature of newsworthiness.

The extent of crime in the news

Most analyses of the content of media representations of crime have focused more narrowly on the legally defined category, not the broad sociological concept of deviance. Some studies only consider stories about specific criminal incidents, but others include reports, articles, or editorials about the state of crime generally, about criminal justice, and about criminal law violations related to political and social conflict, such as terrorism. ‘Because of this variability, estimates of the proportion of total news that is devoted to crime coverage range from 5 to 25%’ (Sacco 1995: 142).

The lower estimates tend to come from earlier research (such as Harris 1932; Swanson 1955; Deutschmann 1959). More recent American studies have found higher proportions of crime-related items. Graber found that crime and justice topics accounted for 22 to 28 per cent of stories in the newspapers she studied, 20 per cent on local television news, and 12 to 13 per cent on network television news (Graber 1980: 24). A literature review of 36 American content analyses of crime news conducted between 1960 and 1980 found considerable variation in the proportion of crime: from 1.61 per cent to 33.5 per cent (Marsh 1991: 73).

The first study of crime news in Britain looked at crime news reporting in September 1938, 1955, and 1967 (Roshier 1973). In September 1967 the percentage of crime news was 5.6 per cent in the *Daily Mirror*, 4.4 per cent in the *Daily Express*, 2.4 per cent in the *Daily Telegraph* (and 2 per cent in the *Newcastle Journal*). The *News of the World* gave crime much more prominence: 11 per cent of news space. There was no clear trend over time. In the dailies the proportion of crime news in 1967 was virtually the same as in 1938, but it had been higher in 1955 in the *Daily Mirror* and *Daily Express*. The *News of the World* showed a similar U-shaped pattern: crime was 17.8 per cent of news in 1938, 29.1 per cent in 1955, and 11 per cent in 1967 (*ibid.*: 45).

In Britain, more recent studies find higher proportions of crime news than Roshier’s average of 4 per cent for 1938–67. For example, a study of six Scottish newspapers in 1981 found that an average of 6.5 per cent of space was given to crime news (Ditton and Duffy 1983: 161; see also Smith 1984; Schlesinger *et al.* 1991: 411–15). This rise was confirmed by a later study comparing coverage of crime in 10 national daily newspapers for four weeks from 19 June 1989 (Williams and Dickinson 1993). ‘On average, 12.7% of event-oriented news reports were about crime’ (*ibid.*: 40). The proportion of space devoted to crime was greater the more ‘downmarket’ the newspaper. The smallest proportion of crime news was 5.1 per cent in the *Guardian*; the largest was 30.4 per cent in the *Sun* (*ibid.*: 41).

Broadcast news generally devotes more attention to crime reports than newspapers (Cumberbatch *et al.* 1995: 5–8). There are also variations in the proportion of crime news items between different markets. Commercial radio and television broadcast a higher proportion of crime news stories overall than the BBC, although the latter carried more reports about crime in general and criminal justice. Crime news is more frequent than any other category for every medium at each market level (*ibid.*:7).

Given that different studies work with different concepts of crime, and have ranged over many different newspapers and places, it is not possible to conclude from a literature review whether there is a trend for an increasing proportion of news to be about crime. Although later studies predominantly find higher proportions of crime stories than earlier ones, they have also adopted broader concepts of crime, so the increase may well be a result of the measurement procedures used rather than a reflection of change in the media.

A historical study examined a random sample of issues of *The Times* and the *Mirror* for each year between 1945 and 1991 (Reiner *et al.* 2000, 2001, 2003; Reiner 2001). It found a generally upward (albeit fluctuating) trend in the proportion of stories focused on crime in both newspapers (from under 10 per cent in the 1940s to over 20 per cent in the 1990s). The sharpest increase occurred during the late 1960s, when the average annual proportion of crime stories almost doubled, from around 10 per cent to around 20 per cent in both papers. In both papers the proportion of stories about the criminal justice system, as distinct from the commission of criminal offences, has clearly increased since the Second World War. Criminal justice stories were on average 2 per cent of all stories in the *Mirror* between 1945 and 1951, and 3 per cent in *The Times*. By 1985–91 the average had increased to 6 per cent in the *Mirror*, and 9 per cent in *The Times*.

In conclusion, deviance and control in a broad sense are the very stuff of news. However, stories about the commission of particular offences are more common in ‘popular’ news outlets (although for official or corporate crime the reverse is true). The proportion of news devoted to crime and criminal justice has increased over the last half-century.

The pattern of crime news

Crime news exhibits remarkably similar patterns in studies conducted at many different times and places. From the earliest studies (e.g. Harris 1932) onwards, analyses of news reports have found that crimes of violence are featured disproportionately compared to their incidence in official crime statistics. Indeed a general finding has been the lack of relationship between patterns and trends in crime news and crime statistics (Davis 1952; Beckett 1997).

Marsh reviewed 36 content analyses of crime news in the USA published between 1960 and 1988, and 20 studies in 14 other countries between 1965 and 1987. These all found an over-representation of violent and interpersonal crime, compared to official statistics, and an under-reporting of property offences (Marsh 1991). In America ‘the

ratio of violent-to-property crime stories appearing in the surveyed newspapers was 8 to 2; however, official statistics reflected a property-to-violent crime ratio of more than 9 to 1 during the survey period' (ibid.: 73). A similar pattern is found in the content analyses reviewed for other countries (ibid.: 74–6).

A historical study of two British newspapers since the Second World War found that homicide was by far the most common type of crime reported, accounting for about one-third of all crime news stories throughout the period. Other violent crimes were the next most common. However, there were significant shifts in the proportion of stories featuring other sorts of crime. In particular there was a marked decline in the proportion of stories featuring 'volume' property crimes such as burglary in which no violence occurred (these are of course the overwhelming majority of crimes according to official statistics and crime surveys, cf. Maguire, chapter 10, this volume). During the 1940s and 1950s property crimes featured frequently in news stories, but after the mid-1960s they were hardly ever reported unless there was some celebrity angle. On the other hand, some offences began to feature prominently in news stories only after the mid-1960s, notably drug offences, which by the 1990s accounted for about 10 per cent of all crime stories (Reiner *et al.* 2000 and 2001, 2003; Reiner 2001).

Recent studies confirm the pattern of increasing over-representation of violent and interpersonal (especially sex) crimes (Chiricos *et al.* 1997; Beckett and Sasson 2000: ch. 5; Greer 2003). Between 1951 and 1985 the number of rape trials in Britain increased nearly four times, from 119 to 450. In the same period, the number of rape cases reported in the press increased more than five times, from 28 to 154. The percentage of rape cases reported jumped from 23.5 per cent in 1951 to 34.2 per cent in 1985 (Soothill and Walby 1991: 20–22). In Northern Ireland press reporting of sex cases tripled (Greer 2003).

The proportion of news devoted to crime of different types, and the prominence with which it is presented, varies according to market and medium. In one month of 1989, 64.5 per cent of British newspaper crime stories featured violence, while the British Crime Survey found that only 6 per cent of crimes reported by victims were violent (Williams and Dickinson 1993: 40). The percentage of stories dealing with crimes involving personal violence, and the salience they were given, was considerably greater in more downmarket newspapers (ibid.: 40–3).

The pattern of offences reported varies according to medium as well as market. In Britain, the proportion of violent crimes reported in television news broadcasts is closer to the tabloid figure than the quality press, especially for local rather than national bulletins. A study in January–March 1987 found that the proportion of crime stories reporting non-sexual violence against the person in 'quality', 'mid-market', and 'tabloid' newspapers respectively was 24.7 per cent, 38.8 per cent, and 45.9 per cent. On national news bulletins it was 40 per cent; on local bulletins violent crime stories were 63.2 per cent of all crime news. There was no significant difference between ITV (43.5 per cent) and BBC1 (42.3 per cent), but Channel 4 was more like the quality press (18.2 per cent; Schlesinger *et al.* 1991: 412–15). There were some 'market' differences between broadcast news channels, but on the whole the proportion of different offences portrayed on television news is closer to tabloid than broadsheet print journalism.

Violent crimes in general figure disproportionately in British broadcast news, although there are substantial variations according to medium and market. In one study, over 40 per cent of crime news items concerned death and murder on nearly all BBC Radio stations. On television, murder and death accounted for 53 per cent of all crime stories on Sky News, 42 per cent on ITN, and 38 per cent on BBC1 (Cumberbatch *et al.* 1995: 25).

Homicide in general is the most prominent crime in news stories, but the likelihood of particular cases being reported varies systematically. An important recent study analysed the reporting of homicide in three British newspapers between 1993 and 1997 (Peelo *et al.* 2004). Of the 2,685 police-recorded homicides in this period, just under 40 per cent were reported in at least one of the papers studied (*ibid.*: 261). 'Sexual homicides were most likely to be reported in all three newspapers, as were homicides where there was a clear motive for monetary gain, or a jealousy or revenge motive' (*ibid.*: 272). Least likely to be reported were the most common homicides, those arising out of 'rage or quarrel' (*ibid.*: 269). Victim characteristics were also important determinants of the likelihood of reporting. Homicides where the victim was a child (but not an infant), female, or of higher status were more likely to be reported (*ibid.*: 262–7).

An indirect consequence of the pattern of offences reported by news stories is an exaggeration of police success in clearing-up crime, 'because the police are more successful in solving violent crimes than property crimes' (Marsh 1991: 73). A historical study of British crime news stories found, however, that whilst the majority report crimes that are cleared up by the police, this is declining. The clear-up rate in news stories fell from 73 per cent in 1945–64 to 51 per cent in 1981–91 (Reiner *et al.* 2003: 23).

There is a clear pattern to news media portrayal of offenders and victims. Most studies find that offenders featuring in news reports are typically older and of higher status than those officially processed by the criminal justice system (Roshier 1973: 45–6; Graber 1980; Reiner *et al.* 2003: 19–21). But the officially recorded profile of offenders is likely to be biased misleadingly towards lower-status groups—'the rich get richer and the poor get prison' (Reiman 2003). In this respect the socio-economic characteristics of offenders in media stories may actually be closer to the—ultimately unknowable—'real' pattern than official statistics based on the small proportion of offenders who are the losers of the criminal justice lottery (see Maguire, chapter 9, in this volume).

There is contradictory evidence about whether news reports disproportionately feature ethnic minority offenders (Graber 1980; Garofalo 1981: 324; Marsh 1991: 74; Sacco 1995: 143; Barlow 1998). Crime reports in local newspapers or broadcasting clearly focus more on ethnic minority and lower-status group suspects (Dussuyer 1979; Garofalo 1981: 324; Beckett and Sasson 2000: 79). 'Reality' television programmes also present a marked variation to national news reports in terms of the demography of the offenders portrayed, concentrating on stories with young, ethnic minority suspects (Oliver and Armstrong 1998; Kooistra *et al.* 1998). The one demographic characteristic of offenders which is overwhelmingly congruent in news stories and in all other data sources on crime is their gender: 'both crime statistics and crime news portray offending as predominantly a male activity' (Sacco 1995: 143).

Studies assessing the profile of victims in news stories are fewer in number than analyses of the representation of offenders. There is a clear trend for victims to become the pivotal focus of news stories in the last three decades (Reiner *et al.* 2003), paralleling the increasing centrality of victims in criminal justice and criminology (see Hoyle and Zedner, chapter 15 in this volume) and crime fiction (Reiner *et al.* 2000 and 2001). News stories exaggerate the crime risks faced by higher-status white people, as well as disproportionately representing women, children, or older people as victims (Graber 1980; Garofalo 1981: 324; Mawby and Brown 1983; Chermak 1995; Chiricos *et al.* 1997; Beckett and Sasson 2000: 79–80; Greer 2003: 70–2; Reiner *et al.* 2003: 21–2; Peelo *et al.* 2004: 262–7).

Another consistent finding is the predominance of stories about criminal incidents, rather than analyses of crime patterns or the possible causes of crime (Garofalo 1981: 325; see also Marsh 1991: 76; Sasson 1995; Barlow 1998; Beckett and Sasson 2000: 80–1; Greer 2003: 66–70). Although an aspect of the more general event-orientation that is part of the ‘eternal recurrence’ of news (Rock 1973), the ‘mass media provide citizens with a public awareness of crime . . . based upon an information-rich and knowledge-poor foundation’ (Sherizen 1978: 204). An important example is the reporting of rape and other sex crimes, where issues of power and gender disappear in the fascination with the demonization of individual offenders or victims (Soothill and Walby 1991; Lees 1995; Gregory and Lees 1999; Greer 2003). Stories with child homicide victims and/or perpetrators are particularly likely to be featured so prominently that they become long-running stories with a familiar cast of characters, regularly invoked as symbols of wider issues or the state of the nation, illustrated by the Moors murders, and the Jamie Bulger and Soham cases.

The tendency to exclude analysis of broader structural processes or explanations is also evident in stories about political disorder (Halloran *et al.* 1970; Hall 1973: 232–43; Sumner 1982; Tumber 1982; Cottle 1993). The portrayal of political conflict such as riot or terrorism is often in terms of sheer criminality (Clarke and Taylor 1980; Hillyard 1982; Iyengar 1991: 24–46). This has been evident again in the overall media coverage of the events of 11 September 2001 or 7 July 2005. However, the pattern varies according to different phases in the reporting of such conflicts (Wren-Lewis 1981/2). After the initial reporting of events such as the 1981 Brixton riots, which tends to be in terms of criminality, there is often a later phase of analysis of possible causes (Murdock 1982).

There are also variations between different media and markets. Print journalism, especially ‘quality’ newspapers and editorial pages, will often have more analysis than broadcast news (Ericson *et al.* 1991; Cumberbatch *et al.* 1995: 7). Newspapers and quality broadcasting channels are more likely to carry points of view critical of the authorities. There is a tendency in recent years for critical and campaigning groups to have more access to the media, partly because of the increasing politicization of law and order (Schlesinger and Tumber 1994; Lawrence 2000; Downes and Morgan, chapter 9, this volume).

Although critical stories exposing malpractice by the police or other criminal justice officials are regularly published, this ‘watchdog’ function does not necessarily

undermine the legitimacy of criminal justice institutions. Corruption and other police deviance stories have traditionally been set within the ‘one bad apple’ framework, whereby the exposure of individual wrongdoing is interpreted as a testimony to the integrity of the system which dealt with it (Chibnall 1977: ch. 5). As the volume of police deviance stories has increased in recent years (Reiner *et al.* 2003: 22–4), the ‘one bad apple’ story becomes harder to recycle. An alternative damage-limitation narrative is to present scandals as stories of institutional reform. This acknowledges previous malpractice, but safeguards the legitimacy of the institution as it is portrayed as putting things right (Schlesinger and Tumber 1994: ch. 7).

THE CONTENT OF CRIME FICTION

Some social scientists have conducted quantitative content analyses of film and television crime fiction.¹ More commonly, however, crime fiction—in print, the cinema, or on television—has been analysed using a variety of qualitative techniques and theoretical perspectives drawn from literary, film, and social theory.² The pattern of representation of crime in fictional stories, in all media, resembles the content analyses of crime news.

The frequency of crime fiction

Crime and detection have always been staples of modern literature, as Defoe, Fielding, Poe, and Dickens illustrate (Ousby 1976; Durston 1996). Some authors have sought to trace the ancient ancestry of the detective story. ‘We find sporadic examples of it in Oriental folk-tales, in the Apocryphal Books of the Old Testament, in the play-scene in *Hamlet*; while Aristotle in his *Poetics* puts forward observations about dramatic plot-construction which are applicable today to the construction of a detective mystery’ (Sayers 1936: vii). This was clearly an attempt to emphasize the ‘snobbery’ rather than the ‘violence’ of the classic ratiocinative detective story (Watson 1971). The dominant style of crime fiction has varied from the classic puzzle mystery exemplified by Sayers and Agatha Christie, to the tougher private eye stories pioneered by Dashiell Hammett and Raymond Chandler, and the police procedurals of Ed McBain, Joseph Wambaugh, and others (Symons 1972; Binyon 1989; Ousby 1997).

One estimate suggests that ‘between a quarter and a third of total paperback output could probably be put into the category of “thriller” of one kind or another . . . since

¹ Gerbner 1970; Pandiani 1978; Carlson 1985; Lichter *et al.* 1994; Powers *et al.* 1996; Surette 1998: ch. 2; Allen *et al.* 1998.

² McArthur 1972; Shadoian 1977; Rosow 1978; McCarty 1993; Clarens 1997; Hardy 1997, 1998; Rubin 1999; Chibnall and Murphy 1999; and Rafter 2000 are just a few of the many studies of gangster and crime movies. Haycraft 1941; Watson 1971; Cawelti 1976; Palmer 1978; Knight 1980; Porter 1981; Mandel 1984; Bell and Daldry 1990; Thompson 1993; and Clarke 2001 are some of the numerous texts on literary detective stories. Everson 1972; Tuska 1978; and Meyers 1981, 1989 offer histories of detective films and television shows. Reiner 1978, 1981, 1994, 2000a and 2000b, 2003; Park 1978; Hurd 1979; Kerr 1981; Clarke 1983, 1986, 1992; Dove 1982; Dove and Bargainnier 1986; Inciardi and Dee 1987; Buxton 1990; Laing 1991; Winston and Mellerski 1992; Sparks 1992: ch. 6, 1993; Eaton 1996; Hale 1998; King 1999; Wilson 2000; Gitlin 2000: ch. 11–14; Leishman and Mason 2002 examine police stories. Nellis and Hale 1982; Mason 1996, 2003a, 2003b are studies of prison films.

1945, at least 10,000 million copies of crime stories have been sold world-wide' (Mandel 1984: 66–7).

Crime stories have also been a prominent genre in the cinema, the dominant mass medium of the first half of the twentieth century (Rafter 2000). As with its successors, television and video, the cinema has been haunted by respectable fears about its portrayal of crime and violence (Barker 1984a; Mathews 1994; Miller 1994; Barker and Petley 2001). The proportion of films about crime has fluctuated cyclically since the Second World War, but there is no long-term increase or decrease (Allen *et al.* 1997). In most years, around 20 per cent of all films are crime movies, and around half of all films have significant crime content.

Radio was the main broadcasting medium of the first half of the twentieth century. Stories about crime and law enforcement were a popular part of radio drama, in Britain and North America, although never as dominant as they subsequently became on television (Dominick 1978: 112–13; Shale 1996). Stories about crime and law enforcement have been prominent on television ever since it became the leading broadcasting medium in the 1950s. By 1959 over one-third of American prime-time television was crime shows. Since then at least 20 per cent of prime-time has been crime shows (Dominick 1978: 114). Crime shows are just as much a staple of British television. Since 1955 around 25 per cent of the most popular television shows in Britain in most years have been crime or police series. While there are sharp cyclical fluctuations, there is no long-term trend (Reiner *et al.* 2000 and 2001), but there have been changes in *how* crime and criminal justice are represented.

The pattern of crime in fiction

The pattern of fictional representations of crime is similar to that in news stories—and shows similar discrepancies from the picture conveyed by official crime statistics. Murder and other violent crimes feature vastly more frequently than the property offences that predominate in official statistics. A historical analysis of the crime films that have done best at the British box office since the Second World War (Allen *et al.* 1998; Reiner *et al.* 2000 and 2001) found that murder was the primary crime (the McGuffin of the plot, in Hitchcock's terminology) in the overwhelming majority of films throughout the period. However, property offences provided the McGuffin in a significant minority of films up to the late 1960s, though seldom thereafter. Sex and drug offences began to appear as central aspects of narratives only after the late 1960s. Up to the mid-1960s, most films did not feature any crimes that were not directly related to the McGuffin. From then films portray a world full of contextual crimes, unrelated to the central crime animating the narrative (to the point where characters like the eponymous Dirty Harry cannot go for a hamburger without coming across a bank robbery in progress). Crime is represented as an all-pervasive threat, not an abnormal, one-off intrusion into a stable order. Linked to this is the increasing prevalence in films of police heroes, signifying that crime has become sufficiently routine to provide employment for a large bureaucracy, not just a diversion for enthusiastic

amateurs at country house weekends (Reiner 1978, 2000b, 2003; Allen *et al.* 1998: 67–8; King 1999; Rafter 2000: ch. 3; Wilson 2000; Leishman and Mason 2002).

The representation of violence has become increasingly graphic throughout the period since the Second World War. Up to the early 1970s hardly any films showed more than a minor degree of pain or suffering by victims—even if they were murdered! (Reiner *et al.* 2001: 184). Since then an increasing proportion of films depict victims in severe torment (*ibid.*; Powers *et al.* 1996: 104–6).

On television too, fictional narratives have always featured violent crimes most prominently, but are focusing on them even more. Studies of American television suggest that about two-thirds of crime on prime-time shows consists of murder, assault, or armed robbery (Garofalo 1981: 326; Sparks 1992: 140; Lichter *et al.* 1994; Beckett and Sasson 2000: ch. 6).

A content analysis of 620 randomly selected prime-time television shows broadcast between 1955 and 1986 found that ‘television violence has far outstripped reality since the 1950s . . . During the second decade of our study, covering 1965 to 1975 . . . The FBI-calculated rate for violent crimes . . . doubled to 3 incidents per 1,000 inhabitants. The TV rate for violent crimes, at 114 incidents per 1,000 characters, was more than 30 times greater’ (Lichter *et al.* 1994: 275–6).

In the third decade covered by Lichter *et al.*’s historical content analysis, television and the world of statistically recorded crime converged slightly, ‘but television continues to present far more violent crimes than occur in real life’ (*ibid.*: 278). There was also increasing representation of serious crimes that hitherto had hardly featured in genre crime fiction: prostitution and other organized vice such as pornography, and drug-related offences. On American television there was a fifteenfold increase in prostitution offences and a tenfold rise in drug-related crime between 1975 and 1985 (*ibid.*: 285).

Ironically, in relation to property crime risks television has become safer than the world presented in official statistics. Between 1955 and 1984, the average annual rate for serious property offences in the USA increased from 10 to 50 incidents per 1,000 people according to the FBI data. However, on television ‘the rate for serious property crimes has remained steady at 20 incidents per 1,000 characters over the thirty years of our study’ (*ibid.*: 284). Thus between 1955 and 1964 the television property crime rate exceeded the official statistics, but since then it has fallen far behind them. There is also a trend for the cinema (and newspapers) to understate the risks of property crime increasingly (Allen *et al.* 1998: 65; Reiner *et al.* 2003: 18–19).

The *qualitative* character of crimes depicted in fiction is also vastly different from the officially recorded pattern. While most ‘real’ murders are extensions of brawls between young men (Dorling 2004), or domestic disputes, in fiction murder is usually motivated by greed and calculation (Garofalo 1981: 326–7; Lichter *et al.* 1994: 279; Allen *et al.* 1998: 69). Rape and other sex crimes are also presented in opposite ways in fiction (or news) and criminal justice statistics (Greer 2003: ch. 7; Jewkes 2004: 48–9). Most rapes are perpetrated by intimates or acquaintances (Barclay and Tavares 1999: 16). On television and in other fiction (and in news stories), rape is usually committed

by psychopathic strangers and involves extreme brutality, often torture and murder ('5% of the murders on TV result from rape', Lichter *et al.* 1994: 279–80).

While crime fiction presents property crime less frequently than the reality suggested by crime statistics, the crimes it portrays are far more serious than most recorded offences. Official statistics and victim surveys concur in calculating that the overwhelming majority of property crimes involve little or no loss or damage, and no physical threat or harm to the victim—indeed, there is usually no contact at all with the perpetrator. In fiction, however, most property crimes involve tightly planned, high-value, project thefts, and are frequently accompanied by violence (Garofalo 1981: 326; Lichter *et al.* 1994: 284).

Related to the disproportionate emphasis on the most serious end of the crime spectrum is the portrayal of the demographic characteristics of offenders and victims. Offenders in fiction are primarily higher-status, white, middle-aged males (Pandiani 1978: 442–7; Garofalo 1981: 326; Lichter *et al.* 1994: 290–5; Reiner *et al.* 2000 and 2001). Interestingly, the new genre of 'reality' infotainment cop shows such as *Cops* differs from this pattern, primarily presenting offenders as non-white, underclass youth (Fishman and Cavender 1998; Beckett and Sasson 2000: 113). The social characteristics of fictional victims are similar, but a higher proportion are female. The demographic profile of offenders and victims in fiction is the polar opposite of criminal justice statistics, apart from the maleness of most offenders (Surette 1998: 47 calls this 'the law of opposites'. Sparks 1992: 140–5 offers a qualitative analysis.)

A final important feature of fictional crime is the high clear-up rate. In fiction cops usually get their man (Garofalo 1981: 327; Lichter *et al.* 1994: ch. 9; Powers *et al.* 1996: ch. 5). In Allen *et al.*'s sample of movies since 1945, there was no film before 1952 in which criminals escaped capture, and hardly any up to the early 1970s. Thereafter, offenders get away with their crimes in an increasing number of films, albeit still a minority (Allen *et al.* 1998: 185; Reiner *et al.* 2000 and 2001). Trends on television are similar, with the overwhelming majority of crimes cleared up by the police, but an increasing minority where they fail (Lichter *et al.* 1994: ch. 9.).

The police and the criminal justice system are thus overwhelmingly portrayed in a positive light in popular fiction, as the successful protectors of victims against serious harm and violence. This continues to be so, although with increasing questioning of police success and integrity (Reiner 2000b, 2003). Although the majority of police characters in films and television shows are represented as sympathetic, honest, and just, there is an increasing portrayal of police deviance. Corrupt, brutal, and discriminatory police officers have become more common since the mid-1960s in films (Powers *et al.* 1996: 113–16; Allen *et al.* 1998: 185–6) and television (Lichter *et al.* 1994: ch. 9), as has acceptance of routine police violation of due process legal restraints (Dominick 1978: 117; Garofalo 1981: 327; Sparks 1992: ch. 6).

Victims have moved from a shadowy and purely functional role in crime narratives to a pivotal position. Film and television stories focus increasingly on the plight of victims, whose suffering is portrayed more graphically and often constitutes the driving force of the story (Allen *et al.* 1998; Reiner *et al.* 2000 and 2001). Support for law enforcement

and criminal justice is increasingly constructed in narratives by presenting them as defenders or avengers of victims with whose suffering the audience is invited to identify.

THE MEDIA REPRESENTATION OF CRIME: A SUMMARY

1. News and fiction stories about crime are prominent in all media. While there is evidence of increasing attention to crime in some parts of the media, overall this fascination has been constant throughout media history.

2. News and fiction concentrate overwhelmingly on serious violent crimes against individuals, albeit with some variation according to medium and market. The proportion of different crimes represented is the inverse of official statistics.

3. The demographic profile of offenders and victims in the media is older and higher status than those processed by the criminal justice system. Child victims and perpetrators are also represented disproportionately.

4. The risks of crime as portrayed by the media are both quantitatively and qualitatively more serious than the official statistically recorded picture, although the media underplay the current probabilities of victimization by property crimes.

5. The media generally present a very positive image of the success and integrity of the police, and criminal justice more generally. However, in both news and fiction there is a clear trend to criticism of law enforcement, in terms of both its effectiveness and its justice and honesty. While in the past the unbroken media picture was that *Crime Does Not Pay* (the title of a series of short films produced by MGM between 1935 and 1947), this is increasingly called into question in contemporary news and fiction.

6. Individual victims and their suffering increasingly provide the motive force of crime stories.

The next section will discuss the possible implications of this pattern of representation.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF MEDIA IMAGES OF CRIME

This section offers an analysis of the vast research literature assessing the impact of media images of crime. Much of the inspiration (and dollars) for empirical evaluations of media effects derives from the broader, apocalyptic concerns of subversion or hegemony. However, in practice most research has sought to measure two possible consequences of media representations (which are not mutually exclusive): criminal behaviour (especially violence); and fear of crime (for a detailed critical survey see Howitt 1998: chs 1, 5–8, 10–11).

THE MEDIA AND CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY

For a crime to occur there are several logically necessary preconditions: labelling; motive; means; opportunity; and the absence of controls. The media potentially play a part in each of these.

Labelling

For an act to be 'criminal' (as distinct from harmful, immoral, antisocial, etc.) it has to be labelled as such. This involves the creation of a legal category. A recorded crime also requires the labelling of the act as criminal by citizens and/or law-enforcement officers. The media are an important factor shaping the conceptual boundaries and recorded volume of crime.

The role of the media in developing new (and eroding old) categories of crime has been emphasized in most of the classic studies of the emergence of criminal law within the 'labelling' tradition. Becker's seminal *Outsiders* analysed the 1937 passage of the US Marijuana Tax Act, showing the use of the media as a tool of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics' moral entrepreneurship (Becker 1963: ch. 7). Jock Young analysed how media representations amplified the deviance of drug-takers (Young 1971). Stan Cohen coined the influential concept of 'moral panic' in his study of how the media together with the police developed a spiral of respectable fear about 'mods' and 'rockers' (Cohen 1972). Hall *et al.*'s analysis of the 1973 moral panic about a supposedly new type of robbery, 'mugging', emphasized the crucial part played by the media. Newspapers stimulated public anxiety, producing changes in policing and criminal justice that became a self-fulfilling spiral of deviancy amplification (Hall *et al.* 1978).

Many subsequent studies have illustrated the role of the media in shaping the boundaries of criminality by creating new categories of offence, or by changing perceptions and sensitivities, leading to fluctuations in apparent crime. For example, Roger Graef's celebrated 1982 fly-on-the-wall documentary about the Thames Valley Police was a key impetus to reform of police treatment of rape victims (Gregory and Lees 1999; 'TV that changed the world', *Radio Times*, 24–30 November 2001). This also contributed, however, to a rise in the proportion of victims reporting rape, and thus an increase in the recorded rate. Many other studies document media-amplified 'crime waves' and 'moral panics' about law and order.³ Thus increases and decreases in recorded crime levels may be due in part to the deviance construction and amplifying activities of the media (Barak 1994; Ferrell and Sanders 1995; Jewkes 2004: ch. 3).

Motive

A crime will not occur unless someone is tempted, driven, or otherwise motivated to carry out the 'labelled' act. The media feature in many of the most commonly offered social and psychological theories of the formation of criminal dispositions. Probably the most influential sociological theory of how criminal motives are formed is Merton's

³ e.g. Fishman 1981; Christensen *et al.* 1982; Altheide 1993; Lees 1995; Brownstein 1995; Beckett and Sasson 2000: ch. 4, 5, 7; Critcher 2003.

version of anomie theory (Merton 1938; Messner and Rosenfeld 2000; Rock, chapter 1 in this volume). The media are pivotal in presenting for universal emulation images of affluent lifestyles and a consumerist culture, accentuating relative deprivation and generating pressures to acquire ever higher levels of material success regardless of the legitimacy of the means used. Psychological theories of the formation of motives to commit offences also often feature media effects as part of the process. It has been claimed that the images of crime and violence presented by the media are a form of social learning, and may encourage crime by imitation or arousal effects (Bailey 1993; Carey 1993; Wartella 1995: 309–11; Livingstone 1996: 308).

Means

It has often been alleged that the media act as an open university of crime, spreading knowledge of criminal techniques. This is often claimed in relation to particular *causes célèbres* or horrific crimes, for example during the 1950s' campaign against crime and horror comics (Barker 1984b; Nyberg 1998). A notorious case was the allegation that the murderers of Jamie Bulger had been influenced by the video *Child's Play 3* in the manner in which they killed the unfortunate toddler (Jewkes 2004: 12). A related line of argument is the 'copycat' theory of crime and rioting (Tumber 1982; Howitt 1998: 75–84; Surette 1998: 137–52). Video games such as *Grand Theft Auto* have been accused of being an especially potent source of learning about crime, as the player is placed in the subject position of a criminal (Hayward 2004: 172–3, 193–4). Despite much discussion, the evidence that these are major sources of crime is weak (Young 2004; Hargrave and Livingstone 2006).

New forms of media have sometimes been seen as creating new means to commit crime. This concern has been particularly stimulated by the Internet, which is feared as facilitating all sorts of offences, from fraud, identity theft, child pornography and grooming children for sex, to organizing transnational crime and terrorism (Wall 2001; Jewkes 2003; Brown 2003: ch. 5; Hargrave and Livingstone 2006).

Opportunity

The media may increase opportunities to commit offences by contributing to the development of a consumerist ethos, in which the availability of tempting targets of theft proliferates (Hayward 2004; Hallsworth 2005: 62–3, ch. 7). They can also alter 'routine activities', especially in relation to the use of leisure time, which structure opportunities for offending (Cohen and Felson 1979). The domestic hardware and software of mass media use—TVs, videos, radios, CDs, personal computers, mobile phones—are the common currency of routine property crime, and their proliferation has been an important aspect of the spread of criminal opportunities.

Absence of controls

Motivated potential offenders, with the means and opportunities to commit offences, may still not carry out these crimes if effective social controls are in place. These might be *external*—the deterrent threat of sanctions represented in the first place by the

police—or *internal*—the still, small voice of conscience—what Eysenck has called the ‘inner policeman’.

A regularly recurring theme of respectable anxieties about the criminogenic consequences of media images of crime is that they erode the efficacy of both external and internal controls. They may undermine external controls by derogatory representations of criminal justice, for example ridiculing its agents, a key complaint at least since the days of Dogberry, resuscitated more recently by the popularity of comic images of the police, from the Keystone Cops onwards. Serious representations of criminal justice might undermine its legitimacy by becoming more critical, questioning the integrity and fairness, or the efficiency and effectiveness of the police. Negative representations of criminal justice could lessen public cooperation with the system, or potential offenders’ perception of the probability of sanctions, with the consequence of increasing crime.

Probably the most frequently suggested line of causation between media representations and criminal behaviour is the allegation that the media undermine internalized controls, by regularly presenting sympathetic or glamorous images of offending. In academic form this is found in the psychological theories about disinhibition and desensitization (Wartella 1995: 309–12; Surette 1998: 119–30 are succinct evaluations).

CRIMINOGENIC MEDIA? THE RESEARCH EVIDENCE

In a comprehensive review of the research literature, Sonia Livingstone noted that ‘since the 1920s thousands of studies of mass media effects have been conducted’ (Livingstone 1996: 306). She added that even listing the references to research in the previous decade would exhaust the space allocated to her article (some twenty pages). Reviews of the literature regularly recycle the apotheosis of agnosticism represented by the conclusion of one major study from the 1960s: ‘for some children, under some conditions, some television is harmful. For some children under the same conditions, or for the same children under other conditions, it may be beneficial. For most children, under most conditions, most television is probably neither particularly harmful nor particularly beneficial’ (Schramm *et al.* 1961: 11).

This meagre conclusion from the expenditure of countless research hours and dollars is primarily a testimony to the limitations and difficulties of empirical social science. The armoury of possible research techniques for assessing directly the effects of media images on crime is sparse, and suffers from evident and long-recognized limitations.

The archetypal technique has been some version of the classic experiment: a group of subjects are exposed to a media stimulus—say a film—and the response is measured, by comparing behaviour or attitudes before and after. In a characteristic example, children of four to five were shown a five-minute film in the researcher’s office, and then taken to a room with toys and observed for 20 minutes through a one-way mirror (Bandura *et al.* 1961, 1963). The children were randomly assigned to watch one of three films, enacting scenarios in which a boy who attacked another boy and some toys was

depicted as being rewarded, or punished, or neither. The children (especially the boys) who saw the film about the boy rewarded for his attack by getting all the toys, were observed to carry out twice as much imitative aggression as the other groups, but no more non-imitative aggression.

This example shows all the problems of inferring conclusions about links between media and violence from laboratory-style experiments. Are the results a Hawthorn effect arising from the experimental situation itself? For instance, were the more aggressive children who saw a film in which aggression was rewarded influenced by their perception that the experimenter approved of such behaviour? How far can results from one context of viewing be extrapolated to others? Do experimental results exaggerate the links in the everyday world by picking up short-term effects of media exposure that rapidly evaporate? Or do they underestimate the long-term cumulative effects of regular, repeated exposures by measuring only one-off results? To some the artificiality of such experiments fatally compromises them (Surette 1998: 122–3). Others point out that ‘laboratories’ (or more typically researchers’ offices or other convenient campus locations) are social situations ‘whose particular dynamics and meanings must be considered . . . and generalisability depends on how far these same factors may occur or not in everyday life’ (Livingstone 1996: 310).

Given the huge number of such experimental studies (using different forms of stimuli and different types of measures of response, for different sorts of subjects, at many different times and places) it is hardly surprising that there are variations in the extent of effect shown, if any. However, most studies do show *some* effect, and the few that conducted follow-ups over time found that while effects diminished by about 25 per cent over the fortnight or so after an experiment, they do not disappear (Livingstone 1996: 309–10). There are many suggestions in the experimental literature about what determines the degree of effect caused by media exposures. These include the perceived realism of the representation, whether violence or deviance was seen as justified, punished, or rewarded, whether the viewers identified with the perpetrator, the variable vulnerability or susceptibility of the viewer, and so on (*ibid.*).

Typically, however, the effects of exposure to media stimuli in experimental situations are small. Interestingly, most of the research has looked at supposed negative effects of media, such as violence. The few studies that have examined the effects of ‘prosocial’ images suggest that these are much larger. One meta-analysis of 230 studies of media effects estimated that overall they showed that a single exposure to violent or stereotyped content was followed by about an extra 20 per cent of ‘antisocial’ responses, compared to an extra 50 per cent of ‘prosocial’ responses after viewing positive images (Hearold 1986; Livingstone 1996: 309).

Given the limitations of laboratory experiments, some studies have tried to assess the effects of media exposure in ‘natural’ everyday situations. One method has been by looking at the introduction of some form of medium (usually television) in an area where it did not exist before. This was most frequently done in the 1950s, when the spread of television ownership, first in the USA, then in the UK, provided the opportunity of a once-and-for-all natural experiment. One study of matched sets of 34

US cities in the early 1950s found that larceny increased by about 5 per cent in those cities where television was introduced for the first time, compared to cities without TV or those that had been receiving it for some time (Hennigan *et al.* 1982). However, British research in the same period does not find similar effects on deviance (Himmelweit *et al.* 1958; Livingstone 1996: 312–13). Since the virtually universal availability of television, such natural experiments are seldom possible. One recent example found that children's verbal and physical aggression increased in a Northern Canadian town after television was introduced, compared to two towns with established television (Williams 1986). While such natural experiments do not suffer from the artificiality of their laboratory counterparts, they are of course less completely controlled: the possibility can never be ruled out that differences between areas (even if roughly matched) were due to factors other than television.

Several studies have compared the viewing patterns of known offenders and (supposed) non-offenders. Some have concluded that more exposure to television is related to greater aggressiveness (see Belson 1978, and the other examples in Wartella 1995: 307–9); others that the viewing preferences of delinquents are remarkably similar to the general pattern for their age (Hagell and Newburn 1994). Neither conclusion is free from the possibility of other, unmeasured factors explaining either the association or the lack of it.

There is also evidence that abuses of power by police and other criminal justice agents may be affected by media representations. A study of 'reality' television programmes such as *Cops* suggested that the police may adopt forms of entrapment or illicit punishment of offenders to ensure good video footage for such shows (Doyle 1998: 110–12, 2003).

The big fix: the media-crime connection

Reviews of the research literature generally 'conclude that there is a correlation between violence viewing and aggressive behaviour, a relationship that holds even when a variety of controls are imposed' (Wartella 1995: 306). However, the overall negative effects of media exposure seem to be small compared to other features in the social experience of offenders. Thus 'the question that remains is not whether media violence has an effect, but rather how important that effect has been, in comparison with other factors, in bringing about major social changes such as the postwar rise in crime' (*ibid.*: 312).

One problem with most of the effects debate and research is that it has often been directed at a rather implausible notion (Brown 2003: 27–9). What has been at issue is the will-o'-the-wisp of a 'pure' media effect. The implicit model was of the media as hypodermic syringe, injecting ideas and values into a passive public of cultural dopes. Audiences are not passive recipients, however, but active interpreters, in a complex process of interaction with other cultural and social practices (Livingstone *et al.* 2001; Carrabine *et al.* 2002: 129–34). Changes in media representations do not come fully formed from another planet and affect behaviour patterns *ex nihilo*, but reflect ongoing changes in social perceptions and practices. Changing media images are interpreted by different audiences in various ways, which may reinforce or alter emerging social

patterns. The relationship between developments in the media and in the wider society is a dialectical one. While this makes the isolation and measurement of pure media effects chimerical, it certainly does not imply that media representations have no significant consequences.

As Sonia Livingstone concluded:

Most media researchers believe that the media have significant effects, even though they are hard to demonstrate, and most would agree that the media make a significant contribution to the social construction of reality. The problem is to move beyond this platitude . . . The study of enculturation processes, which work over long time periods, and which are integral to rather than separate from other forms of social determination, would not ask how the media make us act or think, but rather how the media contribute to making us who we are [Livingstone 1996: 31–2].

A further limitation of the effects literature is that it has been almost exclusively concerned with the consequences of violent and other representations of deviance. The theoretical connections examined earlier suggest that media representations of non-law-breaking behaviour, for example advertising and other images of consumerist lifestyles, may increase anomie and hence offending. The most plausible criminogenic implications of media representations concern how they impact on material aspirations and conceptions of legitimate means of achievement, not how they depict crime or violence directly.

THE MEDIA AND FEAR OF CRIME

In recent years policy debates have identified fear of crime as an issue potentially as serious as crime itself (Ditton and Farrell 2000; Hope and Sparks 2000; Jackson 2004; Ditton *et al.* 2004; Chadee and Ditton 2005). Concern is not just about the unnecessary pain of excessive anxiety, nor even the damage done to trust and social relations by fear and the prevention strategies it encourages. In the ‘cultivation analysis’ tradition which Gerbner and his associates have been developing for thirty years, media images of crime and violence are a threat to democracy (Gerbner 1970, 1995).

Fearful people are more dependent, more easily manipulated and controlled, more susceptible to deceptively simple, strong, tough measures and hard-line postures—both political and religious. They may accept and even welcome repression if it promises to relieve their insecurities and other anxieties (Signorielli 1990: 102). When reel-world violence is compared to real-world crime as measured by official statistics, it appears that the media images exaggerate the probability and severity of danger. This is said to ‘cultivate’ a misleading view of the world based on unnecessary anxiety about levels of risk from violent crime (*ibid.*: 96–102).

There has been extensive criticism of the empirical and theoretical validity of these claims (Howitt 1998: ch. 4; Ditton *et al.* 2004). How much of the association between measures of exposure to the media and of fearfulness survives the introduction of other control variables such as class, race, gender, place of residence, and actual experience of

crime (Doob and MacDonald 1979; Chadee 2001; Roberts 2001)? Could any association between viewing and fearfulness result from the opposite causal process, that is, do more fearful viewers watch more television rather than vice versa? More generally, it appears that 'cultivation' does not export well. British attempts to replicate the Gerbner findings have failed to do so (Wober 1978; Gunter 1985).

Although the debate about the empirical validity of the cultivation hypothesis continues, there is only limited evidence from other studies to confirm the plausible idea that exposure to media images is associated with fear of crime. An extensive multivariate analysis concluded that there was a significant relationship between reading newspapers with more emphasis on violent crime and measures of fearfulness expressed in a survey (Williams and Dickinson 1993). This association survived control by a number of demographic variables, such as socio-economic status, gender, and age. However, this association was not found with behavioural concomitants of fear, such as going out after dark. Neither could the study rule out the possibility that fear led to heavier readership of newspapers with more crime, rather than vice versa. On the empirical issue, while it remains a reasonable hypothesis that much public fear of crime is created or accentuated by media exposure, the research evidence remains equivocal about the strength, or even existence, of such a causal relationship (Sacco 1995: 151; Jewkes 2004: ch. 6; Greer 2005: 171–3; Ditton *et al.* 2004; Chadee and Ditton 2005). Most studies have not examined how frequently people experience fear, as opposed to their responses to particular surveys (Farrall and Gadd 2004).

Much of this inconclusiveness is rooted in the theoretical limitations of positivist content analysis (Sparks 1992: ch. 4). Items of violence are collated according to operational definitions used by observers, without reference to the narrative contexts within which they are embedded. Most stories have conclusions concurring with Miss Prism's celebrated definition of fiction: 'The good ended happily, and the bad unhappily' (Oscar Wilde, *The Importance of Being Earnest*, Act II). Although there is a trend towards greater ambivalence and ambiguity, most crime stories still have an underlying emphasis on just resolutions of conflict and violence (Zillman and Wakshlag 1987; Reiner *et al.* 2000 and 2001). It is not obvious that exposure to high degrees of violence en route to a happy ending has a fear-enhancing effect. 'When suspenseful drama featuring victimisation is known to contain a satisfying resolution, apprehensive individuals should anticipate pleasure and enjoyment' (Wakshlag *et al.* 1983: 238).

Quantitative assessments of the relationship between 'objectively' measured units of media content and survey responses cannot begin to understand the complex and dynamic interdependence of the differential experiences of crime, violence, and risk of different social groups and their subjective interpretations of the meaning of texts. The subtle intertwinings of differential social positions and life experiences with the reception of media texts is only beginning to be addressed by studies of content and interpretation. These use qualitative methods and ways of reading that seek to be sensitive to the complexities of analysing meaning (Sparks 1992, 2000, 2001; Schlesinger *et al.* 1992; Livingstone *et al.* 2001; Ditton *et al.* 2004). As with the issue of the effects of media images on criminality, so too with fear, the issue is not whether

media representations have consequences. Hardly anyone would deny this. The agenda is the unravelling of the complex interrelationship of media content and other dimensions of social structure and experience in shaping offending behaviour, fear of crime, and the politics of law and order (Sasson 1995; Beckett 1997; Girling *et al.* 2000; Stenson and Sullivan 2000; Hope and Sparks 2000; Garland 2001; Greve 2004; Cavender 2004).

THE CAUSES OF MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS OF CRIME

What processes and priorities produce the pattern of representation of crime? Until recently, accounts of the production of crime news were primarily based on inferences drawn from content analyses and the political economy of the media (e.g. Hall *et al.* 1978; Sherizen 1978; Tunnell 1998; Green 2001). There is now a body of empirical research on the production process, based on interviews with reporters and other creative personnel, or the police (e.g. Chibnall 1977; Fishman 1981; Ross 1998; Mawby 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002; Innes 1999, 2001; Greer 2003), and/or observation (Ericson *et al.* 1987, 1989, 1991; Schlesinger *et al.* 1991; Schlesinger and Tumber 1992, 1993, 1994; Chermak 1995, 1998; Skidmore 1996; Doyle 1998, 2003).

CRIME NEWS AS HEGEMONY IN ACTION

Most of the earlier studies supported a version of the dominant ideology model. The immediate source of news content was the ideology of the reporter, personal and professional. However, a variety of organizational and professional imperatives exerted pressure for the production of news with the characteristics identified by content analyses. The sources of news production were seen as threefold:

1. The political ideology of the press.
2. The elements of 'newsworthiness'.
3. Structural determinants of news-making.

The political ideology of the press

The majority of newspapers have a more or less overtly C/conservative political ideology, and individual reporters are aware of this whatever their personal leanings. The broadcasting media, especially the BBC, are characterized by an ethic of political neutrality and professional objectivity in performing a public service of providing news information. In practice, however, this becomes a viewpoint which takes for granted certain broad beliefs and values, those of moderate, middle-of-the-road majority opinion—what Stuart Hall succinctly called a 'world at one with itself' (Hall 1970). The

master concepts of this worldview include such notions as the 'national interest', the 'British way of life', and the 'democratic process' as epitomized by Westminster. In political or industrial conflict situations these are seen as threatened by 'mindless militants' manipulated by extremist minorities seeking 'anarchy' and subversion, with only the 'thin blue line' to save the day for law and order (Chibnall 1977: 21). Political conflict is assimilated to routine crime: both are portrayed as pathological conditions unrelated to wider social structures (Clarke and Taylor 1980; Hillyard 1982; Iyengar 1991; Beckett 1997: 38; Lawrence 2000: 57–60).

Traditional crime reporters explicitly saw it as their responsibility to present the police and the criminal justice system in as favourable a light as possible. As one put it: 'If I've got to come down on one side or the other, either the goodies or the baddies, then obviously I'd come down on the side of the goodies, in the interests of law and order' (Chibnall 1977: 145). This of course did not mean that even the most pro-police crime reporter would not pursue stories of police malpractice as assiduously as possible. But it generated a tendency to present these within a 'one bad apple' framework (*ibid.*: ch. 5). However, the characteristics of crime reporting were more immediately the product of a professional sense of news values rather than any explicitly political ideology.

The elements of 'newsworthiness'

News content is generated and filtered primarily through reporters' sense of 'newsworthiness', what makes a good story that their audience wants to know about, rather than any overtly ideological considerations. The core elements of this include immediacy, dramatization, personalization, titillation, and novelty (Chibnall 1977: 22–45; Jewkes 2004: ch. 2 offers an elaborated set). The primacy of these news values explains the predominant emphasis on violent and sex offences, and the concentration on higher-status offenders and victims, especially celebrities. It also accounts for the tendency to avoid stories about crime trends and patterns.

These news values also encourage the presentation of political violence or disorder in terms of individual pathology rather than ideological opposition; as discrete criminal events, not manifestations of structural conflict (Halloran *et al.* 1970; Hall 1973; Lawrence 2000: ch. 3).

Structural determinants of news-making

A variety of concrete organizational pressures underlying news production have unintended consequences, bolstering the law and order stance of most crime reporting. For example, concentrating personnel at institutional settings like courts, where newsworthy events can be expected to recur regularly, is an economic use of reporting resources. But it has the unintended consequence of concentrating on cleared-up cases, creating a misleading sense of police effectiveness.

The need to produce reports to fit the time schedules of news production contributes to their event orientation, the concentration on specific crimes at the expense of analysis of causal processes or policies (Rock 1973: 76–9; Lawrence 2000: ch. 8).

Considerations of personal safety and convenience lead cameramen covering riots typically to film from behind police lines, which unintentionally structures an image of the police as vulnerable 'us' threatened by menacing 'them' (Murdock 1982: 108–9).

The police and the criminal justice system control much of the information on which crime reporters rely, and this gives them a degree of power as essential accredited sources. Crime reporters tend to develop a symbiotic relationship with the contacts and organizations they use regularly, especially the police (Chibnall 1977: ch. 3 and 6). Institutional sources on which reporters structurally depend, notably the police, become the 'primary definers' of crime news, which tends to be filtered through their perspective (Hall *et al.* 1978: 58; Lawrence 2000: ch. 3).

In recent years the production of crime news (like news in general) has been transformed by a decline in the use of specialist reporters, including court and crime correspondents. This is due to the increasing news emphasis on celebrities, and the increasingly commercial orientation of the multimedia conglomerates that own most news outlets, which has restricted editorial budgets severely. Many crime and criminal justice stories, cases, and issues now fail to get aired prominently or perhaps at all, even in the sensationalist manner that used to be a core news staple (Davies 1999). Crime news increasingly shares in the increasingly dominant celebrity culture. Stories with famous victims or perpetrators are the acme of news value, as illustrated by the impact of the murder of Jill Dando.

In sum, the hegemonic model sees news content as the largely unintended but determined consequence of the structure and political economy of news production. 'Journalists are not *necessarily* biased towards the powerful—but their bureaucratic organisation and cultural assumptions make them conduits of that power' (McNair 1993: 48).

CRIME NEWS AS CULTURAL CONFLICT

Empirical studies of the crime news production process suggest that the deterministic implications of the hegemonic model require qualification (Ericson *et al.* 1987, 1989, 1991; Schlesinger *et al.* 1991; Schlesinger and Tumber 1992, 1993, 1994; Greer 2003). They do not overthrow its fundamental implications, however, but confirm earlier accounts of the structuring of news-gathering and presentation around a sense of news values, criteria leading to the selection of particular types of stories and perspectives. These constitute a 'vocabulary of precedents': not hard and fast rules, but 'what previous exemplars tell them should be done in the present instance' (Ericson *et al.* 1987: 348). There is scope for flexibility and judgement; the newsroom is not characterized by normative consensus but by negotiation and conflict between reporters, editors, and sources. News stories vary in character. Many are routine fillers, where a clearly established paradigm is followed, albeit with new names, dates, and details each time. What usually makes a story newsworthy at all is some departure from expected norms, an element of freakishness or an opportunity to explore everyday moral dilemmas (Katz 1987). But the big stories are ones where novelty and other news values are high,

and there is proximity to the intended audience so the events have particular salience for them (Greer 2003: ch. 3; Jewkes 2004: ch. 2).

There is always a tension between two contradictory pressures. The highest journalistic accolade is the 'scoop', reporting a high-news-value story that has not yet been reported. This exerts pressure to be ahead of the pack, to seek out sources that no rivals have yet found. However, the worst possible scenario is to miss important information that everybody else has. This generates a tendency to hunt with the pack, mining the same sources as rivals. The fear of failure usually prevails over the lure of the scoop, on minimax principles, which is why front pages tend to be so similar.

There are also systematic variations between news stories in different media and markets. This is partly because they have different variants of political and professional journalistic ideology according to patterns of ownership (state versus private, for example) and perceived audience (business or policy elites, other opinion leaders, liberal professionals, or a mass public seeking entertainment; local or national). These are interconnected with differences in technological resources, budgetary limitations, and the different 'grammars' of written and spoken language, still and moving pictures.

Observation also alerts analysts to the ever-present role of contingency and cock-ups (Ericson *et al.* 1991: 93–4). 'We know that at the level of production news is more procedure-related than content-related' (*ibid.*), and procedures can be disrupted for all sorts of random reasons.

Detailed study reveals that there is more diversity, negotiation, and contingency than the hegemony model implies, not only within news organizations, but also in the sources used. These now range far beyond the accredited agencies of the formal criminal justice institutions (Schlesinger and Tumber 1994; Lawrence 2000; Greer 2003: 32–3). Groups critical of the establishment (such as penal reform or civil liberties groups) *are* given a voice, depending in part on their organizational and presentational skills, their hold on interesting knowledge, and on medium and market differences.

Empirical analyses of news production in action do emphasize its contingency and fluidity, but they do not fundamentally challenge the hegemonic model. While news may be a competitive arena of conflicting viewpoints, it is culturally and structurally loaded. For all the fluidity and contingency observed in the process of production, in the final analysis 'the news media are as much an agency of *policing* as the law-enforcement agencies whose activities and classifications are reported on' (Ericson *et al.* 1991: 74). They reproduce order in the process of representing it.

Although there have been many studies of the production of crime news, there has been no comparable research on fiction. All we have is memoirs of writers, directors, and other creators of crime fiction, and fan-oriented biographies or accounts of the making of particular films or programmes. The sole exception is an interview study of Hollywood writers, directors, and producers of television shows and cinema films (Lichter *et al.* 1994: Part IV; Powers *et al.* 1996: ch. 3). This depicts them as former 1960s radicals on a 'long march' through the institutions. Their ideology combines acceptance of the economic and political institutions of America, to which they owe their status and privileges, with a libertarian stance on issues of personal and sexual morality that

they have carried since their youth. They feel a mission to put as much of this into their work as is compatible with the overriding priority of keeping the audience ratings high and the networks happy. How this expressed ideology translates into actual creative and production practices has not been studied, however, in any research analogous to that on crime news.

OBSERVERS OR PLAYERS? THE MEDIA AND CRIME IN POSTMODERNITY

In the introduction to this chapter two competing concerns about media representations of crime were outlined: the 'respectable fear' that they were subversive and desubordinating; and the radical anxiety that they were a means of social control and discipline. The review of research suggests that there is a complex interplay between media representations of crime, criminal behaviour, and criminal justice.

With variations according to medium and market, mass media news and entertainment are saturated with stories about crime. These disproportionately feature the most serious and violent crimes, but strip them from any analytic framework. The emphasis is on crime as the product of individual choice and free-floating evil, diverting attention from any links to social structure or culture (Sasson 1995). There is strong evidence that media images *can* influence criminal behaviour, but overall their direct effect is small relative to other factors. This is largely because people vary in their interpretation of representations according to demographic, generational, and other life-course factors. There is a variety of ways theoretically in which media representations could influence crime rates and patterns. For example, the overall volume of property crime is likely to be affected by media portrayals of material success as the acme of the good life in a context of structural inequalities of opportunity, as Mertonian strain theories suggest. It is unlikely to be an accident that the remorseless rise of volume property crime after the mid-1950s in Britain coincided with the advent of commercial television. Research on media effects has mainly assessed the consequences of representations of crime, using rather inadequate models and methods, not the theoretically more plausible criminogenic implications of other aspects of the media, for example the celebration of consumerism.

The disciplinary role of media stories about crime, reproducing as well as representing order, is supported more clearly by the research. This is partly because media representations exaggerate the threat of crime and promote policing and punishment as the antidote. Because of organizational exigencies as for much as ideological reasons, the media present viewpoints on crime and criminal justice policy which—though not monolithic—are loaded towards official definitions. They tend to frame crime issues increasingly in a 'law and order' perspective so other approaches become marginalized (Sasson 1995; Beckett 1997; Altheide 2002; Cavender 2004).

The present trends indicate a growing symbiosis between media images, criminality, and criminal justice. In Simon Lee's words, 'The media are no longer, if they ever were, observers of the scene, they are players in the game' (cited in Peay 1998: 8). This accentuates past patterns to an extent amounting to a qualitatively new stage. The insecure borderline between purportedly factual and fictional narratives is eroding. A growing variety of criminal justice lobbies and pressure groups seek to influence, if not construct, the news. At the same time technological developments interact with cultural changes to produce more 'reality' broadcasting (Fishman and Cavender 1998).

The current stage of development reflects the impact of the more general features of 'postmodernity' on the relationship between media, crime, and criminal justice (Brown 2003). The space-time distancing between criminal cases and their reporting in the media, and the reciprocal feedback of images on practice, are eroding rapidly (Giddens 1984; Thompson 1995). Increasing numbers of criminal justice events, such as the 1992 Los Angeles riots or the O. J. Simpson case, are broadcast around the world literally as they are happening. An ever-wider range of participants in the criminal justice process are not only seeking to influence representations but are creating events specifically for the media. 'We live in a dramatised world' (Ericson 1991: 235), where the media are participants in the processes they represent. Criminal justice agencies tailor their activities to public relations, how their activities will play on the news. Police investigate (sometimes instigate) all the crimes fit to print. Crimes and legal processes are not only reflected in reporting with greater rapidity, they may be created for news stories. Offences have been incited by law-enforcement agencies in order to have the successful investigation televised (as in the Azscam entrapment case analysed by Altheide 1993). Since the 1960s, protesters and police act with self-conscious awareness that 'the whole world is watching' (Gitlin 1980). The tragedy of 11 September 2001 is simply the most vivid and dramatic example of these developments to date, when thousands of people were murdered in front of the eyes of television audiences around the globe, in a way calculated to achieve the maximum possible media impact.

The mass media are important not only because of their ideological significance. Media technology plays an increasingly direct role in social control, above all through the growth of CCTV and other forms of surveillance (Norris and Armstrong 1999; McCahill 2003; Jewkes 2004: ch. 7). Media technology can also be used to control the controllers, to make authorities more accountable, as the use of CCTV and other recording devices in police stations shows (Newburn and Hayman 2001). The proliferation of cheap, portable cameras contributes to this too, as the Rodney King case indicated (Lawrence 2000). Mass media technologies make the model of contemporary social control a Synopticon (Mathiesen 1997): they provide the means for the many to see the few, offsetting the Benthamite paradigm of the few observing the many. However, this reciprocal process of surveillance between elites and masses is highly unbalanced. The greater vulnerability of the powerful to exposure and scandal does not fundamentally change structures of power and advantage. Indeed Mathiesen argues plausibly that the illusion of intimacy with elites, provided by contemporary media surveillance of their activities, gives people a misleading sense of empowerment which

acts as a more complex process of discipline than traditional forms of legitimation. It is possible, he argues, 'that the control and discipline of the "soul", that is, the creation of human beings who control themselves through self-control and thus fit neatly into a so-called democratic capitalist society, is a task which is actually fulfilled by a modern Synopticon' (Mathiesen 1997: 215).

The growing interdependence of media representation and social 'reality' raises the spectre of 'a media spiral in which the representations of crime and the fear of crime precisely constitute . . . the hyperreal' (Osborne 1996: 36). Certainly these developments vastly complicate the vexed question of how images and narratives that are felt to be undesirable can be regulated or influenced. Perhaps hope lies precisely in the greater openness of the media to a diversity of inputs and influences. Past experience, however, suggests the more pessimistic prediction that although contemporary mass communications present 'an appreciably open terrain for struggles for justice' (Ericson 1991: 242), the dice are loaded in favour of dominant interests—even if they have to struggle harder for their hegemony.

■ SELECTED FURTHER READING

Richard Sparks's *Television and the Drama of Crime* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1992) is a theoretically sophisticated critique of content analyses of crime fiction, and their relationship to fear of crime. Illuminating recent studies of the production of crime news are the trilogy by R. Ericson, P. Baranek, and J. Chan, *Visualising Deviance, Negotiating Control, and Representing Order* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1987, 1989, 1991 respectively); P. Schlesinger and H. Tumber's *Reporting Crime* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); and C. Greer, *Sex Crime and the Media* (Cullompton, Devon: Willan, 2004). Useful reviews of the research on media effects can be found in: S. Livingstone, 'On the Continuing Problem of Media Effects', in J. Curran and M. Gurevitch (eds), *Mass Media and Society* (London: Arnold, 1996); D. Howitt, *Crime, The Media and the Law* (London: Wiley, 1998); and from a fundamentally critical perspective, M. Barker and J. Petley (eds), *Ill Effects*, 2nd edn, (London: Routledge, 2001). Excellent recent texts on crime and media are S. Brown, *Crime and Law in Media Culture* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2003) and Y. Jewkes, *Media and Crime* (London: Sage, 2004). Chapters offering excellent brief reviews of the literature are: K. Beckett and T. Sasson, *The Politics of Injustice* (Thousand Oaks, Cal.: Pine Forge, 2000), chs 5, 6; E. Carrabine, P. Iganski, M. Lee, K. Plummer, and N. South, *Criminology* (London: Routledge, 2004), ch. 18; C. Greer 'Crime and Media' in C. Hale, K. Hayward, A. Wahidin, and E. Wincup (eds), *Criminology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). Useful edited volumes offering a rich diversity of research papers on media and crime are: R. Ericson (ed.), *Crime and the Media* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995); D. Kidd-Hewitt and R. Osborne (eds), *Crime and the Media: The Post-Modern Spectacle* (London: Pluto, 1996); P. Mason (ed.), *Criminal Visions* (Cullompton, Devon: Willan, 2003). Valuable specialist journals are *Crime, Media, Culture* (London: Sage) and *Journal of Crime, Conflict and Media Culture* (www.jc2m.co.uk).

■ REFERENCES

- ALLEN, J., LIVINGSTONE, S., and REINER, R. (1997), 'The Changing Generic Location of Crime in Film', *Journal of Communication*, 47(4): 1–13.
- , —, and — (1998), 'True Lies: Changing Images of Crime in British Postwar Cinema', *European Journal of Communication*, 13(1): 53–75.
- ALTHEIDE, D. (1993), 'Electronic Media and State Control: The Case of Azscam', *The Sociological Quarterly*, 34(1): 53–69.
- (2002) *Creating Fear: News and the Construction of Crisis*, New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- BAILEY, F., and HALE, D. (eds) (1998), *Popular Culture, Crime and Justice*, Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth.
- BAILEY, S. (1993), 'Fast Forward to Violence: Violent Visual Imaging and Serious Juvenile Crime', *Criminal Justice Matters*, 11 (Spring): 6–7.
- BANDURA, A., ROSS, D., and ROS, S.A. (1961), 'Transmission of Aggression Through Imitation of Aggressive Models', *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 63(3): 575–82.
- BARAK, G. (ed.) (1994), *Media, Process, and the Social Construction of Crime*, New York: Garland.
- BARCLAY, G., and TAVARES, C. (1999), *Information on the Criminal Justice System in England and Wales: Digest 4*, London: Home Office.
- BARKER, M. (1984a), *A Haunt of Fears*, London: Pluto.
- (1984b), *The Video Nasties: Freedom and Censorship in the Media*, London: Pluto.
- and PETLEY, J. (eds) (2001), *Ill Effects: The Media/Violence Debate*, 2nd edn, London: Routledge.
- BARLOW, M. H. (1998), 'Race and the Problem of Crime in Time and Newsweek Cover Stories, 1946–1995', *Social Justice*, 25: 149–83.
- BECKER, H. (1963), *Outsiders*, New York: Free Press.
- BECKETT, K. (1997), *Making Crime Pay*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- and SASSON, T. (2000), *The Politics of Injustice*, Thousand Oaks, Cal.: Pine Forge Press.
- BELL, I. A., and DALDRY, G. (eds) (1990), *Watching the Detectives*, London: Macmillan.
- BELSON, W. (1978), *Television Violence and the Adolescent Boy*, Westmead: Saxon House.
- BINYON, T. J. (1989), *Murder Will Out: The Detective in Fiction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- BIRESSI, A. (2001), *Crime, Fear and the Law in True Crime Stories*, London: Palgrave.
- BROWN, S. (2003), *Crime and Law in Media Culture*, Buckingham: Open University Press.
- BROWNSTEIN, H. (1995), 'The Media and the Construction of Random Drug Violence', in J. Ferrell and C.R. Sanders (eds), *Cultural Criminology*, 45–65, Boston, Mass.: Northeastern University Press.
- BUXTON, D. (1990), *From The Avengers to Miami Vice: Form and Ideology in Television Series*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- CAREY, S. (1993), 'Mass Media Violence and Aggressive Behaviour', *Criminal Justice Matters*, 11(Spring): 8–9.
- CARLSON, J. M. (1985), *Prime-Time Law Enforcement: Crime Show Viewing and Attitudes to the Criminal Justice System*, New York: Praeger.
- CARRABINE, E., COX, P., LEE, M., and SOUTH, N. (eds) (2002), *Crime in Modern Britain*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , IGANSKI, P., LEE, M., PLUMME R, K., and SOUTH, M. (2004), *Criminology*, London: Routledge.
- CAVENDER, G. (2004), 'Media and Crime Policy', *Punishment and Society*, 6(3): 335–348.
- CAWELTI, J. G. (1976), *Adventure, Mystery and Romance*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- CHADEE, D. (2001), 'Fear of Crime and the Media: From Perceptions to Reality', *Criminal Justice Matters*, 43: 10–11.
- and DITTON, J. (2005), 'Fear of Crime and the Media: Assessing the Lack of Relationship', *Crime, Media, Culture*, 1(3): 322–32.
- CHERMAK, S. M. (1995), *Victims in the News: Crime in American News Media*, Boulder Cal.: Westview.
- (1998), 'Police, Courts, and Corrections in the Media', in F. Bailey and D. Hale (eds), *Popular Culture, Crime and Justice*, 87–99, Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth.
- CHIBNALL, S. (1977), *Law-and-Order News*, London: Tavistock.
- and MURPHY, R. (eds) (1999), *British Crime Cinema*, London: Routledge.
- CHIRICOS, T., ESCHHOLZ, S., and GERTZ, M. (1997), 'Crime, News and Fear of Crime', *Social Problems*, 44(3): 342–57.
- CHRISTENSEN, J., SCHMIDT, J., and HENDERSON, J. (1982), 'The Selling of the police: media ideology and crime control', *Contemporary crises*, 6(3): 227–39.

- CLARENS, C. (1997), *Crime Movies*, New York: Da Capo.
- CLARKE, A. (1982), *Television Police Series and Law and Order* (Popular Culture Course Unit 22), Milton Keynes: Open University.
- (1983), 'Holding the Blue Lamp: Television and the Police in Britain', *Crime and Social Justice*, 19: 44–51.
- (1986), 'This is Not the Boy Scouts: Television Police Series and Definitions of Law and Order', in T. Bennett, C. Mercer, and J. Woollacott (eds), *Popular Culture and Social Relations*, 219–32, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- (1992), "'You're Nicked!'" Television Police Series and the Fictional Representation of Law and Order', in D. Strinati and S. Wagg (eds), *Come On Down? Popular Media Culture in Post-War Britain*, 232–53, London: Routledge.
- and TAYLOR, I. (1980), 'Vandals, Pickets and Muggers: Television Coverage of Law and Order in the 1979 Election', *Screen Education*, 36: 99–112.
- CLARKE, J. (2001), 'The Pleasures of Crime: Interrogating the Detective Story', in J. Muncie and E. McLaughlin (eds), *The Problem of Crime*, 2nd edn, 71–106, London: Sage.
- COHEN, L., and FELSON, S. (1979), 'Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activities Approach', *American Sociological Review*, 44: 588–608.
- COHEN, S. (1972), *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, London: Paladin.
- and YOUNG, J. (eds) (1973), *The Manufacture of News*, London: Constable.
- COTTLE, S. (1993), *TV News, Urban Conflict and the Inner City*, Leicester: Leicester University Press.
- CRITCHER, C. (2003), *Moral Panics and the Media*, Buckingham: Open University Press.
- CUMBERBATCH, G. (1989), *A Measure of Uncertainty: The Effects of Mass Media*, Broadcasting Standards Council Research Monograph 1, London: John Libbey.
- , WOODS, S., and MAGUIRE, A. (1995), *Crime in the News: Television, Radio and Newspapers: A Report for BBC Broadcasting Research*, Birmingham: Aston University, Communications Research Group.
- DAHLGREN, P. (1988), 'Crime News: The Fascination of the Mundane', *European Journal of Communication*, 3(1): 189–206.
- DAVIS, N. (1999), 'Getting away with murder', *The Guardian (media Section)*: 4–5, 11 January.
- DAVIS, J. (1952), 'Crime News in Colorado Newspapers', *American Journal of Sociology*, 57: 325–30.
- DEUTSCHMANN, P. (1959), *News Page Content of Twelve Metropolitan Dailies*, Cincinnati, Ohio: Scripps-Howard Research Centre.
- DITTON, J., and DUFFY, J. (1983), 'Bias in the Newspaper Reporting of Crime News', *British Journal of Criminology*, 23(2): 159–65.
- and FARRALL, S. (eds) (2000), *The Fear of Crime*, Aldershot: Dartmouth.
- , CHADEE, D., FARRALL, S., GILCHRIST, E. and BANNISTER, J. (2004), 'From Imitation to Intimidation: A Note on the Curious and Changing Relationship Between the Media, Crime and Fear of Crime', *British Journal of Criminology*, 44(4): 595–610.
- DOBASH, R. E., SCHLESINGER, P., DOBASH, R., and WEAVER, C. K. (1998), "'Crimewatch UK": Women's Interpretation of Televised Violence', in M. Fishman and G. Cavender (eds), *Entertaining Crime*, 37–58, New York: Aldine De Gruyter.
- DOMINICK, J. (1978), 'Crime and Law Enforcement in the Mass Media', in C. Winick (ed.), *Deviance and Mass Media*, 105–28, Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage.
- DOOB, A., and MACDONALD, G. (1979), 'Television Viewing and the Fear of Victimization: Is the Relationship Causal?', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 37(1): 170–9.
- DORLING, D. (2004), 'Prime Suspect: Murder in Britain', in P. Hillyard, C. Pantazis, S. Tombs, and D. Gordon (eds), *Beyond Criminology*, 178–91, London: Pluto.
- DOVE, G. (1982), *The Police Procedural*, Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green Popular Press.
- and BARGAINNIER, E. (eds) (1986), *Cops and Constables: American and British Fictional Policemen*, Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green Popular Press.
- DOYLE, A. (1998), "'Cops": Television Policing As Policing Reality', in M. Fishman and G. Cavender (eds), *Entertaining Crime*, 95–116, New York: Aldine De Gruyter.
- (2003), *Arresting Images*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- DURSTON, G. (1997), *Moll Flanders: Analysis of 18th Century Criminal Biography*, Chichester: Barry Rose.
- DUSSUYER, I. (1979), *Crime News: A Study of 40 Toronto Newspapers*, Toronto: University of Toronto Centre of Criminology.

- EATON, M. (1996), 'A Fair Cop? Viewing the Effects of the Canteen Culture in *Prime Suspect* and *Between the Lines*', in D. Kidd-Hewitt and R. Osborne (eds), *Crime and the Media: The Post-Modern Spectacle*, London: Pluto.
- ELTON, B. (1996), *Popcorn*, London: Simon and Schuster.
- ERICSON, R. (1991), 'Mass Media, Crime, Law, and Justice', *British Journal of Criminology*, 31(3): 219–49.
- (ed.) (1995), *Crime and the Media*, Aldershot: Dartmouth.
- , BARANEK, P., and CHAN, J. (1987), *Visualising Deviance*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- , —, and — (1989), *Negotiating Control*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- , —, and — (1991), *Representing Order*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- EVERSON, W. (1972), *The Detective in Film*, New York: Citadel.
- FABIAN, R. (1950), *Fabian of the Yard*, London: Naldrett.
- (1954), *London After Dark*, London: Naldrett.
- FALLER, L. (1987), *Turned to Account: The Forms and Functions of Criminal Biography in Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Century England*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- FARRALL, S., and GADD, D. (2004), 'The Frequency of the Fear of Crime', *British Journal of Criminology*, 44(1): 127–32.
- FERRELL, J. (1998), 'Criminalising Popular Culture', in F. Bailey and D. Hale (eds), *Popular Culture, Crime and Justice*, 71–84, Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth.
- and SANDERS, C. R. (eds) (1995), *Cultural Criminology*, Boston, Mass.: Northeastern University Press.
- FISHMAN, M. (1981), 'Police News: Constructing An Image of Crime', *Urban Life*, 9(4): 371–94.
- and CAVENDER, G. (eds) (1998), *Entertaining Crime: Television Reality Programs*, New York: Aldine De Gruyter.
- GARLAND, D. (2001), *The Culture of Control*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- GAROFALO, J. (1981), 'Crime and the Mass Media: A Selective Review of Research', *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 18(2): 319–50.
- GERBNER, G. (1970), 'Cultural Indicators: The Case of Violence in Television Drama', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 338(1): 69–81.
- (1995), 'Television Violence: The Power and the Peril', in G. Dines and J. Humez (eds), *Gender, Race and Class in the Media*, 547–57, Thousand Oaks, Cal.: Sage.
- and GROSS, L. (1976), 'Living With Television: The Violence Profile', *Journal of Communication*, 26(1): 173–99.
- GIDDENS, A. (1984), *The Constitution of Society*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- GIRLING, E., LOADER, I., and SPARKS, R. (2000), *Crime and Social Change in Middle England*, London: Routledge.
- GITLIN, T. (1980), *The Whole World Is Watching*, Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press.
- (2000), *Inside Prime Time*, revised edn, Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press.
- GRABER, D. (1980), *Crime News and the Public*, New York: Praeger.
- GREEN, P. (2000), 'American Television, Crime and the Risk Society', in K. Stenson and R. Sullivan (eds), *Crime, Risk and Justice*, 214–27, Cullompton, Devon: Willan.
- GREER, C. (2003), *Sex Crime and the Media*, Cullompton, Devon: Willan.
- (2005), 'Crime and Media', in C. Hale, K. Hayward, A. Wahidin, and E. Wincup (eds), *Criminology*, 157–82, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- GREGORY, J., and LEES, S. (1999), *Policing Sexual Assault*, London: Routledge.
- GREVE, W. (2004), 'Fear of Crime Among Older and Younger Adults: Paradoxes and Misconceptions', in H.-J. Albrecht, T. Serassis, and H. Kania (eds), *Images of Crime II*, 167–86, Freiburg: Max Planck Institute.
- GUNTER, B. (1981), 'Measuring Television Violence: A Review and Suggestions for a New Analytic Perspective', *Current Psychological Research*, 1(1): 91–112.
- (1985), *Dimensions of Television Violence*, Aldershot: Gower.
- HAGELL, A., and NEWBURN, T. (1994), *Young Offenders and the Media*, London: Policy Studies Institute.
- HALE, D. C. (1998), 'Keeping Women in their Place: An Analysis of Policewomen in Videos, 1972–1996', in F. Bailey and D. Hale (eds), *Popular Culture, Crime and Justice*, 159–79, Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth.
- HALL, S. (1970), 'A World At One With Itself', *New Society*, 18 June: 1056–8.
- (1973), 'The Determination of News Photographs', in S. Cohen and J. Young (eds), *The*

- Manufacture of News*, 226–43, London: Constable.
- (1979), *Drifting Into A Law and Order Society*, London: Cobden Trust.
- , CRITCHLEY, C., JEFFERSON, T., CLARKE, J., and ROBERTS, B. (1978), *Policing the Crisis*, London: Macmillan.
- HALLORAN, J., ELLIOTT, L., and MURDOCK, G. (1970), *Demonstrations and Communication*, London: Penguin.
- HALLSWORTH, S. (2005), *Street Crime*, Cullompton, Devon: Willan.
- HARDY, P. (1997), *The BFI Companion to Crime*, London: Cassell.
- (1998), *Gangsters*, London: Aurum.
- HARGRAVE, A. M., and LIVINGSTONE, S. (2006), *Harm and Offence in Media Content: A Review of the Evidence*, Bristol: Intellect.
- HARRIS, F. (1932), *Presentation of Crime in Newspapers*, Minneapolis, Minn.: Minneapolis Sociological Press.
- HAYCRAFT, H. (1941), *Murder For Pleasure*, New York: Appleton Century.
- HAYWARD, K. (2004), *City Limits*, London: Glasshouse.
- HEAROLD, S. (1986), 'A Synthesis of 1043 Effects of Television on Social Behaviour', in G. Comstock (ed.), *Public Communications and Behaviour Vol. 1*, 65–133, New York: Academic Press.
- HENNIGAN, K. M., DELROSARIO, M. L., HEATH, L., COOK, J. D., and CALDER, B. J. (1982), 'Impact of the Introduction of Television Crime in the United States: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Implications', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 42(3): 461–77.
- HILLYARD, P. (1982), 'The Media Coverage of Crime and Justice in Northern Ireland', in C. Sumner (ed.), *Crime, Justice and the Mass Media*, 36–54 (Cropwood Papers 14), Cambridge: Institute of Criminology.
- HIMMELWEIT, H., OPPENHEIM, A. N., and VINCE, P. (1958), *Television and the Child*, London: Oxford University Press.
- HOPE, T., and SPARKS, R. (eds) (2000), *Crime, Risk and Insecurity*, London: Routledge.
- HOWITT, D. (1998), *Crime, The Media and The Law*, London: Wiley.
- HURD, G. (1979), 'The Television Presentation of the Police', in S. Holdaway (ed.), *The British Police*, London: Edward Arnold.
- INCIARDI, J., and DEE, J. L. (1987), 'From the Keystone Cops to Miami Vice: Images of Policing in American Popular Culture', *Journal of Popular Culture*, 21(2): 84–102.
- INNES, M. (1999), 'The Media as an Investigative Resource in Murder Enquiries', *British Journal of Criminology*, 39(2): 268–85.
- (2001), ' "Crimewatching": Homicide Investigations in the Age of Information', *Criminal Justice Matters*, 43: 42–3.
- (2003), ' "Signal Crimes": Detective Work, Mass Media and Constructing Collective Memory', in P. Mason (ed.), *Criminal Visions*, 51–69, Cullompton, Devon: Willan.
- IYENGAR, S. (1991), *Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues*, Chicago, Ill.: Chicago University Press.
- JACKSON, J. (2004), 'An Analysis of a Construct and Debate: The Fear of Crime', in H-J. Albrecht, T. Serassis and H. Kania (eds), *Images of Crime II*, 35–64, Freiburg: Max Planck Institute.
- JEWKES, Y. (ed.) (2003), *Dot.Cons: Crime, Deviance and Identity on the Internet*, Cullompton, Devon: Willan.
- (2004), *Media and Crime*, London: Sage.
- KATZ, J. (1987), 'What Makes Crime "News"?', *Media, Culture and Society*, 9(1): 47–75.
- KERR, P. (1981), 'Watching the Detectives: American Television Crime Series 1949–81', *Prime-Time*, 1(1): 2–6.
- KIDD-HEWITT, D., and OSBORNE, R. (eds) (1996), *Crime and the Media: The Post-modern Spectacle*, London: Pluto.
- KING, N. (1999), *Heroes in Hard Times: Cop Action Movies in the US*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- KNIGHT, S. (1980), *Form and Ideology in Crime Fiction*, London: Macmillan.
- KOOISTRA, P. G., MAHONEY, J. S., and WESTERVELT, S. D. (1998), 'The World of Crime According to "Cops" ', in M. Fishman and G. Cavender (eds), *Entertaining Crime*, 141–58, New York: Aldine De Gruyter.
- LAING, S. (1991), 'Banging in Some Reality: The Original "Z-Cars" ', in J. Corner (ed.), *Popular Television in Britain: Studies in Cultural History*, 125–43, London: British Film Institute.
- LAWRENCE, R. G. (2000), *The Politics of Force: Media and the Construction of Police Brutality*, Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press.

- LEES, S. (1995), 'Media Reporting of Rape: The 1993 British "Date Rape" Controversy', in D. Kidd-Hewitt and R. Osborne (eds), *Crime and the Media*, 107–30, London: Pluto.
- LEISHMAN, F., and MASON, P. (2002), *Policing and the Media: Facts, Fictions and Factions*, Cullompton, Devon: Willan.
- LEVI, M. (2001), 'White-Collar Crime in the News', *Criminal Justice Matters*, 43: 24–5.
- (2006), 'The media Construction of Financial White-Collar Crimes', *British Journal of Criminology* (forthcoming).
- LICHTER, S. R., LICHTER, L. S., and ROTHMAN, S. (1994), *Prime Time: How TV Portrays American Culture*, Washington: Regnery.
- LIVINGSTONE, S. (1996), 'On the Continuing Problem of Media Effects', in J. Curran and M. Gurevitch (eds), *Mass Media and Society*, 305–24, London: Arnold.
- , ALLEN, J., and REINER, R. (2001), 'Audiences for Crime Media 1946–91: A Historical Approach to Reception Studies', *Communication Review*, 4(2): 165–92.
- MCCARTHY, C. (1972), *Underworld USA*, London: Secker and Warburg.
- MCCAHILL, M. (2003), 'Media Representations of Visual Surveillance', in P. Mason (ed.), *Criminal Visions*, 192–213, Cullompton, Devon: Willan.
- MCCARTY, J. (1993), *Hollywood Gangland*, New York: St Martin's Press.
- MCCNAIR, B. (1993), *News And Journalism in the UK*, London: Routledge.
- MANDEL, E. (1984), *Delightful Murder: A Social History of the Crime Story*, London: Pluto.
- MANNING, P. (1998), 'Media Loops', in F. Bailey and D. Hale (eds), *Popular Culture, Crime and Justice*, 25–39, Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth.
- MARSH, H. L. (1991), 'A Comparative Analysis of Crime Coverage in Newspapers in the United States and Other Countries From 1960–1989: A Review of the Literature', *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 19(1): 67–80.
- MASON, P. (1996), 'Prime Time Punishment: The British Prison and Television', in D. Kidd-Hewitt and R. Osborne (eds), *Crime and the Media*, 185–205, London: Pluto.
- (2003a) 'The Screen Machine; Cinematic Representations of Prison', in P. Mason (ed.), *Criminal Visions*, 278–97, Cullompton, Devon: Willan.
- (ed.) (2003b), *Criminal Visions*, Cullompton, Devon: Willan.
- MATHEWS, T. D. (1994), *Censored*, London: Chatto and Windus.
- MATHIESEN, T. (1997), 'The Viewer Society: Michel Foucault's "Panopticon" Revisited', *Theoretical Criminology*, 1(2): 215–34.
- MAWBY, R. C. (1998), 'The Changing Image of Policing in Television Drama 1956–96', *Journal of the Police History Society*, 13: 39–44.
- (1999), 'Visibility, Transparency, and Police-Media Relations', *Policing and Society*, 9(3): 263–86.
- (2001), 'Promoting the Police? The Rise of Police Image Work', *Criminal Justice Matters*, 43: 44–5.
- (2002), *Policing Images: Policing, Communication and Legitimacy*, Cullompton, Devon: Willan.
- (2003) 'Completing the "Half-formed Picture"? Media Images of Policing', in P. Mason (ed.), *Criminal Visions*, 214–37, Cullompton, Devon: Willan.
- MAWBY, R. I., and BROWN, J. (1983), 'Newspaper Images of the Victim', *Victimology*, 9(1): 82–94.
- MEDVED, M. (1992), *Hollywood vs. America*, London: HarperCollins.
- MERTON, R. (1938/1957), 'Social Structure and Anomie', *American Sociological Review*, 3: 672–82. Reprinted in R. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957; revised edn, 1963.
- MESSNER, S. F., and ROSENFELD, R. (2000), *Crime and the American Dream*, 3rd edn, Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth.
- MEYERS, R. (1981), *TV Detectives*, San Diego, Cal.: Barnes.
- (1989), *Murder on the Air*, New York: The Mysterious Press.
- MILLER, F. (1994), *Censored Hollywood: Sex, Sin and Violence on Screen*, Atlanta, Ga.: Turner.
- MURDOCK, G. (1982), 'Disorderly Images', in C. Sumner (ed.), *Crime, Justice and the Mass Media*, 104–23 (Cropwood Papers 14), Cambridge: Institute of Criminology.
- NELLIS, M., and HALE, C. (1982), *The Prison Film*, London: Radical Alternatives to Prison.
- NEWBURN, T., and HAYMAN, S. (2001), *Policing, CCTV and Social Control*, Cullompton, Devon: Willan.

- NORRIS, C., and ARMSTRONG, G. (1999), *The Maximum Surveillance Society: The Rise of CCTV*, Sussex: Berg.
- NYBERG, A. K. (1998), 'Comic Books and Juvenile Delinquency: A Historical Perspective', in F. Bailey and D. Hale (eds), *Popular Culture, Crime and Justice*, 61–70, Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth.
- OLIVER, M. B., and ARMSTRONG, G. B. (1998), 'The Color of Crime: Perceptions of Caucasians' and African-Americans' Involvement in Crime', in M. Fishman and G. Cavender (eds), *Entertaining Crime*, 19–36, New York: Aldine De Gruyter.
- OSBORNE, R. (1996), 'Crime and the Media: From Media Studies to Post-modernism', in D. Kidd-Hewitt and R. Osborne (eds), *Crime and the Media*, 25–48, London: Pluto.
- OUSBY, I. (1976), *Bloodhounds of Heaven: The Detective in English Fiction From Godwin to Doyle*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- (1997), *The Crime and mystery Book*, London: Thames & Hudson.
- PALMER, J. (1978), *Thrillers*, London: Edward Arnold.
- PANDIANI, J. (1978), 'Crime Time TV: If All We Knew Is What We Saw . . .', *Contemporary Crises*, 2: 437–58.
- PARK, W. (1978), 'The Police State', *Journal of Popular Film*, 6(3): 229–38.
- PEARSON, G. (1983), *Hooligan: A History of Respectable Fears*, London: Macmillan.
- PEAY, J. (1998), 'The Power of the Popular', in T. Newburn and J. Vagg (eds), *Emerging Themes in Criminology*, Loughborough: British Society of Criminology.
- PEELO, M., FRANCIS, B., SOOTHILL, K., PEARSON, J., and ACKERLEY, E. (2004), 'Newspaper Reporting and the Public Construction of Homicide', *British Journal of Criminology* 44(2): 256–75.
- PHILLIPS, M. (1996), *The Observer Review*, 8 December: 2.
- PORTER, B. (1981), *The Pursuit of Crime*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- POWERS, S. P., ROTHMAN, D. J., and ROTHMAN, S. (1996), *Hollywood's America: Social and Political Themes in Motion Pictures*, Boulder, Col.: Westview.
- RAFTER, N. (2000), *Shots in the Mirror: Crime Films and Society*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- RAWLINGS, P. (1992), *Drunks, Whores, and Idle Apprentices: Criminal Biographies of the Eighteenth Century*, London: Routledge.
- (1998), 'Crime Writers: Non-Fiction Crime Books', in T. Newburn and J. Vagg (eds), *Emerging Themes in Criminology*, Loughborough: British Society of Criminology.
- REINER, R. (1978), 'The New Blue Films', *New Society*, 43(808): 706–708.
- (1981), 'Keystone to Kojak: The Hollywood Cop', in P. Davies and B. Neve (eds), *Politics, Society and Cinema in America*, 195–220, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- (1994), 'The Dialectics of Dixon: The Changing Image of the TV Cop', in S. Becker and M. Stephens (eds), *Police Force, Police Service*, 11–32, London: Macmillan.
- (2000a), *The Politics of the Police*, 3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2000b), 'Romantic Realism: Policing and the Media', in F. Leishman, B. Loveday, and S. Savage (eds), *Core Issues in Policing*, 52–66, London: Longman.
- (2000c), 'Crime and Control in Britain', *Sociology*, 34(1): 71–94.
- (2001), 'The Rise of Virtual Vigilantism: Crime Reporting Since World War II', *Criminal Justice Matters*, 43: 4–5.
- (2003), 'Policing and the Media' in T. Newburn (ed.), *Handbook of Policing*, 259–82, Cullompton, Devon: Willan.
- , LIVINGSTONE, S., and ALLEN, J. (2000), 'No More Happy Endings? The Media and Popular Concern About Crime Since the Second World War', in T. Hope and R. Sparks (eds), *Crime, Risk and Insecurity*, 107–25, London: Routledge.
- , —, and — (2001), 'Casino Culture: Media and Crime in a Winner-Loser Society', in K. Stenson and R. Sullivan (eds), *Crime, Risk and Justice*, 175–93, Cullompton, Devon: Willan.
- , —, and — (2003), 'From Law and Order to Lynch Mobs: Crime News Since the Second World War', in P. Mason (ed.), *Criminal Visions*, 13–32, Cullompton: Willan.
- ROBERTS, J. V., and STALANS, L. J. (2000), *Public Opinion, Crime and Criminal Justice*, Boulder, Col.: Westwood.
- ROBERTS, M. (2001), 'Just Noise? Newspaper Crime Reporting and Fear of Crime', *Criminal Justice Matters*, 43: 10–11.
- ROCK, P. (1973), 'News As Eternal Recurrence', in S. Cohen and J. Young (eds), *The Manufacture of News*, 64–70, London: Constable.

- ROSHIER, B. (1973), 'The Selection of Crime News By the Press', in S. Cohen and J. Young (eds), *The Manufacture of News*, 40–51, London: Constable.
- ROSOW, E. (1978), *Born to Lose*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- ROSS, J. I. (1998), 'The Role of the Media in the Creation of Public Police Violence', in F. Bailey and D. Hale (eds), *Popular Culture, Crime and Justice*, 100–10, Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth.
- RUBIN, M. (1999), *Thrillers*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- SACCO, V. F. (1995), 'Media Constructions of Crime', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 539: 141–54.
- SASSON, T. (1995), *Crime Talk: How Citizens Construct A Social Problem*, New York: Aldine De Gruyter.
- SAYERS, D. (ed.) (1936), *Tales of Detection*, London: Dent.
- SCHLESINGER, P., and TUMBER, H. (1992), 'Crime and Criminal Justice in the Media', in D. Downes (ed.), *Unravelling Criminal Justice*, 184–203, London: Macmillan.
- and — (1993), 'Fighting the War Against Crime: Television, Police and Audience', *British Journal of Criminology*, 33(1): 19–32.
- and — (1994), *Reporting Crime*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , DOBASH, R., and MURDOCK, G. (1991), 'The Media Politics of Crime and Criminal Justice', *British Journal of Sociology*, 42(3): 397–420.
- , —, DOBASH, R., and WEAVER, C. (1992), *Women Viewing Violence*, London: British Film Institute.
- SCHRAMM, W., LYLE, J., and PARKER, E. B. (1961), *Television in the Lives of Our Children*, Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press.
- SHADOIAN, J. (1977), *Dreams and Dead Ends*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- SHALE, S. (1996), 'Listening to the Law: Famous Trials on BBC Radio 1934–69', *Modern Law Review*, 59(6): 813–44.
- SHERIZEN, S. (1978), 'Social Creation of Crime News: All the News Fitted to Print', in C. Winick (ed.), *Deviance and Mass Media*, 203–24, Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage.
- SIGNORIELLI, N. (1990), 'Television's Mean and Dangerous World: A Continuation of the Cultural Indicators Perspective', in N. Signorielli and M. Morgan (eds), *Cultivation Analysis: New Directions in Media Effects Research*, 85–106, Newbury Park: Sage.
- SKIDMORE, P. (1996), 'Telling Tales; media power, ideology, and the Reporting of Child Sexual Abuse in Britain', in D. Kidd-Heirtt and R. Osborne (eds), *Crime and the media*, 78–106, London: Pluto.
- SKLAR, R. (1975), *Movie-Made America*, New York: Vintage.
- SMITH, S. (1984), 'Crime in the News', *British Journal of Criminology*, 24(3): 289–95.
- SOLOMONS, S. (1976), *Beyond Formula: American Film Genres*, New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
- SOOTHILL, K., and WALBY, S. (1991), *Sex Crime in the News*, London: Routledge.
- SPARKS, R. (1992), *Television and the Drama of Crime*, Buckingham: Open University Press.
- (1993), 'Inspector Morse', in G. Brandt (ed.), *British Television Drama in the 1980s*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (2000), ' "Bringin' It All Back Home": Populism, Media Coverage, and the Dynamics of Locality and Globality in the Politics of Crime Control', in K. Stenson and R. Sullivan (eds), *Crime, Risk and Justice*, 194–213, Cullompton, Devon: Willan.
- (2001), 'The Media, Populism, Public Opinion and Crime', *Criminal Justice Matters*, 43: 6–7.
- STENSON, K., and SULLIVAN, R. (eds) (2000), *Crime, Risk and Justice: The Politics of Crime Control in Liberal Democracies*, Cullompton, Devon: Willan.
- STEPHENSON-BURTON, A. (1995), 'Through the Looking-Glass: Public Images of White Collar Crime', in D. Kidd-Hewitt and R. Osborne (eds), *Crime and the Media*, 131–63, London: Pluto.
- SUMNER, C. (1982), ' "Political Hooliganism" and "Rampaging Mobs": The National Press Coverage of the Toxteth "Riots" ', in C. Sumner (ed.), *Crime, Justice and the Mass Media*, 25–35, Cropwood Papers 14, Cambridge: Institute of Criminology.
- SURETTE, R. (1998), *Media, Crime and Criminal Justice: Images and Realities*, 2nd edn, Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth.
- SWANSON, C. (1955), 'What They Read in 130 Daily Newspapers', *Journalism Quarterly*, 32(4): 411–21.
- SYMONS, J. (1972), *Bloody Murder*, London: Penguin.
- THOMPSON, J. (1993), *Fiction, Crime and Empire: Clues to Modernity and Postmodernity*, Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press.
- THOMPSON, J. B. (1995), *The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

- TOMBS, S., and WHYTE, D. (2001), 'Reporting Corporate Crime Out of Existence', *Criminal Justice Matters*, 43: 22–23.
- TUMBER, H. (1982), *Television and the Riots*, London: British Film Institute.
- TUNNELL, K. D. (1998), 'Reflections on Crime, Criminals, and Control in Newsmagazine Television Programs', in F. Bailey and D. Hale (eds), *Popular Culture, Crime and Justice*, 111–22, Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth.
- TUSKA, J. (1978), *The Detective in Hollywood*, New York: Doubleday.
- WAKSHLAG, J., VIAL, V., and TAMBORINI, R. (1983), 'Selecting Crime Drama and Apprehension About Crime', *Human Communication Research*, 10(2): 227–42.
- WALL, D. (ed.) (2001), *Crime and the Internet*, London: Routledge.
- WARTELLA, E. (1995), 'Media and Problem Behaviours in Young People', in M. Rutter and D. Smith (eds), *Psychological Disorders in Young People*, 296–323, London: Wiley.
- WATSON, C. (1971), *Snobbery With Violence: English Crime Stories and Their Audience*, London: Eyre Methuen.
- WILLIAMS, P., and DICKINSON, J. (1993), 'Fear of Crime: Read All About It? The Relationship Between Newspaper Crime Reporting and Fear of Crime', *British Journal of Criminology*, 33(1): 33–56.
- WILLIAMS, T. M. (ed.) (1986), *The Impact of Television: A Natural Experiment in Three Communities*, New York: Academic Press.
- WILSON, C. P. (2000), *Cop Knowledge: Police Power and Cultural Narrative in Twentieth-Century America*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- WINSTON, R. (2004), 'Seeing is Believing', *Guardian G2*, 7 January.
- WINSTON, R., and MELLERSI, N. (1992), *The Public Eye: Ideology and the Police Procedural*, London: Macmillan.
- WOBER, M. (1978), 'Televised Violence and Paranoid Perception: The View From Great Britain', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 42(3): 315–21.
- WREN-LEWIS, J. (1981/2), 'TV Coverage of the Riots', *Screen Education*, 40: 15–33.
- WYKES, M. (2001), *News, Crime and Culture*, London: Pluto.
- YOUNG, J. (1971), *The Drug-Takers*, London: Paladin.
- (1999), *The Exclusive Society*, London: Sage.
- (2004), 'Constructing the Paradigm of Violence: Mass Media, Violence and Youth', in H.-J. Albrecht, T. Serassis and H. Kania (eds), *Images of Crime II*, 187–98, Freiburg: Max Planck Institute.
- ZILLMAN, D., and WAKSHLAG, J. (1987), 'Fear of Victimization and the Appeal of Crime Drama', in D. Zillman and J. Bryant (eds), *Selective Exposure to Communication*, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

