# MONROE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

### **TERRORISM PREPAREDNESS PLAN**

### <u>DRAFT</u>

November 2003

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#### 1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document is intended to provide guidance to support agencies during a terrorist event. It identifies lead personnel and a plan of action. It is not intended to replace existing first responder operation procedures, but serves as a guide to terrorist attack and threat response management for events involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. It presents planning guidelines for local emergency management, law enforcement, fire rescue, and emergency medical/health services response.

The Monroe County Department of Emergency Management, in its role as the County's emergency management planning agency, is implementing a systems approach for a unified response to a terrorist event. This approach is designed to complement the State of Florida and Federal Terrorism Response Plan Annexes. Additionally, this document facilitates the escalation from local first response to the more definite federal response.

This document, in conjunction with the Monroe County Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan constitutes a coordinated and integrated approach to these types of events. It must be emphasized that the key component of success is a unified management approach.

Monroe County is an active participant on the Regional Domestic Security Task Force (Southeast Region). The County Emergency Management Director serves on the Regional Advisory Board, with various county personnel participating in Emergency Services, Human Services, Investigations and Intelligence, Training, Public Information and Critical Infrastructure sub-committees.

#### 2.0 PURPOSE

To protect persons and property from the effects of terrorist acts, and to provide guidance to primary responders and support agencies in the event of a terrorist act.

#### 3.0 INTRODUCTION

- 3.1 <u>Terrorism</u> is the art of instilling unreasonable fear in the population by various means. It is generally done to achieve political ends or objectives. Attacks are intended to influence human events and the actions of the people and their government. It can be accomplished by individuals or a small group with very specific purposes.
- **There are two means of attack:** conventional and unconventional. Conventional terrorist attack utilizes bombs, bullets, and weapons such as knives, grenades, etc. Unconventional terrorist attack use the unexpected, such as, train derailments, insects, gases, viruses and germs, sprays and chemicals, stolen nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, etc.
- 3.3 <u>Terrorist incidents</u> involving biological, nuclear, incendiary, chemical or explosive materials (B-NICE) are considered technological hazardous incidents. Incidents, which are believed to be terrorist acts, will be treated as a hazardous material incident with additional complicating factors.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation further describes terrorism as either **domestic** or **international**. These distinctions are based on the origin, base and objectives of the terrorist organization involved. Further definitions of these two types of terrorism are:

- **3.3.1** <u>Domestic terrorism</u> involves groups or individuals that are based and operate entirely within the United States and Puerto Rico. They do not receive foreign direction and their acts are directed at elements of the U.S. Government or population.
- **3.3.2** <u>International terrorism</u> is the unlawful use of force or violence committed by a group or individual having some connection to a foreign power or whose activities transcend national boundaries.

#### 4.0 TYPES OF TERRORIST GROUPS

The United States is an open society with many potential terrorist targets. "Hard Targets", buildings and facilities, as well as "Soft Targets", individuals, organizations and groups are especially susceptible in Monroe County due to its geographical proximity to Cuba and the Caribbean nations. Terrorist groups may include, but are not limited to, the following:

#### 4.0 TYPES OF DOMESTIC TERRORIST GROUPS (continued)

- Ethnic separatist and émigré groups
- Left-wing extremist organizations
- Right-wing racist, extremist groups
- International terrorist organizations
- Neo-Nazi
- Anti-Gay
- Anti-Abortion
- Anti-Government
- Anti-Authority/Skinheads
- White Supremacy
- Extremist Religious
- Extremist Environmental
- Patriot Groups (Militia)
- Others

#### 5.0 TERRORIST GOALS

Goals a terrorist attack may be associated with, but not limited to, are:

#### 5.1 Immediate Goals

- Obtain worldwide, national, or local recognition for their cause
- Create fear to further their cause or achieve their objective
- Cause government reaction, overreaction, and repression leading to immediate public dissension
- Harass, weaken, or embarrass government, military, or other security forces
- Show a government's lack of power and inability to protect its citizens
- Obtain money or equipment
- Disrupt or destroy means of mobility or communications
- Demonstrate power or lend credibility to threats
- Prevent or delay executive decisions or legislation
- Cause strikes or work slowdowns
- Discourage impending foreign investments or foreign government assistance programs
- Influence elections
- Free prisoners
- Satisfy vengeance

#### 5.0 <u>TERRORIST GOALS</u> (continued)

#### 5.2 Long-Range Goals

- Cause dramatic changes in government, i.e. revolution, civil war, or war between nations
- Turn the tide favorably to their side during guerrilla warfare
- Influence local, national, or international policy decision making
- Gain political recognition as the legal body representing an ethnic or national group

#### 6.0 TYPES OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

#### 6.1 <u>Armed Assaults</u>

Armed assaults can include a wide variety of direct action. Examples include throwing hand grenades into crowds or rocket attacks on airlines or buildings. Another type of increasingly familiar example involves routine traffic stops that evolve into armed confrontation(s) between police and extremist militia members

#### 6.2 Arson

Less dramatic than most tactics, arson has the advantage of low risk to the perpetrator and requires a low level of technical knowledge

#### 6.3 Assassination

A term generally applied to the killing of prominent persons and symbolic enemies as well as traitors who defect from the group. Assassination targets are generally selected carefully with a strategic purpose, and the actual attack is planned, coordinated and practiced. Common law courts of the American militia movement have issued execution notices against judges, law enforcement and other government officials for perceived violations of their oaths of office.

#### 6.4 Biological Agent Release

Biological agents consist of organisms or chemicals of biological origin that cause death and disease among humans, animals and plants. Biological agents include anthrax, cholera, plague, botulism and ricin among others (refer to Annex "A" for various biological agents)

#### 6.5 **Bombing**

Bombs can range from very simple to extremely complex. They can consist of ounces of explosive packaged in letter bombs, to tons of explosives in a large vehicle bomb. A burning time fuse can initiate a bomb, a sophisticated electronic time delays mechanism or can be booby-trapped, and detonating when disturbed.

#### 6.0 TYPES OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES (continued)

Bombs have been incorporated in letters, packages briefcases, computers, purses, luggage and automobiles.

Although bombs overwhelmingly remain the weapon of choice for terrorists, it must be realized that others may use this technique as well. Revenge, extortion, mischief and vandalism by neighbors, former lovers, juveniles or co-workers have all been cause for bombing(s).

The improvised explosive device (IED) is the contemporary terrorist's weapon of choice. An IED is inexpensive to produce, and because of the various denotation techniques available, is a low risk to the perpetrator.

#### 6.6 Bomb Threat - Hoaxes

Any terrorist group that has established credibility can employ a hoax with considerable success. A bomb threat can close a commercial building, empty a theater, or delay an aircraft flight at no cost to the terrorist.

Bombs threats are a close relation to actual bombings. Most bombings are not preceded by a telephone message or written threat, but bomb threats can not simply be ignored. Bomb threats can cost schools and businesses considerable loss of productivity if a bomb incident management plan is not developed and implemented.

#### 6.7 Chemical Releases

Of the five categories of chemical agents (nerve, blister, choking, blood and vomiting), nerve gas is undoubtedly the most notorious and dangerous. Terrorist use of a chemical agent in a closed environment such as a subway station (i.e. Sarin used in the Tokyo subway system) auditorium, sports arena or shopping mall has the potential for creating massive casualties.

#### 6.8 Civil Disturbance

A large, often violent public demonstration intended to attract media coverage that will help convince the world that the event organizers represent a popular cause.

#### 6.9 Cyber Terrorism

This increasingly costly tactic is emerging and may be used be terrorists in the future with intensifying frequency. Terrorists can use sophisticated hacker skills remotely to enter computer systems in order to steal funds, or alter information in databases and operating systems. Cyber terrorists may also attempt to gain control of, or disable, critical facility infrastructure components such as dams, utilities or airport radar systems.

#### 6.0 TYPES OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES (continued)

#### 6.10 Environmental Destruction

Examples would be the intentional dumping of hazardous chemicals into a city's water supply or the destruction of an oil tanker.

#### 6.11 Hijacking or Skyjacking

Hijacking is normally carried out to produce a hostage situation and to gain media attention to the hijacker's cause. Aircraft are the preferred target because of their greater mobility and vulnerability.

#### 6.12 Hostage Taking

This is an overt seizure of one or more individuals with the intent of gaining publicity or other concessions in return for release of the hostage(s).

Hostage and hostage barricade situations are risky for the perpetrator when executed in an unfriendly environment. Generally hostage taking is a well-planned out operation that involves considerable surveillance, reconnaissance and planning prior to the attack.

#### 6.13 Kidnapping

Kidnapping involves the seizure of prominent people. While similar to hostage taking, kidnapping has significant differences. Kidnapping is usually a covert seizure of one or more specific persons who are held until specific demands are met.

Kidnapping for ransom is becoming an increasingly favored method of financing terrorist operations in parts of the world.

#### 6.14 Nuclear Release - Weapons

The nuclear terrorist threat consists of improvised nuclear devices (IND) capable of creating a nuclear yield, and radiological dispersion devices (RDD). INDs include nuclear weapons obtained from a nuclear power inventory, or improvised devices designed and constructed by the terrorists. RDDs employ conventional explosive devices to distribute radioactive material, contaminating a wide area.

#### 6.15 Product Tampering, Sabotage

Sabotage of industrial or commercial facilities is one means of identifying the target while making a statement of future intent. Utilities, communications, and transportation systems are so interdependent that a serious disruption of any one affects all of them and gains immediate public attention.

#### 6.0 TYPES OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES (continued)

#### 6.16 Raids or Attacks on Facilities

Armed attacks on facilities are usually undertaken for one of three purposes: to gain access to radio or television broadcast capabilities in order to make a statement; to demonstrate the government's inability to secure critical facilities or national symbols; or for logistic purposes (i.e. robbery of a bank or armory).

#### 6.17 Robbery-Attempted Robbery

To obtain funds to support the terrorist's cause and logistics needs.

#### 6.18 Seizure

This usually involves a building or object that has value in the eyes of the audience. There is some risk to the terrorist because security forces have time to react and may opt to use force to resolve the incident, especially if few or no innocent lives are involved.

#### 6.19 Cyberterrorism

#### 6.19.1 Definitions

<u>Activism</u> – Normal, non-disruptive use of the Internet in support of an agenda or cause

<u>Hacktivism</u> – Operations that use hacking techniques (system infiltration, mass e-mail, computer viruses, etc.,), to attack a computer system, company, or other user. Commonly results in denial of service or theft of information

<u>Cyberterrorism</u> – Politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data intended to cause grave harm such as loss of life or severe economic damage, for furtherance of political or social objectives

#### 6.19.2 Threat Analysis

The susceptibility of computers and their networks to those with criminal intent is well documented and publicized. From the security of individual e-mail, to incidents of hackers gaining access to Department of Defense systems, the need for ever-increasing and evolving computer security is obvious. However, the ability of recognized terrorist groups to achieve the goal of inflicting casualties on a civilian population via the Internet is somewhat more questionable.

At the local level, major systems that may be vulnerable to Cyberterrorism, which may possibly result in casualties or loss of life, are largely limited to

#### 6.0 TYPES OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES (continued)

#### 6.19.2 Threat Analysis (continued)

utilities (electricity and water distribution), and 911 Emergency Response Systems. Human involvement and oversight, however, is still a part of most computer systems, especially those involving life-safety issues. The likelihood that an attack upon even these important systems would result in casualties, death, or even severe economic disruption is minimal. A municipal water supply, for example, is routinely tested for safety, and any measures that detect and prevent a physical threat, such as a chemical attack, would inherently detect any Cyber-attack that resulted in a life-threatening situation.

#### 6.19.3 Prevention

As no documented incidents of actual Cyberterrorism have taken place, methods of preventing future attacks may be uncertain. However, it would be reasonable to consider that security measures already utilized by those responsible for operating computer networks can and must continually evolve to keep up with the threat of cyber criminals. Information and financial theft, denial and disruption of computer services, and activist and criminal use of the Internet for any variety of goals and purposes will continue, as will efforts to prevent and mitigate the effect of these activities. Such efforts to prevent or limit attempts of cyberterrorism, which would require infiltration of those same networks and systems.

#### 7.0 ASSUMPTIONS

- **7.1** Targets (hard and soft) exist in Monroe County
- 7.2 Law enforcement organizations can, with cooperation, protect the public
- **7.3** Terrorist elements exist
- **7.4** Alert police and security forces may block attempted terrorist acts
- **7.5** Individuals are responsible for taking reasonable precautions for their own defense/protection
- **7.6** Attacks may be conventional or unconventional
- 7.7 Procedures are in place for those injured by a terrorist act
- **7.8** There is a possibility of secondary devices aimed at responders
- 7.9 Both crisis management (law enforcement) and consequence management (emergency management) will be occurring simultaneously with crisis management in the lead until a transition to consequence management is coordinated

#### 7.0 ASSUMPTIONS (continued)

- **7.10** No single agency at the local, State, Federal or private level possesses the authority and expertise to act unilaterally on issues that may arise in response to threats or acts of terrorism.
- 7.11 Local, State and Federal responders may define working perimeters that may overlap to some degree. Perimeters may be used to control access to the area and assess potential effects on the population and the environment. Control of these perimeters may be enforced by different authorities, which may impede the overall response if adequate coordination is not established.
- 7.12 An act of terrorism, particularly an act directed against a large population center within the United States involving NBC/WMD (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical/Weapons of Mass Destruction), may produce major consequences that would overwhelm the capabilities of many local and State governments almost immediately. Major consequences involving NBC/WMD may overwhelm existing Federal capabilities as well.
- 7.13 If protective capabilities are not available, responders cannot be required to put their lives at risk in order to enter an area contaminated with NBC agents. It is possible that the area will be closed until the effects of the NBC material have degraded to safe levels.

#### 8.0 COUNTY PROFILE

- 8.1 Monroe County is located at the southernmost tip of the state of Florida. This archipelago is 120 miles in length, and comprises approximately 1,418 square miles. Of these 1,418 square miles, 424 square miles is comprised of water with the remaining 994 square miles consisting of landmass. Made up of 882 islands with 600 miles of exposed coastline, Monroe County is designated as a State of Florida Area of Critical Concern.
- 8.2 Monroe County has approximately 85,000 residents. However, the number increases significantly due to the tourist and seasonal population. Therefore estimates of the population can vary from as low as 51,000 in July and as high as 105,000 in November.

#### 9.0 RISK ANALYSIS

The Office of Monroe County Emergency Management (MCEM) has identified numerous possible terrorist targets.

#### 9.1 Bridges

United States Highway One (US 1), also referred to as the Overseas Highway, is a road which runs continuously for 126 miles from Florida City in Dade County to Key West in Monroe County. US 1 is primarily a two-lane highway which is connected by 42 bridges (the bridges have a combined overall length of 19 miles). The commission of any criminal act, which damages even one bridge, would be detrimental to Monroe County.

#### 9.0 RISK ANALYSIS (continued)

#### 9.2 Boca Chica Naval Air Station

Naval/Air Combat Training Facility

#### 9.3 Coast Guard Stations

Due to the Florida Keys geographical location, all three USGC Stations are heavily involved in drug interdiction and the interdiction of illegal immigrants.

#### 9.4 Telecommunications and Radio Stations

The networks and systems that support the transmission and exchange of electronic communications among and between end-users extend from the public sector to the private sector services, facilities and infrastructure in Monroe County. A detailed analysis of the telecommunications system will ensure the vital vulnerable linkages for government continuity are identified.

In addition to numerous commercial radio stations, the Florida Keys is also home to the Radio Marti transmitter, as well as TV Marti's transmitter and antenna.

Both of these sites are prime targets due to the controversial nature of their broadcasts.

#### 9.5 Government Facilities

Federal facilities are, historically, priority targets for acts of terrorism. The county plays host to a number of critical federal facilities. Most of these facilities qualify as prime targets for terrorist actions.

Traditionally, State and local facilities rank as lower priorities for terrorist acts, but as symbols of governmental authority, still must be considered targets. The most likely facilities to be targeted would be:

- Monroe County Government Centers
- Monroe County Sheriff's Headquarters and Stations
- Monroe County Department of Emergency Management
- 5 Municipal City Halls
- Federal Judicial System

These county government facilities, along with municipal government headquarters, an the various array of state and federal buildings, all require a detailed assessment to accurately evaluate the level of potential terrorism threat. Detailed attention will be placed on facilities that ensure the operation and service of governments at the local level, such as the county and municipal government centers.

#### 9.0 RISK ANALYSIS (continued)

#### 9.6 Medical Facilities and Emergency Services

The police, Fire Rescue/EMS, Emergency Management, medical facilities and hospitals, which service public health and safety in this county are also diverse and extensive.

There are 3 (three) hospitals located in the Florida Keys, one in each of the three traditional county areas:

Mariner's Hospital Upper Keys Fishermen's Hospital Middle Keys Lower Florida Health Systems Lower Keys

#### 9.7 Tourist Facilities

There are numerous tourism related facilities throughout the Florida Keys, which are frequented by tourists/visitors not only from all over United States, but also from around the world.

Monroe County and many of the jurisdictions annually sponsor an array of events, which attract large audiences such as the Fantasy Fest, International Boat Races, Poker Run, Fishing Competitions, lobster seasonal event, and various other activities.

The county also comprises a large cultural and religious diverse population. Historical incidents indicate that facilities such as the Jewish Community Centers and alternative lifestyle nightclubs/events may attract attention from radical terrorist groups and therefor should be included in the comprehensive assessment of the county.

A terrorist attack on a tourist facility in the Florida Keys could have an international impact.

#### 9.8 <u>Transportation</u>

In addition to the 2 (two) commercial airports and US 1, travel into the Florida Keys may also be accomplished by means of numerous large cruise ships, which dock in the City of Key West.

The primary transportation route however, is the US1 highway, which spans over 42 bridges. Diverse types of resources (food, gasoline, pharmaceutical, chemical, etc.) are brought into Monroe County via US1.

Personnel and resources traversing these transportation conduits pose multiple risks to the residents of this county and business community. A comprehensive evaluation of the connectivity links and potential impact on county government operations, commerce, and individual mobility is essential.

#### 9.0 RISK ANALYSIS (continued)

#### 9.9 Marinas

There are approximately 110 marinas located throughout the county, which registered (for 1998) 20,356 pleasure vessels and 4,355 commercial vessels.

#### 9.10 Charles River Laboratory

This facility houses animals for research and experimental purposes. The area and it's related facilities are a subject to action by Animal Rights Activists, some of whom have used terrorist practices to make their point.

#### 9.11 Correctional Facilities

Monroe County has four (4) correctional institutions. Three (3) of the facilities are under the supervision of Monroe County Sheriff's Office, and one (1) is Florida State operated.

Upper Keys – Plantation Key	Monroe County Sheriff's Office
Middle Keys – Marathon	Monroe County Sheriff's Office
Lower Keys - Big Pine Key	Florida State Correctional Facility
Lower Keys – Stock Island	Monroe County Sheriff's Office

#### 9.12 J.F. Kennedy School of Special Warfare

The J.F.K. School of Special Warfare is operated by the U.S. Army, which trains members of Military Service Branches in the art of Special Warfare.

Members of the Special Forces units receive their underwater combat and operational training at the Florida Keys facility.

#### 9.13 U.S. LANTCOM – JTF 4 (U.S. Army Drug Command)

This U.S. Army Command tracks and interdicts the flow of drugs in international waters and airspace prior to its entry into U.S. territory.

A Branch of the Command, JTF 4, is located in the City of Key West.

#### 9.14 **Dolphin Research Facilities**

There are 5 (five) Dolphin Research Centers/facilities located throughout the Florida Keys.

Although the primary responsibility is geared towards research, these facilities are also tourist oriented, are frequently mentioned in the national media, and are criticized by Animal Rights Activists.

#### 9.0 RISK ANALYSIS (continued)

#### 9.15 Mass Migration

Armed violence and civil unrest abroad, due to political and economical turmoil, results in the threat of spontaneous mass migration to Florida, particularly southern Florida.

Monroe County's unique geographical location makes it easily accessible to migratory populations, in particular from Caribbean countries.

#### 9.16 Water Supply System

Nearly all of the water used in the Florida Keys is delivered through a pipeline from Florida City. There are two (2) desalinization generation plants located on Stock Island and Marathon Keys.

These plants may be used to supplement the pipeline water supply. Additionally, there are several storage tanks in the Florida Keys where emergency water supplies are being maintained.

In the event of a destruction of the water pipeline, our water supply would be significantly impacted. The use of both desalinization plants as well as all the storage tanks could not replace its loss.

#### 9.17 Airports

Monroe County has total of 6 airport facilities and they are as follows:

2 commercial Marathon and City of Key West

1 military Boca Chica – Key West

3 private Located throughout the Florida Keys

#### 10.0 Concept of Operations

#### 10.1 Initial Notification

Those first aware of a terrorist situation in any jurisdiction should call 911. The 911 center will notify the appropriate law enforcement agency and the Department of Emergency Management.

#### 10.2 First Arriving Units

First arriving units (police and fire) will establish an exclusion zone around the area or suspected areas(s). If necessary, and safety permitting, an on-scene command post will be established nearby. Traffic will be re-routed around the exclusion zone.

#### 10.0 <u>Concept of Operations (continued)</u>

#### 10.3 <u>Police/Military Protocols</u>

Existing police and military protocols (radio/telephone procedures, equipment, methods of operation, transportation, etc.) will be used during all counter-terrorist operations.

#### 10.4 Lead Agencies – Federal Crime

During a Federal crime, the Federal agencies will be Lead Agencies requiring state and local assistance.

#### 10.5 Local and State Agencies

Local and State agencies must work closely together and coordinate their activities to assist Federal agencies during terrorist incidents.

#### 10.6 Shelters

Temporary shelter(s) will be opened for those affected by the incident and unable to return to their residence.

#### 10.7 <u>Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)</u>

A Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), or working group, will be established. JTTF will consist of Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, emergency management personnel, and the Governor's staff, if required. The JTTF will be responsible for determining protective actions, such as evacuations, increased security, planning, training, etc.

#### 10.8 Incident Command System

The ICS is based upon basic business management principles. In a business or government environment, managers and leaders perform the basic daily tasks of planning, directing, organizing, coordinating, communicating, delegating and evaluating. The same is true for ICS when dealing with evolving emergency situations. These tasks are performed under the overall direction of the Incident Manager. The ICS is a management system consisting of procedures for organizing personnel, facilities, equipment, communications and other resources in response to, and recovery from, a disaster situation. It is a method of unified command whereby multiple agencies and jurisdictions jointly work together to accomplish the required response and recovery activities dictated by a disaster.

As such, all participating agencies and jurisdictions will contribute to the determination of the incident objectives and strategy and the optimal utilization of all available resources in an integrated manner. This flexible management method allows expansion or contraction of response and recovery forces as dictated by the magnitude of the event. ICS can be utilized in all types of hazard threats or disaster situations, and has provisions for the establishment of manageable span of control whereby tasks are limited to a manageable number.

#### 11.0 Roles and Responsibilities

#### 11.1 Office of Emergency Management

In the event of a major or catastrophic emergency event the Monroe County Emergency Management will activate all portions of the Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP).

The Office of Emergency Management is tasked with the primary responsibility for mitigation, response, and recovery formulation. The OEM will activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The facility will be activated by order of the Senior Director and/or the Director whenever conditions warrant. Staffing of the EOC will be in response to the degree of the emergency event.

All participating agencies will send a liaison to the EOC who will be responsible for transmitting information to and from their field operations. The EOC will support Federal, State and local law enforcement activities, especially ESF 16 (Law Enforcement and Security) and ESF 13 (Military Support), as well as monitor and evaluate the entire incident.

#### 11.2 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) "United States Policy on Counterterrorism" clarifies and expands upon the responsibilities of the FBI as the Federal Lead Agency for crisis management.

The agency will appoint a FBI On-Scene-Commander (OSC) to provide leadership and direction to the Federal crisis management response. The OSC will convene meetings with decision-makers representing FEMA, Federal agencies involved in technical operations, and the State (as appropriate).

Coordinate the Federal crisis management response with the lead State and local crisis management agencies (Emergency Management; Monroe County Sheriff's Office). Issue and track the status of crisis management actions assigned to Federal agencies.

Establish the primary Federal operations centers for crisis management in the field and Washington, DC. Designate appropriate liaison and advisory personnel to support FEMA.

Establish the primary Federal centers for information on the crisis management response to the media.

Determine when a threat of an act of terrorism warrants consultation with the White House.

Advise the White House, through the Attorney General, when FBI requires assistance for a Federal crisis management response, in accordance with the PDD-39 Domestic Guidelines.

#### 11.0 Roles and Responsibilities (continued

#### 11.3 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

PDD-39 clarifies and expands upon the responsibilities of FEMA as the Federal Lead Agency for consequence Management.

The agency will appoint a Regional Operations Center (ROC) Director or Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) and will convene meetings with decision-makers representing the FBI, Federal agencies involved in technical operations, and State and local agencies (as appropriate).

Coordinate the Federal consequence management response with the lead State and local consequence management agencies.

Issue and track the status of consequence management actions assigned to Federal agencies.

Establish the primary Federal operations centers for consequence management in the field and Washington, DC.

Establish the primary Federal centers for information on the consequence management response for the media.

Designate appropriate liaison and advisory personnel to support the FBI.

Determine when consequences are imminent that warrant consultation with the White House and the Governor's Office.

Consult with the White House and the Governor's Office to determine if a Federal consequence management response is required and if FEMA is directed to use Stafford Act authorities. This process will involve appropriate notification and coordination with the FBI.

#### 11.4 Law Enforcement Agencies

It is likely that Law Enforcement agencies will be among the event's first responders. Monroe County Sheriff's Office is the lead response agency for the county. The Sheriff's Office supports police, security, and law enforcement operations, and coordinates with other law enforcement organizations during terrorism incidents.

The MCSO, with the support of other Law Enforcement agencies if required, is responsible for the scene security, traffic control and subsequent incident investigation. Support from other Law Enforcement agencies or Emergency Services (if necessary), may include; bomb squad, K-9 units, special response teams, hostage negotiators and homicide investigations.

#### 11.0 Roles and Responsibilities (continued)

#### 11.4 Law Enforcement Agencies (continued)

The MCSO is responsible for security measures at designated shelter locations, and may also be required to provide security and crowd control at various other locations, including medical facilities, casualty collection points, etc.

As soon as it has been determined that an event indicates terrorist activity, the FBI will become the lead response agency.

The MCSO will provide support to the FBI with tracking and prosecution of terrorists and those responsible for terrorist crime in Monroe County

#### 11.5 Fire/Rescue/Emergency Medical Services

The Monroe County Fire/Rescue Department is responsible for the life safety issues relative to an incident involving terrorist act. They may be the first, or among the first, incident responders.

The Fire/Rescue Department is responsible for fire suppression, victim extraction, decontamination; the Emergency Medical Services Department is responsible for immediate treatment and victims transport. Both departments participate in triage. Specialized teams (HAZMAT or Search and Rescue) may be requested to assist, if necessary.

#### 11.6 Hospitals

Local hospitals will, most likely, receive the brunt of casualties (victims) affected by the terrorist act. Medical facilities must be prepared for triage, decontamination and treatment of victims. Many will leave the incident area before the arrival of first responders, and transport themselves into the medical facility, placing hospitals and medical providers at risk of cross-contamination. In the event of victim overload and lack of medical resources, neighboring counties medical facilities will be utilized.

#### 11.7 Monroe County Health Department

It is the responsibility of MCHD to collect information, monitor local trends and notify the Centers for Disease Control if necessary, and to maintain a connection with medical providers for notification of reportable diseases and trends surveillance.

#### 11.8 Medical Examiner

The Office of the Medical Examiner is responsible for the investigation and process of any fatalities, possibly with outside assistance. Any fatalities due to a terrorist act are considered murder victims; therefore, the location should be cordoned off and the area secured as a crime scene. Everything within the crime scene is considered evidence and should not be disturbed, except by investigators and/or highly trained specialized law enforcement personnel.

#### 11.0 Roles and Responsibilities (continued)

#### 11.9 Continuity of Government

Monroe County is governed by a Board of County Commissioners consisting of elected commissioners one of which, serves as the County Mayor. During times of Emergency the County Administrator is given the authority to accomplish whatever actions are necessary to protect lives. The authority succession is: County Mayor; County Administrator; County Sheriff.

Continuity of Government (COG) is an essential function of emergency management and is vital during an emergency/disaster situation. All levels of government (federal, state, and local) share a constitutional responsibility to preserve the life and property of its citizenry. State and local COG is defined as the preservation, maintenance, or reconstitution of the civil government's ability to carry out its constitutional responsibilities. Consequently, if a unit of government is not prepared, most if not all of its critical governance ability could be severely degraded. Such a situation could create a climate that could make the jurisdiction vulnerability to anarchy, lawlessness, and chaos. The State Constitution, statutes and administrative rules address COG in the State of Florida.

The resources of all County and Municipal governmental departments and agencies are considered to be available at the County and/or Municipal level in minimizing the effects of disaster; these resources will be supplemented, as determined by necessity and availability, by voluntary assistance from:

- Adjoining counties
- Private businesses and industry
- All other groups and individuals

Once activated, MCEM will coordinate county resources for preparedness, response, and recovery operations through the ESF agencies.

All government offices are responsible to raise awareness of their employees and outside contracted personnel concerning the dangers of terrorism by conducting in-house training and meetings to discuss individual actions.

All County departments and agencies have established lines of succession in the event those key individuals are unavailable.

Additionally, MCEM has in place an agreement with the MCSO to airlift essential county personnel (Mayor, County Administrator, Judicial personnel, etc.) to a safe zone should the circumstances require such a response.

Any additional assistance required at any level will be requested through the Emergency Management Director of Monroe County.

#### 11.0 Roles and Responsibilities (continued)

#### 11.9 Continuity of Government (continued)

#### Levels of Government

- Chapter 252. Florida Statutes, "State Emergency Management Act"
- Governor's Executive Order
- Adjoining Counties
- Private Businesses and Industry
- All Other Groups or Individuals
- State and Federal Agencies

Support agencies will ensure 24-hour staffing availability as required. ESF representatives responding to the EOC shall be knowledgeable of their resources and have the authority to coordinate the release of these resources.

During a terrorist incident, all unaffected government offices and organizations should continue to operate with increased security until notified otherwise by the Governor's authorized representative. Increased security includes individual employee awareness, observation, reporting of suspicious objects and characters, the immediate challenge of all suspicious persons, places or things foreign to the normal business environment and any prudent method to secure the facility and protect it's occupants.

#### 11.10 Administration and Logistics

Each agency, office, and/or organization involved is responsible for its own administration and logistics. Detailed logs, financial records and receipts are to be kept for possible future reimbursement and possible legal proceedings. These logs and records shall be submitted to MCEM upon request.

Each local, State and private agency is responsible for maintaining a list of emergency resources to include personnel, supplies and equipment.

MCEM shall prepare situation reports (which will also be submitted to the State Division of Emergency Management) and After Action reports describing the situation and response actions of local, state, Federal agencies and private sectors.

#### 11.11 Regional Response Assets

Monroe County has mutual aid agreements in place should outside assistance be required.

Monroe County Sheriff's Office would request assistance through the Florida Sheriff's Association, which may include bomb squad personnel, SWAT personnel, etc. The MCSO has also a mutual aid agreement with various police

#### 11.0 Roles and Responsibilities (continued)

#### 11.11 Regional Response Assets (continued)

departments (Key West, Key Colony Beach, Florida City and Homestead among others). The Sheriff's Office would also utilize the resources of the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP), Florida Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWCC) and Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE).

The county has several ways to request mutual aid in the event of a fire or other emergency requiring Fire-Rescue response:

<u>Haz-Mat:</u> The county's Fire-Rescue would call Miami-Dade Fire-Rescue to request Haz-Mat assistance. Should their resources be tied up, we would be referred to the next nearest unit (City of Miami). Should situation require response of more than one unit, then request would be made to the Florida Fire Chief's Association.

Other emergency: For a small number of units or manpower, the county's Fire-Rescue would request support directly from Miami-Dade. Should situation develop further and more units and manpower would be required, request would be made to the Florida Fire Chief's Association. This would also apply to EMS assistance.

For every threat level, the local Incident Commander should notify the local Emergency Operations Center of one of the following two situations:

- Federal and/or state resources will be necessary to support local operations
- Local capabilities are deemed to be adequate for local crisis and consequence management response operations.

The local Emergency Operations Center under the direction of Emergency Management will pass this information to the State Warning Point and coordinate State assistance. The State will respond appropriately to the information regarding local capabilities for the incident management.

Based on after action reports and critiques, MCEM shall update their plans and SOPs, provide appropriate training, acquire necessary equipment, etc., to facilitate preparedness for subsequent incidents.

#### 12.0 Mitigation and Prevention

#### 12.1 Definition of Mitigation

Mitigation is any activity that actually eliminates or reduces the probability of occurrence of a disaster; or activities that reduce the effects of unavoidable disasters; or eliminate or reduce the degree of long-term risk to human life and property from natural and technological hazards.

#### 12.0 <u>Mitigation and Prevention (continued)</u>

#### 12.2 Reducing the Risk

Terrorism prevention begins with the local community and facilities. There are warnings that, if noticed, can indicate potential terrorist activity.

Police, fire, public works and the general public need to know what potential indicators are and have a system to report suspicious activity.

Public and government sectors need to acknowledge the potential threat and implement physical security programs commensurate with the threat and value of facilities to be protected.

The terrorist's greatest asset is anonymity and the ability to reach his potential target unnoticed.

Mitigation (prevention) actions are meant to thwart the potential terrorist and reduce the probability of an incident. Communities, agencies, facilities and individuals can reduce the risk of becoming terrorist targets by understanding the nature of terrorism, assessing their risk, and by taking basic systematic security precautions.

#### 12.3 <u>Mitigation Planning</u>

#### 12.3.1 Operations Security

A threat assessment may reveal security weaknesses in day-to-day operations. Communications security is an integral part of operations assessment. Terrorists are not hampered by regulations and fully exploit opportunities presented to them. The objectives of operations security as they pertain to anti-terrorism are:

- Deny intelligence and information to terrorists
- Avoid rigid operational routines
- Be familiar with techniques used by terrorists

#### **Personal Security**

Prevention of personal attack depends on the planning and the use of the personal protection measures. The most important of these is to educate individuals who are likely targets, to recognize threats and to be familiar with actions that may reduce their level of risk.

#### **Physical Security**

Physical security measures for a facility reduce the probability for terrorist attack by making the act more difficult and increasing the risk to the terrorist.

#### 12.0 <u>Mitigation and Prevention (continued)</u>

#### **Physical Security (continued)**

Developing its defensive capabilities enhances the security of any public facility. Employing an integrated system of intrusion detection equipment, barriers, structural hardening, access control and trained response forces are critical components of this defense, as is delaying terrorist action until additional forces can arrive.

Measures designed to prevent unauthorized access to facilities, equipment, material and information will also safeguard against sabotage, vandalism and theft.

#### **Awareness Education and Training**

The key element to an effective anti-terrorism program is to develop awareness.

#### 12.3.2 Facility Mitigation

A facility that is assessed as a possible target for terrorist activity should implement prevention measures. General measures can include (but are not limited to):

#### **Individuals Should**

- Be aware of the surroundings
- Look for big or small surrounding changes
- Look for suspicious persons, objects, vehicles
- Report anything unusual to proper authority

#### **Building, Facility Supervisors/Managers Should**

- Remind personnel to be suspicious and inquisitive about strangers, particularly those carrying suitcases or other containers
- Watch for unidentified vehicles on or in the building/facility vicinity
- Watch for abandoned parcels, briefcases, suitcases and any unusual activity
- Restrict, control distribution of building and site blueprints; plans for building/facility evacuations; security plans
- Secure and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms and storage areas not in regular use
- Limit access points for vehicles and personnel commensurate with a reasonable traffic flow

#### 12.0 <u>Mitigation and Prevention (continued)</u>

#### 12.3.2 <u>Buildings, Facility Supervisors, Managers Should (continued)</u>

- Move vehicles and objects (i.e., crates, trash containers) at least 25 meters from buildings
- Consider centralized parking
- Inspect mail (above the regular examination process) for letter or parcel bombs
- Physically inspect visitors and randomly inspect their briefcases, parcels, and other containers
- Identify the visitor's destination
- Operate random patrols to check vehicles, persons and buildings
- Erect barriers and obstacles to control traffic flow
- Do not point out security features to press tours, public tours (if applicable)
- Require that all planning documents and drawings be returned after job completion
- Give contractors only those plans that are necessary for the job

#### 12.3.3 Physical Security Controls - Internal

#### **Office Accessibility**

- Offices most likely to be terrorist targets should not be directly accessible to the public
- Executive offices should not be located on the ground floor
- If office windows face public areas cover them with heavy curtains
- Place ingress door within view of the person responsible for screening personnel and objects passing through the door
- Remotely control doors by installing electromagnetic door locks
- Lock doors from within and have only one visitor access door

#### **Physical Security Measures**

- Install security devices (i.e., alarm system, sonic warning devices or other intrusion systems, exterior floodlights, dead bolt locks on windows, iron grills or heavy screens
- Add a thin, clear plastic sheet to windows to degrade the effects of flying glass in case of explosion
- Inspect the interior of the entire building and other infrequently used areas
- Book depositories or mail slots should not be adjacent to, or in, the building
- Janitorial closets, telephone and electric closets should be locked at all times, and protected with an alarm system

#### 12.0 Mitigation and Prevention (continued)

#### 12.3.3 Physical Security Controls – Internal (continued)

#### **Personnel Procedures**

- Stress heightened awareness by facility personnel (effective facility security depends largely on the actions and awareness of people)
- Develop and disseminate clear instruction on personnel security procedures
- Hold regular security briefings
- Conduct drills
- Senior personnel should not work late on a routine basis
- No one should ever work alone
- Provide staff with a bomb threat/extortion checklist
- Ensure the existence of secure communications systems between senior personnel, administrative support, and security personnel with intercoms and telephones
- Develop an alternate means of communications in event of a primary communications systems failure

#### **Physical Security Controls – Internal**

- Do not open packages or large envelopes in offices unless the sender or source is positively known. Notify the appropriate personnel of a suspicious package
- Lock all doors at night, on weekends, and when the facility is unattended
- Maintain tight control of keys. Lock cabinets and closets when not in use
- Escort visitors in the facility, and maintain complete control of strangers who seek entrance
- Do not reveal the location of facility personnel to callers unless they are positively identified and have a need for the information
- Use extreme care when providing information over the telephone (remember, telephone lines can be tapped)
- Do not give names, home addresses/phone numbers of facility personnel to strangers or telephone callers
- Avoid discussing travel plans or timetables in the presence of visitors

#### **Controlling Entry**

- Use a reception area to handle visitors, thereby restricting their access to interior offices
- Consider installing metal detection devices at controlled entrances
- Prohibit non-organizational persons from bringing boxes and parcels into the facility
- Arrange office space so that unescorted visitors are under the administrative assistant's visual observation
- Do not make exceptions to the facilities access control system

#### 12.0 <u>Mitigation and Prevention (continued)</u>

#### 12.3.3 Physical Security Controls – Internal (continued)

#### **Public Area**

- Remove all potted plants and ornamental objects from public areas
- Empty trash receptacles frequently
- Lock doors to service areas
- Ensure that construction or placement of furniture and other items will not conceal explosive devices or weapons
- Exercise particular cautions in public rest rooms (install springs on stall doors so they stand open when not locked; equip stalls with an inside latch to prevent someone from hiding a device in a locked stall; install a fixed covering over the tops on commode water tanks; use open mesh baskets for soiled towels, etc.)
- Guards in public areas should have a way to silently alert the facility of danger and to summon assistance

#### 12.3.4 Physical Security Controls – External

#### Physical Security Measures

- High perimeter fence or wall and a comprehensive external lighting system
- Check grounds to ensure there are no covered or concealed avenues of approach for intruders, especially near entrances
- Deny exterior access to fire escapes, stairways, roofs
- Cover, lock, or screen outdoor openings (i.e., air vents, utility access points, etc.)
- Screen windows, particularly those near the ground or accessible from adjacent buildings
- Remove names and/or titles on reserved parking spaces
- Locate outdoor trash containers, storage bins, bicycle racks away from the building(s)
- Mail boxes should not be close to the building(s)

#### Personnel Procedure

- Be alert to people disguised as public utility crews or vendors who may station themselves near the facility to observe activities
- Pay attention to parked or abandoned vehicles near the building entrance or near walls
- Note the license plate number, make, model, year and color of suspicious vehicles and the occupant's description, and report that information to supervisor or the Sheriff's Office

#### Area Law Enforcement Procedures

- Determine whether local law enforcement patrol the area
- Request patrol by local law enforcement to include door checks after office hours

#### 12.0 <u>Mitigation and Prevention (continued)</u>

#### 12.4 Groups Monitoring

Law Enforcement agencies, in particular Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and the Monroe County Sheriff's Office will monitor known groups or factions which are suspected of, or who have the potential to commit terrorist acts.

#### 12.5 Interdiction

Actions such as arrests, or confiscation of materials, will be implemented to intervene in potential terrorist acts.

#### 12.6 Profiling

Using established guidelines, a profile of the type of person(s) or groups who might attempt to commit terrorist act will be utilized to identify groups or individuals to keep under observation.

#### 12.7 Facilities

Locations, which are likely to be the target of a terrorist act should have a plan, which describes methods, used to search for suspicious items and monitor suspicious events or persons. Action plans, to be implemented in the event of a terrorist incident, should be developed.

#### 12.8 Resources

Resources necessary to respond to an emergency event (i.e., personnel, supplies, equipment, etc.) must be identified in advance, and inventoried on regular basis.

#### 13.0 POLICIES, CRISIS AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

#### 13.1 Federal

Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) establishes the federal response responsibilities, framework, and coordination among federal agencies responding to terrorist incidents. The overall federal response to a terrorist incident within the United States includes these components:

• <u>Crisis management</u>, primarily under the jurisdiction of the federal government, involves measures to resolve a hostile situation, investigate the incident, and prepare a criminal case for prosecution under federal law.

#### 13.0 POLICIES, CRISIS AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

#### 13.1 Federal (continued)

• Consequence Management, under the primary jurisdiction of the affected state and local government, includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to affected governments, businesses and individuals. Per the Governor's request, the federal government provides assistance to alleviate damage, loss, hardship and suffering caused by the event. The Federal Emergency Management Agency is the designated lead agency for coordinating of federal assistance to state and local governments in managing the consequences of a terrorist incident.

#### 13.2 State and Local

The FBI is, under PDD 39, responsible for Crisis Management. However, local law enforcement personnel provide the initial response to a terrorist incident. Initial response forces contain the incident and isolate the area as well as locate and secure witnesses and physical evidence.

Local and/or state response units may also be committed to the incident to maintain containment and isolation, and to protect and assist the population. Direct intervention may be required to save lives in event the incident rapidly deteriorates.

While securing and containing the incident scene, response forces must be alert to the fact that terrorist incident often include diversionary tactics. Local and state resources should stand ready to assist the FBI as required.

#### 13.3 Emergency Management's Role - Consequence Management

The role of Emergency Management is to serve as the "consequence manager". That means finding and applying resources (personnel, equipment, and supplies) to the appropriate emergency response tasks and demands. The state government is to augment local response by supplying additional resources as needed. This is coordinated through Monroe County Department of Emergency Management and the state EOC.

#### 13.4 Resource Needs Determination – Crisis and Consequence Management

The emergency response agencies of the affected local government may find that the tasks and demands of a terrorist act have over-taxed their personnel and equipment to deal with the impacts, and that resource "shortfall" exist.

#### 13.0 POLICIES, CRISIS AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT (continued)

#### 13.4 Resource Needs Determination – Crisis and Consequence Management

Responding to terrorist acts will require specialized personnel, equipment, and supplies. The following identifies the requirements:

#### 13.4.1 <u>Human Resources</u>

**Bomb Disposal Technicians** Clergy-Mental Health Professionals EMS Personnel Confined Space Rescue Technician

**EOC Personnel Evacuation Personnel** 

Shelter - Special Needs Personnel Fire Personnel

Search & Rescue Personnel HazMat Entry Teams

**Health Specialists Hostage Negotiators** Specialized Crime Units Legal Personnel

Technical Rescue Teams Law Enforcement

Funeral Directors – Mass Fatality Trained

#### 13.4.2 Equipment-Supplies Resources

Communications Construction Equipment HazMat Monitoring Devices Crowd - Traffic Control Confined Space Entry **Decontamination Materials** 

Firefighting Emergency Medical - Life Support HazMat Response Mass Care - Food, Water, Shelter

**Transportation Systems** Portable Power, Fuels

Utilities

#### 13.4.3 Possible Consequences of Terrorist Act

**Utilities System Disruption Transportation System Disruption** Unemployment Structure Collapse - Entrapment Loss of Tax Base Isolated/Stranded Populations Multiple Deaths **Government Services Disruption** Mass Fatalities Government Leadership - Loss Of Mass Casualties **Communications Disruption** Health/Epidemic **Business/Industry Disruption** Fire/Explosion Government Expenditure Displaced Populations Critical Incident Stress Contamination

Pollution – Air, Water, Soil

#### 13.4.4 Additional Consequences

- Demoralization of Security Forces
- Unauthorized Over-Reaction By Security Forces
- Intimidation Of The Targeted Group
- Violent Response By The Targeted Group
- Imposition Of Martial Law and/or Related Measures

### 13.0 POLICIES, CRISIS AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT (continued)

Four Phases of Emergency Management	Terrorism Crisis Management Tasks	Terrorism Consequence Manag. Tasks
Mitigation:	Terrorism threat analysis, crisis monitoring, intelligence system establishment, operations security, security upgrades to critical facilities	Terrorism threat analysis, crisis monitoring, operations security, personal security, security upgrades to EOC and other continuity-of-government facilities
Preparedness:	Response planning, resource inventories, resource development, equipment procurement, exercise and training, mutual aid agreements, mobilization planning	Response planning, evacuation and sheltering planning, resource inventories, mutual aid agreements, public education and awareness, stockpiling supplies, mobilization planning
Response:	Response plans implementation, isolate scene, contain threat, resolve incident, arrest suspects, assist federal law enforcement agencies	Response plans implementation, Activate EOC, issue alerts and warnings, mobilize resources, rescue victims, provide emergency medical services, evacuate populations at risk, shelter evacuees
Recovery:	Manage crime scene, collect evidence, process suspects, prepare prosecution case	Recover victims, assess damage, prepare disaster declaration, provide public information, decontaminate, provide health and safety information

### **Consequence Management Organizational Structure**

#### 14.0 PREPAREDNESS

#### 14.1 Plan

This plan reflects the actions and responsibilities of Emergency Management and agencies that will be called upon to prepare for, respond to, and recover from a terrorist incident.

In order to better execute any necessary response, the Department of Emergency Management provided to all applicable organizations/departments the Florida Incident Field Operations Guide (FOG), which would further assist the responding personnel to better understand the Incident Command Structure and the roles of various responders. Some of those departments are Sheriff's Office, municipalities Police Departments, County Fire-Rescue and EMS, all municipalities Fire-Rescue departments, Public Works, etc.

#### 14.2 **Training**

It is the responsibility of local agencies and departments to provide all appropriate training.

The Department of Emergency Management will provide training information and/or materials from the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigations, etc. Training session information (and such) will be announced, as it becomes available. Each organization should determine the level of training for their personnel.

#### 14.3 Resource Analysis

It is the responsibility of each organization to inventory equipment and personnel available to them in event of an incident.

#### 15.0 ALERT AND NOTIFICATION AND ACTIVATION LEVELS

Alert and notification will encompass of the following:

- Threat information assessment and initiation of protective measures
- Notification of appropriate agencies who will be responding or will be placed on stand-by in the event of terrorist actions
- Dispatching responding personnel to the incident scene

#### 15.1 **Alert**

Though warning does not precipitate all terrorist events, a communication system will be established to link agencies that collect pertinent information.

Agencies who would be involved in the notification include, but are not limited to: Monroe County Sheriff's Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Defense Intelligence Agency (military intelligence); other local, state and federal law enforcement organizations.

#### 15.0 ALERT AND NOTIFICATION AND ACTIVATION LEVELS (continued)

#### 15.2 Activation Levels

Agency activation will be based on the four notification levels:

#### 15.2.1 Low Condition - Green

Low risk of terrorist attacks. The following Protective Measures may be applied:

- ⇒ Refining and exercising pre-planned Protective Measures
- ⇒ Ensuring personnel receive training on HSAS, departmental, or agency-specific Protective Measures
- ⇒ Regularly assessing facilities for vulnerabilities and taking measures to reduce them

#### 15.2.2 Guarded Condition - Blue

General risk of terrorist attack. In addition to the previously outlined Protective Measures, the following may be applied:

- ⇒ Checking communications with designated emergency response or command locations
- ⇒ Reviewing and updating emergency response procedures
- ⇒ Providing the public with necessary information

#### 15.2.3 Elevated Condition - Yellow

Significant risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the previously outlined Protective Measures, the following may be applied:

- ⇒ Increasing surveillance of critical locations
- ⇒ Coordinating emergency plans with nearby jurisdictions
- ⇒ Assessing further refinement of Protective Measures within the context of the current threat information
- ⇒ Implementing, as appropriate, contingency and emergency response plans

#### 15.2.4 High Condition - Orange

High risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the previously outlined Protective Measures, the following may be applied:

- ⇒ Coordinating necessary security efforts with armed forces or law enforcement agencies
- ⇒ Taking additional precaution at public events
- ⇒ Preparing to work at an alternate site or with dispersed workforce
- ⇒ Restricting access to essential personnel only

#### 15.0 ALERT AND NOTIFICATION AND ACTIVATION LEVELS (continued)

#### 15.2.5 Severe Condition - Red

Severe risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the previously outlined Protective Measures, the following may be applied:

- ⇒ Assigning emergency response personnel and pre-positioning specially trained teams
- ⇒ Monitoring, redirecting or constraining transportation systems
- ⇒ Closing public and government facilities
- ⇒ Increasing or redirecting personnel to address critical emergency needs
- Response is primarily directed toward public safety and the preservation of human life

#### 16.0 RESPONSE

#### 16.1 **Event**

The initial assessment may be provided by dispatcher, first responder, or by the terrorist's early warning and may indicate whether the event is the result of a man-made or other act.

#### 16.2 Location

The initial assessment may indicate the event's location and possibly occupation of the following types of areas:

- Public buildings
- Assembly areas
- Symbolic or historical areas/facilities
- Controversial businesses
- Infrastructure systems
- Other public or private property

#### 16.3 <u>Scene Control</u>

It is safe to assume responders will rush to the scene without sufficient information. Personal safety is of the utmost importance. Once an incident occurs, proper chain of command control must be established in order to eliminate the possibility of additional casualties and victims.

#### 16.0 RESPONSE (continued)

It is paramount that emergency responders do the following:

- establish a perimeter control
- set up field command posts
- · designate triage and decontamination areas
- direct victims to appropriate sites/facilities
- determine evacuation and/or shelter zones
- follow strict personal safety protocols
- keep the public away from affected area
- perform sweep of affected area to locate/assist disoriented victims

#### 16.4 Command Post

Command Post will be established between the inner and outer perimeter to provide on site coordination of services. Mobile units may be brought in when suitable buildings/facilities are not available in the area. Direct contact from the On-Scene Command Post and the Emergency Operations Center will be established to ensure requests for assistance are processed and information updates are received. The Command Post will be located uphill and upwind of the incident, and should not be within the line of sight of the incident.

#### 16.5 Staging Area

The Incident Commander will identify the need for Staging Areas where incident resources can be located while awaiting immediate assignment.

To maintain an effective measure of control, a Staging Area Manager needs to be appointed whose responsibilities are:

- Report to the Operations Section Manager or to the Incident Manager
- Oversee the check-in procedure for personnel and equipment
- Respond to requests for resources by assigning available resources
- Monitor resources status
- Keep the Incident Manager or the Operations Section Manager informed of resource status at the Staging Area

Staging Area implementation will vary along with the ICS structure. The Staging Area at a simple incident may serve as a holding area where resources may report for only a short time before deployment. At a complex incident, staging may require a formal deployment system. Each Staging Area will be identified and named. Staging Areas may be relocated if necessary but must always be clearly identified.

#### 16.0 RESPONSE (continued)

Factors for selecting Staging Areas include:

#### Proximity of operational assignments.

Staging Areas should be away from the incident but as close to probable operational assignments as possible. The Staging Area should not be more than 5 minutes away from the incident.

#### Proximity to possible hazards.

Staging Areas should be located *out of the way* of any possible direct hazard.

#### Access Routes.

Staging Areas must have separate access routes for incoming and outgoing resources.

#### Space.

Staging Areas must be large enough to accommodate available resources and should have enough room to expand if the incident escalates.

#### Security.

Staging Areas must offer security for both personnel and equipment.

#### 16.1 On-Scene Warnings

"On-Scene warnings" are situations that are observed on-site which would indicate something out of ordinary, such as:

- Unexplained illnesses or deaths
- Items that seem out of place unattended packages, suitcases, containers, bulky envelopes, etc.

#### 16.2 Secondary Devices

In terrorism incidents, always consider that a secondary device is present. This will prevent unnecessary casualties/fatalities. Bomb Squad or other qualified personnel should make determination of secondary devices.

Keep potential consequences of secondary devices in mind when organizing the response site and executing the response.

Establish functional areas as far away from the incident as practical. These include the Incident Command Post (ICP), staging area(s), triage/treatment area (s) and decontamination site(s).

Cellular phones, radios, pagers and car alarm remotes must be turned off or kept away from suspected bombs. Radio frequency transmitted by one of these devices could cause device detonation.

#### 16.0 RESPONSE (continued)

#### 16.3 Casualties – Triage

Triage is a process of sorting a number of patients into categories and ordering their treatment and transport based on the severity of their injuries and medical conditions.

If there are too many victims, the responder will have to complete triage before beginning care on anyone. The purpose of triage is to assess the patient's condition, determine the urgency of the patient's condition, and assign a treatment priority.

#### 16.8 Casualties - Triage (continued)

When there are more victims than there are rescuers, triage assures that the most critical but still salvageable patients are cared for first. The typical triage process does not allow for a responder to stop and provide interventions for each person in need of care, including patients who are in respiratory or cardiac arrest.

If the scene is unstable or dangerous in any way, patients ought to be moved regardless of their injuries.

The following is an example of a four-category triage:

- Priority 1 Treatable life-threatening injuries Immediate
- Priority 2 Serious but not life-threatening injuries Delayed
- Priority 3 Walking wounded Ambulatory
- Priority 4 Dead or fatally injured Deceased/Non-salvageable

Many factors can change a patient's priority during the triage process. These factors include the type of incident, location, how quickly patient assessment may be performed, weather conditions, number of patients, types of injuries, number of rescuers, availability of high-level trauma services, and limitations of the EMS system.

When responders are dispatched to a multiple-casualty incident already operating under the direction of an Incident Commander at a command post, the responders will report to the Staging Officer or directly to the command post. Responders will identify themselves and his/her level of training, then follow the directions indicated by the Staging Officer or the Incident Commander.

#### 16.4 <u>Casualties – Treatment</u>

Analysis of large-proportion incidents has shown that victims will leave the scene and walk or transport themselves to the closest medical facility. This is especially dangerous in an event where victims may be contaminated. Their actions may result in the contamination of other individuals, vehicles and medical facilities.

#### 16.0 RESPONSE (continued)

Emergency personnel must designate a staging area where the triaging process will start immediately. Local medical facilities will be contacted in order for them to prepare an exterior triage and decontamination area to ensure the safety of hospital staff and facility.

Incidents which would be beyond the scope of Monroe County resources will involve/require mutual aid assistance from surrounding counties.

#### 16.5 Casualties - Decontamination

In the event of contamination, standard HAZMAT decontamination procedures will be followed. If determination is made that an alternate decontamination procedure is needed due to the contaminate, local HAZMAT Teams or the military will be consulted.

Fire department personnel trained in accordance with established standard operating procedures will perform decontamination. Decontamination performance is based on two considerations:

- whether the contaminant is a person or an article, and
- the physical state of contaminant (gas, liquid or solid)

Any site found to be contaminated will be sealed off under the control of the Monroe County Public Health Department and county law enforcement agencies. These sites will be decontaminated with the assistance of Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) personnel and other appropriate federal and state agencies.

#### 16.6 <u>Isolation and Quarantine</u>

The criteria and procedures for exposed personnel (those who can not be safely extracted, pending arrival of additional assistance) as well as procedures for isolation/quarantine of victims are addressed in the local Fire/Rescue department's procedure manuals.

The first arriving unit will perform the initial size-up and determine the approximate number of victims. The Hazardous Materials Operating Policy requires that the affected area be isolated and entry denied to all personnel until the contaminant has been identified. Protective clothing and equipment must be utilized for proper operation.

Decisions regarding long-term community quarantine for highly contagious biological agents will be made in conjunction with Monroe County Health Department and the Center for Disease Control.

#### 16.0 RESPONSE (continued)

#### 16.7 <u>Casualties – Hospital Transport</u>

Transportation of contaminated persons to appropriate facilities will follow EMS and Fire/Rescue guidelines. Victims may be transported out of the area if deemed necessary. Coordination with other counties and state and federal resources will be conducted through the State Division of Emergency Management.

#### 16.8 Casualties – Disposition of the Deceased

In the event of a mass casualty incident involving a NBC device, decontamination of the deceased will have to be performed. It is the responsibility of the lead HAZMAT Team to determine who will perform this function.

If the incident is the result of a biological agent, the Medical Examiner's Office will work with experts from the Monroe County Health Department and the Center for Disease Control.

#### 16.9 Crime Scene Preservation

Crime scene preservation is the responsibility of Monroe County Sheriff's Office in conjunction with other responding law enforcement agencies (if necessary).

The health and human safety issues will take precedence over evidence collection.

#### 16.10 Evidence Gathering

Depending on the device used, it is possible that evidence fragments will be found in the deceased. The FBI will place evidence collection experts at the autopsy site. In the absence of FBI, the responsibility lies with the leading jurisdiction.

#### 17.0 FACILITIES

In order to meet the needs of the responders, the media and the victims, in the event of a terrorist act, the following facilities will/may be needed:

#### 17.1 Emergency Operations Center

The Primary Emergency Operations Center will serve as an information and coordination point for response and recovery. The EOC will be activated when emergency situation requirements exceed the ability to be managed individually by the Emergency Management Senior Director, Director and/or County Administrator.

The Monroe County Primary Emergency Operations Center is located on the second floor of the Regional Government Center at 2798 Overseas Highway in Marathon.

#### 17.0 FACILITIES (continued)

#### 17.2 Field Command Post

The first responders may choose to activate their operations from a mobile command post, tent or structure. The Incident Commander will make this decision.

#### 17.3 <u>Emergency News Center (Media/Public Information Officer)</u>

Terrorist incidents will capture worldwide attention, and media representatives will be present to cover the event. In order to facilitate their needs and keep them up to date, an Emergency News Center (ENC) will be established by the Public Information Officer in charge.

The ENC may be either an indoor or outdoor facility. Designated area will be in the proximity of the incident however; it can not be in an area that would interfere with the response operations.

There are several mechanisms for the delivery of Emergency Public Information:

- 17.3.1 The Office of Emergency Management will utilize the Emergency Alert System (EAS) when a sudden event requires immediate public notification. Pre-scripted messages will be utilized and the Communications Department or, the Public Information Officer at the EOC will execute notification.
- 17.3.2 They County's Emergency Information Line will be activated and its staff mobilized at the EOC when interactive information delivery is needed to inform the general public. The Emergency Information Line phone number will be issued to the media, and will be included in all EOC press releases.
- **17.3.3** Non-Credible Threat the local law enforcement agency will be responsible for providing information to the media.
- 17.3.4 <u>Credible Threat</u> the Incident Manager and/or Command Group will designate the most appropriate agency Public Information Officer to handle the media, or will establish a Joint Information Center. All responding agencies (law enforcement, Emergency Medical Services, hospitals, state agencies and the facility owner) shall coordinate with the designated Public Information Officer.

All press releases shall be coordinated with the designated PIO. The Unified Command Staff (Incident Manager and Operations members) will approve the release of information.

#### 18.0 **DISENGAGEMENT**

If an act of terrorism does not occur, the consequence management response disengages when the FEMA Director, in consultation with the FBI Director, directs FEMA Headquarters and the responsible Region(s) to issue a cancellation notification by standard procedure to appropriate FEMA officials and Federal Response Plan (FRP) agencies. FRP agencies disengage according to standard procedures.

If an act of terrorism occurs that results in major consequences, then each FRP structure disengages at the appropriate time according to their established procedures. Following FRP disengagement, operations by individual Federal agencies or, by multiple Federal agencies under other Federal plans, may continue in order to support the affected State and local governments with long-term hazard monitoring, environmental decontamination, and site restoration (clean-up).

#### 19.0 RECOVERY

Recovery activities continue beyond the emergency period. Their purpose is to return all systems to normal and/or "near" normal conditions. They can be broken down into short-term and long-term activities.

**Short-term** activities attempt to return vital human systems to minimum operating standards.

#### 19.1.1 Search and Rescue

In the event of a building (any fixed facility) collapse, search and rescue operation could last until the last victim is removed from the site. Searches for viable victims will last for approximately ten days, and operations will continued from that point on, as directed.

#### 19.1.2 Sheltering

Coordination of activities and resources for temporary shelters and mass care is the responsibility of The Salvation Army and the American Red Cross in conjunction with the Monroe County Department of Emergency Management, Monroe County School Board, Monroe County Sheriff's Office and Monroe County Emergency Medical Services. Responsibilities are:

- Provide county-wide sheltering, including the special needs population
- Coordinate mass feeding operations
- Provide First Aid stations
- Coordinate with appropriate agencies for the provision of medical support exceeding that of First Aid
- Provide shelter registration data to proper authorities
- Coordinate with the proper agencies for facility security and a working communications system
- Provide for additional resources to support the mass care and feeding operations

#### 19.0 RECOVERY (continued)

- 19.2 <u>Long-term</u> activities stabilize all systems. The length of the response will depend on the type of incident. The most complicated recovery period would be if the incident involved nuclear, biological or chemical agents. Issues to consider are:
  - Extent/Degree of allowable re-entry
  - Extent of chemical, biological and/or nuclear contamination
  - Identification of agent/s
  - · Identification of contaminated victims
  - Identification of contaminated facilities/sites
  - Decontamination effort
  - Quarantine activities
  - Identification of successfully decontaminated facilities/sites
  - Identification of "lost" facilities/sites (those which can not be safely decontaminated and are determined unsafe for future use)
  - Economic impact

#### 20.0 SPECIAL EVENTS AND THE STAFFORD ACT

Commitments by individual agencies to take precautionary measures in anticipation of special events will not be reimbursed under the Stafford Act, unless mission-assigned by the Federal Emergency Management Agency to support consequence management.

#### 21.0 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

The following are guidance documents to Terrorism Incident Response Planning:

- Florida Terrorism Incident Response Plan www.dca.state.fl.us/bpr/EMTOOLS/Terrorism/Summit/terrorism.htm
- FEMA's Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning, Attachment-G (Terrorism) Tab A to SLG101
   www.fema.gov/pte/gaheop.htm
- The United States Government Interagency Concept of Operations Planning www.fema.gov/nwz01/nwz01 09.htm)

#### 21.0 PRIMARY POINT OF CONTACT

Inquiries concerning this document should be addressed to Irene Toner, Director, Monroe County Department of Emergency Management at (305) 289-6065.

### **ANNEX "A"**

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL

#### ANNEX "A"

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#### Annex "A"

#### 1.0 INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is not a modern phenomenon. It is as old as humankind and has been as much a part of history as has war, literature, the arts and sciences, and religion. Modern terrorism is merely an extension of the terrorism of history. However, modern terrorism, because of technological advancements in weaponry and communications, takes the basic principles of terrorism to the most extreme.

There are many definitions of terrorism. It is generally accepted to be <u>the use</u>, or <u>threatened use</u>, of force to intimidate persons, or a society, for political/and or social <u>goals</u>. Modern terrorism uses new methods of intimidation and force, or ancient methods more effectively, to accomplish their political and/or social aims.

The purpose of this document is to familiarize personnel with those forms of terrorist methodology known as **Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)**. They are classified as **Nuclear**, **Biological and Chemical weapons (NBC)**.

#### 2.0 NUCLEAR TERRORISM

Nuclear terrorism could occur at any time. It can be achieved with a budget of a few hundred thousand dollars, designed for nuclear weapons available on the Internet, and about 30 pounds of highly enriched uranium. The time and resources required to design and produce nuclear weapon depends on the type of device used to deliver nuclear contamination.

The fall and disintegration of the Soviet Union created an unprecedented problem. For the first time in history a country that was a "superpower", with an arsenal of nuclear materials and weapons, experienced a revolutionary transformation. This upheaval has put the security of this nuclear stockpile in jeopardy. Nuclear terrorism is more likely than ever.

While the threat of nuclear terrorism is indeed frightening, the threat of chemical and biological terrorism is even more terror provoking.

#### 3.0 CHEMICAL TERRORISM

When members of the Aum Shinrikyo sect released Sarin in a Tokyo subway in 1995, observers of international terrorist activity were forced to include chemical weapons in the terrorist arsenal. Once the exclusive domain of professional military forces, chemical weapons now threaten worldwide populations where the battlefield is no longer defined by geographical borders.

#### Annex "A"

#### 3.0 CHEMICAL TERRORISM (continued)

There are hundreds of chemical warfare agents. Only a few have actually been used in warfare. The terrorist experience in Japan demonstrates the need to be aware to the nature of chemical weapons and to prepare for a possible attack.

Chemical agents most likely to be used by terrorists are those valued for their ability to cause injury, incapacitation, and in sufficient quantity, mass destruction. Chemical agents are classified most often into categories based upon their physiological effects.

#### 3.1 Chemical Agents are:

- Easy to manufacture
- Easy to disperse
- Controllable
- Better stabilized than biological weapons
- Not contagious but may contaminate by persistence
- Affordable
- Quickly produced
- Easier to disguise than conventional weapons
- Highly reliable
- Available through increasingly accessible formulas and agents

#### 3.2 <u>Public Perception:</u>

- Disastrous outcome
- Impossible defense
- High casualty and death rates
- Terror

#### 3.3 Reality:

- Defense IS possible
- Chemical casualties CAN be saved
- Mortality CAN be minimized
- Be PREPARED

#### 3.4 <u>History of Chemical Warfare Agents:</u>

- The Germans first used chemical warfare agents against the Allies in World War I. First agent used was Chlorine Gas
- Many improvements were made during World War II in both chemical weapons and chemical weapons defense

#### Annex "A"

#### **3.4** History of Chemical Warfare Agents (continued)

- The Germans developed Mustard Gas near the end of WWI. This weapon caused the majority of chemical casualties in that war
- The Italians used Mustard Gas on the Ethiopians during their invasion of Ethiopia in 1935
- The Japanese used Mustard Gas and Chlorine during their invasion of China (1930 1944)
- The Germans developed Nerve Agents in 1937
- Both the Allies and the Germans had large chemical weapon supplies during WWII. However, neither side used these weapons in combat
- The Soviets and the Egyptians used Mustard Gas in Yemen (1963 1967)
- The Vietnamese used Mustard Gas and Nerve Agents in Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia during the 1970's
- The United States uses Irritating Agents during conflicts (CN, CS, and DM) and Defoliant Chemicals (Agents Blue, Orange, Purple and White). Agent Orange, an herbicide made up of two common weed killers was used most frequently, over 50 million pounds was spread over Viet Nam
- The Soviets used Nerve Agents and Mustard Gas in Afghanistan (1977 1989)
- Nerve Agents and Mustard Gas were used by both sides in the Iran-Iraq War (1979 – 1989)
- American and Allied soldiers were exposed to chemical weapons during the Gulf War in 1991

#### **3.5** History of Chemical Terrorism

- Arab Revolutionary Army injected poisonous mercury into citrus products (1976)
- West German police seized four hundred kilograms of chemical precursors used in making Nerve Agents from a Red Army Brigade "safe house" (1979)
- Israeli army discovered that coffee in a base mess hall was contaminated with a Nerve Agent (1985)
- Arsenic-contaminated Tylenol was found in several drug and grocery stores (1984). Several deaths occurred as a result of those actions.
- In June 1994 and March 1995, the Nerve Agent, Sarin, in a diluted form, was released in the subway system of Japan. Twelve people were killed and over 5,000 people were injured. This is the largest successful act of chemical terrorism to date

#### Annex "A"

#### 3.6 Nerve Agents

Nerve Agents are liquids at ambient conditions. They are clear, colorless, and tasteless. The "G" agents are reported to have a slightly fruity odor; "V" agents are odorless.

Nerve Agents attack the human nervous system in such a way as to cause almost immediate convulsions and death. It does so by interfering with actions of an enzyme called acetylcholinesterase. Under normal circumstances, muscle contractions are reversed due to the action of the enzyme cholinesterase. Nerve agents block the action of this enzyme, causing muscle spasms, paralysis, and asphyxiation. Symptoms of exposure may occur within minutes or hours, depending on the dose and mode of entry into the body.

#### **Physical Symptoms:**

<u>Eyes</u> - Pinpoint pupils, blurred vision, pain in and above eyes aggravated by bright lights

<u>Skin</u> - Excessive sweating and fine muscle tremors visible under the skin Muscles - Involuntary muscle contraction and twitching

<u>Respiratory System</u> – Runny nose, nasal congestion, chest pressure, coughing, and breathing difficulty

<u>Digestive System</u> – Excessive salivation, abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, involuntary urination and defecation

Nervous System - Anxiety, giddiness, irrational thinking, insomnia

#### Agents:

GA - Tabun (most lethal)

GB - Sarin

GD – Soman

VX – V Agents (liquid, very sticky, persistent)

G – Stands for "germ"

V – Stands for "venom"

#### 3.7 <u>Vesicants (Blistering Agents)</u>

Vesicants, or Blistering Agents, were first used by the British at Ypres during World War I. The original product had a mustard odor, but in it's pure state, it is both colorless and odorless.

#### **ANNEX "A"**

#### 3.7 Vesicants (Blistering Agents) continued

Vesicants cause severe burns to the skin, eyes and respiratory tract tissues. Additionally, if a large area of skin is exposed to Vesicants, and a significant amount is absorbed into the bloodstream, severe systemic poisoning may result.

Vesicants are heavy, oily liquids. In a pure state they are colorless and nearly odorless. In their impure state they are dark colored and have a strong mustard, garlic, or onion odor. They have a very high propensity for penetration and can easily penetrate layers of clothing and are quickly absorbed through the skin.

These agents are extremely toxic, although far less lethal than Nerve Agents. A few drops of Mustard on the skin can cause severe injury, and three grams absorbed through the skin can be fatal.

#### **Physical Symptoms:**

- Eyes Exposure time until symptoms appear varies from ½ to 12 hours. Reddening, congestion, tears, burning and a gritty feeling in the eyes. In more severe cases there is a marked swelling, pain and spasm of the eyelids
- <u>Skin</u> Exposure time until symptoms appear is from1 to 12 hours. Initially, mild itching followed by redness, tenderness, and burning pain. Later, appearance of burns, some with large fluid-filled blisters. The blisters appear particularly in the groin and armpits, where the skin is warm and moist
- Respiratory System Exposure time until symptoms appear is from 2 to 12 hours. A burning sensation in the throat and nose, hoarseness, profusely runny nose, severe cough and shortness of breath
- <u>Digestive System</u> Exposure time until symptoms appear is from 2 to 3 hours. Acute abdominal pain, nausea, bloody vomiting and diarrhea

#### Agents:

H – Mustard

HD - Distilled Mustard

HN - Nitrogen Mustard

CX - Phosgene Oxime

L - Lewisite

#### Annex "A"

#### 3.8 Blood Agents

Blood Agents produce casualties by interfering with the blood's ability to transfer oxygen to the cells, which can lead to death by asphyxiation. These agents are common industrial chemicals.

Symptoms of Blood Agent poisoning include rapid death if exposed to high concentrations. Smaller concentrations cause respiratory distress, vomiting, diarrhea, vertigo, and headaches.

Outward warning signs include large numbers of casualties displaying common symptoms, strong odor of peaches or bitter almonds. Since Blood Agents are liquids under pressure, the presence of lecture bottles and gas cylinders are possible clues. Most Blood Agents are derivatives of cyanide compounds and therefore packages of cyanide salt and acid precursors may also be present.

#### **Agents:**

AC – Hydrogen Cyanide CK – Cyanogen Chloride

#### 3.9 Choking Agents

Choking Agents act by severely stressing respiratory system tissue. Acute distress produces copious fluids, which can result in death by asphyxiation that resembles drowning. These agents are common industrial chemicals.

Symptoms of Choking Agents include severe irritation of the respiratory tract and eyes. Extreme choking and coughing are the most obvious symptoms.

Outward warning signs are the very obvious, and irritating chemical odors. Most people recognize the strong odor of Chlorine, while Phosgene has the odor of newly cut hay.

#### Agents;

Chlorine Phosgene Chloropicrin

#### Annex "A"

#### 3.10 <u>Irritating Agents</u>

These agents are also known as tear gas and riot control agents. They cause respiratory distress and copious tearing. The agents are generally non-lethal but can act as an asphixiant, and are recognized by an irritating peppery odor.

#### Agents:

CN – Standard Tear Gas

CS - Stronger Tear Gas plus Nausea

DM – Adamsite Vomiting Agent

(These are but a few examples of the many harmful and/or toxic chemical compounds that are in existence)

#### 4.0 BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

Biological Agents are living organisms or the materials derived from them. They fall into three major groups: whole organism occurring in nature; toxins, which are poisons produced by nature and often concentrated by humans; and genetically engineered agents. Most likely microorganisms, Biological Agents may be too small to be seen with the naked eye. The whole organisms are fungi, viruses, protozoa, bacteria, and other parasites. Toxins, in between the biological and chemical agents, are the poisonous byproducts of microorganisms, plants, and animals. Genetic engineering may pose the greatest threat for the future.

A Biological Agent has a latent period between infection and onset of the disease. The onset of symptoms varies with the microorganism and may vary from days to weeks. Biological weapons are usually odorless and tasteless, are more difficult to recognize than chemical weapons, and are considerably more dangerous. It's been determined that, on an equal-weight basis they are more lethal than the strongest Nerve Agent.

While biological weapons trace their history to before the Middle Ages, they seem particularly well suited for today's modern terrorism. They are portable, easily concealed, and extremely lethal in very small doses.

Biological weapons are by their very nature indiscriminate and very difficult to control or contain once released. While chemical weapons will more likely be the weapons of choice for today's terrorist attack, the biological weapon remains the ultimate lethal terror of the future.

The origin of viruses remains controversial. Some scientists believe in an evolutionary chain that begins with viruses since they are simpler than single celled creatures. Others believe viruses have evolved from bits of cellular genetic material that escaped from their cells eons ago. Still other scientists believe that viruses have fallen, and continue to fall, from outer space.

#### Annex "A"

#### 4.0 BIOLOGICAL AGENTS (continued)

Viruses, while indeed very contagious, and in certain cases extremely lethal, may not be the most likely of biological weapons. They are difficult to cultivate and often do not live long outside their host. Vaccination, the introduction of dead or weakened germs into the body, induces immunity from some viruses. However, their potential, with some modest scientific developments, remains great.

#### 4.1 History of Biological Weapons

- The Tartar Army used plague infected corpses at Kaffa during the 14<sup>th</sup> Century
- The Russian army used the same tactics against Sweden during the 18<sup>th</sup> Century
- The British army intentionally infected Native Americans with Smallpox by giving them contaminated blankets during the 18<sup>th</sup> Century
- German agents gave French horses glanders disease to render them useless during World War I
- The Japanese "dropped" plague on China in 1940
- The 1970's brought the "yellow rain" (T2 toxin) incidents in Southeast Asia
- CIA agent was assassinated by Ricin in Virginia in 1980
- In 1980 The German Red Army Faction discovered a "safe house" in Paris producing Botulin toxin (most toxic/lethal known and dangerous to mankind)
- Cuba reportedly stockpiling toxins 1984
- Iraq admitted researching the offensive use of Anthrax, Botulinum and Clostridium toxins in 1991 (reportedly used on Kurds)
- The Aum Shinrikyo Sect attempted to "drop" Anthrax toxin on Tokyo in 1994 (unsuccessful)
- The Aum Ahinrikyo Sect attempted to obtain strains of the Ebola virus in Africa (could not keep it alive long enough to use it)
- In February 1995 a member of the neo-nazi Aryan nations was arrested in Ohio with a vial of plague

#### 4.2 Types of Biological Weapons

#### 4.2.1 Whole Organisms - Viruses

Viruses are typically not considered living organisms. There can be up to 6 billion viruses in a single drop of blood. First observed in 1939, they were discovered in 1898. The term "virus" being Latin for "poisonous slime".

All living things are cellular except for viruses. A virus is, in fact, nothing more than a tiny, lifeless, totally inert particle – as long as it remains outside the cell. However, it is made to get <u>inside</u> the cell, and that is where the deadly activity of viral infection begins.

#### Annex "A"

#### 4.2 Types of Biological Weapons (continued)

#### 4.2.1 Whole Organisms - Viruses

In order for a virus to penetrate a cell it must attach itself to the membrane surrounding a cell, and search out an appropriate "receptor" site. If the fit is not precise, then attachment and subsequent cell penetration can not occur.

Once inside the cell, the virus may do one of several things, which determine the course of the disease. In many cases the viruses begin immediately and aggressively replicating themselves. This results in acute viral infection. Measles, mumps, meningitis, influenza, and the common cold are diseases in which the infection is acute. The Ebola virus is so acute; it kills the host so rapidly that it may, in a sense, be the source of its own demise.

Another type of virus may, upon entering a cell, go through cycles of activity and latency. This is called a Persistent viral infection, and results in diseases such as Herpes simplex 1, shingles, mononucleosis, some 20% of all cancers and AIDS.

#### 4.2.2 Whole Organisms - Bacteria

Bacteria are the most primitives of all cells. They are the longest existing and most populous life on the planet. There are more bacteria in a handful of soil or inside of your mouth then the total numbers of people that have ever lived. A single sneeze can carry over a million bacteria. Over 90% of all fecal matter are made up of bacteria. The human body contains more bacteria cells than human cells.

There are between three hundred thousand and one million different species of bacteria. Most are pathogenic or parasitic. Most of these live free and feast on nature's bounty however; some mutated in insidious ways and learned to invade other cells and cause disease.

Bacteria are responsible for causing diseases such as Anthrax, Botulism, Plague, Cholera, Diphtheria, Tuberculosis, Typhoid Fever, Typhus, Legionnaire's disease, Lyme disease and strep infections.

Bacterial agents are very likely to be used by terrorists. While still difficult to work with, they are easier to handle than viruses. There have been many incidents involving the possession and attempted use of Anthrax and Plaque bacteria by various terrorist organizations.

#### Annex "A"

#### 4.2.2 Whole Organisms - Bacteria

#### Fungi, Protozoa and other Parasites:

While bacteria and viruses are the so-called "germ" diseases and are the most likely biological weapons among the whole organism category of weapons, it is necessary to be aware of other possibilities.

Deadly fungus poisoning is responsible for one of the greatest episodes of mass deaths in recorded history. Aside from contagious diseases spread by vermin, the largest killer was bread-poisoned fungus. Fungal poisons have accounted for hundreds of thousands of human lives and the devastation of livestock on an order comparable to the ravages of anthrax, typhus, and smallpox. Only the monumental bubonic plaque, which wiped out one-third of the human population of Europe in two years, has killed more.

The most familiar of these ghastly fungal poisons was ergot, a black or dark purple mass that forms as a mold on grasses including edible food grains. Fungal poisoning still rages in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The deadly toxins from these fungi are now used as potent toxic biological weapons.

Bacteria and protozoa are both one-celled organisms. Protozoa are much larger and more complex and yet are the simplest of all parasites. Most protozoa are benign but some are parasitic and present significant threats to infected humans.

Protozoa are usually found in watery environments. They are routinely found in drinking water contaminated by animal and human feces. In April of 1993, 400,000 Milwaukee residents came down with cryptosporidiosis; 4,400 were hospitalized.

Protozoa are not the only parasites found in humans. External parasites such as ticks, lice, and mites feed on people without entering their bodies. They spread disease by infecting the person with germs. However, internally parasitic worms are responsible for many diseases and may be used as weapons of biological terrorism.

Worms enter the body of the host through various routes and can cause diseases such as; aniskiasis, elephantiasis, guinea worm, tapeworm and trichinosis.

#### Annex "A"

#### 4.2.2 Whole Organisms - Bacteria

#### Prions:

The causes of disease, viruses, bacterium, fungus, protozoan and other parasites (worms, etc.) can be used as biological weapons. In1982, a strange, non-living, tiny, infectious particle was isolated and identified. This particle was named a prion for "proteinaceous infectious particle".

A prion is a pure protein particle that has no genetic material, but is undoubtedly infectious. It causes a number of fatal diseases that literally punch holes in the brain. However, it is best known for a disease that effects animals, "mad-cow disease".

The study of prions is still in its initial phase. There is reason to assume that once more is known about prions and the diseases they cause, prions will also be used as weapons. Consider the economic disaster that has befallen England because due to the recent outbreak of ""mad-cow disease". Such an effective method of biological warfare and sabotage will not be lost on terrorists.

#### 4.2.3 **Toxins**

Toxins, in between biological and chemical weapons, are the poisonous by-products of microorganisms, plants and animals. Toxins tend to be more stable than microorganisms because they are not living. Some toxins, such as ricin and botulinus toxin, have the advantage of being relatively simple to manufacture in a garage or basement, and of being extremely lethal. They are extracted and concentrated from a variety of sources. For example, ricin, the deadliest known plant toxin, is a protein extracted from the castor bean seed.

Toxins are deadly! They can cause an almost immediate paralysis of the cardio-respiratory system in human beings. The potential for mass destruction from toxins can not be overstated. Some toxins that could be used as crude weapons are readily available. Relatively low levels of technological knowledge is necessary to produce enough agents to sabotage a water system, an air conditioning system, or some other terrorist target.

#### Annex "A"

#### 4.2.3 Toxins (continued)

Some toxins and symptoms of their exposure are:

#### Ricin (castor bean bush):

Symptoms appear within a few hours if injected or inhaled, or up to a few days if ingested. They include vomiting, high fever, cramps, convulsions, and jaundice. Death occurs in a few days to two weeks. Ricin is one hundred times more potent than cobra venom and a thousand times more potent than the most lethal Nerve Agents

#### Aflatoxin (mold on peanuts, corn, and cottonseed):

Symptoms develop within hours and include hemorrhaging, extreme weakness, liver and/or kidney failure and death within a week. Aflatoxin is extremely toxic and carcinogenic.

#### Saxitoxin (clams and mussels):

Symptoms begin within thirty minutes and include burning and/or numbness in the mouth then spreading to the entire head, and subsequently to fingers and toes. Shortly after, person looses coordination and has difficulty breathing. Death, from respiratory failure, comes within a few hours. Saxitoxin is a very powerful poison that has been used as a method of assassination.

#### Tetrodotoxin (puffer fish, frogs, newts and octopus):

Symptoms include tingling of the tongue and lips that spreads over the entire body, weakness, collapse, and paralysis. Death due to respiratory paralysis and the collapse of the central nervous system occurs within hours.

#### Botulinum (concentrated bacteria Clostridia botulinum):

Symptoms resemble stomach flu that leads to paralysis and death due to asphyxiation in a matter of hours. Once the symptoms appear, medical intervention is useless. Botulinum is several hundred times more powerful than nerve gas and is often considered by terrorists for large-scale attack.

#### Annex "A"

#### 4.0 ANTHRAX - CLINICAL DESCRIPTION AND CHARACTERISTICS

#### 5.1 Viability

The spore form of <u>B. anthracis</u> is highly resistant to physical and chemical agents. The organism has been shown to persist for years in factories in which the environment became contaminated during the processing of infected imported materials of animal origin. Soil, animal feed, and to a lesser extent, groundwater is the major reservoir for anthrax.

#### 5.2 Anthrax effectiveness as a biological weapon

- Anthrax is almost always DEADLY
- Spores can be produced in large quantities using basic knowledge of biology and relatively unsophisticated equipment
- Spores can be stored for decades and can be easily spread in the air by projectiles and sprayers
- It does not produce cloud, color, smell, nor taste

#### 5.3 Anthrax Infection

Anthrax is produced by the <u>Bacillus Anthracis</u>. A tough protective coat allows for bacteria to survive for decades as spores.

#### 5.4 **Dangers of Anthrax**

- Highly lethal
- Easy to produce in large quantities
- Relatively easy to develop as a weapon
- Easily spread in the air over a large area
- Easily stored and dangerous for a long time
- 99% lethal to unprotected individuals

#### 5.5 Type of Anthrax diseases:

- <u>Cutaneous (Skin) Anthrax</u> caused by contact with infected animals or contaminated animal products
- Intestinal Anthrax caused by ingestion of contaminated meat
- <u>Inhalation Anthrax</u> caused by inhalation of anthrax spores \*\* MOST
   DEADLY BIGGEST THREAT\*\*

#### 5.6 <u>Incubation Period</u>

2 to 5 days

#### Annex "A"

#### 4.0 CLINICAL DESCRIPTION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF ANTHRAX

#### 5.7 Signs and Symptoms

- Flu-like aches and pains
- Tightness in the stomach
- Severe skin infections
- Breathing difficulty
- Fever, malaise, fatigue, cough and mild chest discomfort, followed by severe respiratory distress

#### 5.8 <u>Diagnosis</u>

- Isolation of bacteria from blood, skin lesions or respiratory secretions
- Measurement of specific antibodies in the blood
- Blood culture late in the course of the disease

#### 5.9 Treatment

- High-dose antibiotic treatment; usually penicillin
- Antibiotics will suppress infection <u>only</u> if administered before any symptoms of infection occur – usually within the first 24-48 hours

#### 5.10 Management of Exposed Victim(s)

In the event of a bio-terrorist release of Bacillus anthracis spores, it may be difficult to define which persons are exposed. All persons at the site of the release or downwind of the release (assuming an aerosol dispersal) would be considered exposed. Household and other contacts (such as healthcare workers caring for cases) of exposed persons, are not considered exposed and do not require prophylaxis (unless they too were exposed to the aerosolized anthrax spores at the time of the attack).

#### **5.10.1** Inhalation exposures

Initiation of antibiotic therapy quickly after exposure has been shown to markedly reduce the mortality of inhalation anthrax in animal studies. The best available prophylatic regimen is antibiotic therapy

#### **5.10.2** Exposures through cuts, abrasions or injections

Immediately wash the infected part and apply disinfectant solution such as hydrochloride solution. Appropriate antibiotic therapy should begin under the supervision of a physician

#### Annex "A"

#### 5.0 CLINICAL DESCRIPTION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF ANTRAX

#### **5.10.3** <u>Ingestion exposures</u>

Treat as for exposure by cuts and abrasions

All persons exposed to anthrax should be instructed to watch for signs/symptoms of flu-like illness for 7 days. If symptoms appear, a physician must immediately evaluate patients for the possible institution of intravenous antibiotic therapy.

#### 6.0 TARGETS OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM

- Symbolic targets
- Large public events and gatherings
- Transportation systems
- Large numbers of people in enclosed places
- Food sources
- Products vulnerable to tampering
- Military bases, fire departments, police departments, medical facilities, and other emergency responders
- Government facilities

#### 7.0 BIOLOGICAL WEAPON REFERENCE GUIDE

Refer to pages 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62 and 63

### **ANNEX "B"**

# BOMB THREAT AND LIVE AGENT CHECK LIST

### **BOMB THREAT CHECKLIST**

#### Annex "B"

Exact time of call						
Exact words of caller						
QUES	STIONS TO ASK					
1.	When is bomb going to	o explode?				
2.	Where is the bomb? _					
3.	What does it look like?					
4.	What kind of bomb is i	t?				
5.	What will cause it to ex	kplode?				
6.	Did you place the bom	b?				
7.	Why?					
8.	Where are you calling from?					
9.	What is your address?					
10.	What is your name? _					
CALLI	ER'S VOICE (circle)					
Calm Broke Lisp Crying Accen	Rapid Squeaky	Nasal Slow Giggling Excited Slurred	Angry Sincere Deep Stressed Normal			
If voice is familiar, whom did it sound like?						
Were there any background noises?						
Remarks:						
Call re	eported to (circle approp	riate agencies):				
	Monroe County Sheriff's Office Monroe County Emergency Management State Warning Point State Warning Point					
Notification time:						
Perso	Person receiving call:					
Telepl	Telephone number call received at:Time: Date:					

### **LIVE AGENT THREAT LIST**

#### Annex "B"

Exact time of call						
Exact words of caller						
QL	JESTIONS	TO ASK				
1.	When is it	going to be released	?			
2.	At what lo	cation?				
3.	What doe	s it look like?				
		of agent is it?				
5.	What will	cause it to spread?				
6.	Did you p	ace the device?				
7.	Why?					
8.	Where are	e you calling from?				
9.	What is yo	our address?				
10	. What is yo	our name?				
CA	LLER'S V	DICE (circle)				
Bro Lis Cry	Im oken p ying cent	Disguised Stutter Rapid Squeaky Loud	Nasal Slow Gigglir Excited Slurred	Ĺ	Angry Sincere Deep Stressed Normal	
If voice is familiar, whom did it sound like?						
Were there any background noises?						
Remarks:						
Call reported to (circle appropriate agencies):						
Monroe County Sheriff's Office Monroe County Emergency Managemen County Warning Point State Warning Point				Management		
Notification time:						
Person receiving call:						
Те	Telephone number call received at:Time: Date:				_ Date:	

### **ANNEX "C"**

**SCHOOL VIOLENCE** 

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#### Annex "C"

#### **SCHOOL VIOLENCE**

#### 1.0 INTRODUCTION

The National School Safety Center recorded the following numbers of crime incidents for the 1992-2000 school year: shooting, 207; stabbing/slashing, 38; beating/kicking, 12; strangling, 5.

The National Center for Education Statistics recorded the following numbers of crime incidents for the 1996-1997 school year: physical attack or fight without a weapon, 187,890; theft/larceny, 115,500; vandalism, 98,490; physical attack with weapon, 10,950; robbery, 7,150; rape/sexual battery, 4,170.

A March 1998 survey by the U.S. Department of Education looks at the frequency, seriousness and incidence of violence in public school during the 1996-97 school year. Key findings include: Fifty-seven percent of schools (1,234 surveyed) reported one or more incidents of crime/violence; Ten percent of schools experienced one or more serious violent crimes (murder, rape, suicide, physical attack, and fight with weapon or robbery).

The survey also asked, "what measures are being taken to deal with problems of crime and violence?" The guestions were:

- Whether visitors must sign in
- Whether students must pass through metal detectors
- If there was a closed campus policy for most students during lunch
- Whether the school used random metal detectors checks on students
- If access to the school facility was controlled
- Are drug sweeps being conducted, and how often
- If access to school grounds was controlled

#### The findings:

- Two percent of public schools had stringent security, defined as a full-time guard and daily or random metal detector checks
- Eleven percent had instituted moderate security measures such as a full-time guard, or a part-time guard with restricted access to the school, or metal detectors with no guards
- Eighty-four percent reported having a low level of security-restricted access to their school, but no quards or metal detectors
- Three percent reported that none of the security measures asked about were used

#### Annex "C"

#### **SCHOOL VIOLENCE**

#### 2.0 INDICATORS AND ACTIONS FOR SCHOOLS

Following is information for Monroe County schools. School administrators and personnel should use the indicators to evaluate the potential for violence in their schools. The section also provides lists of strategies and measures for consideration in developing a school violence program.

#### 2.1 General

General indicators that violence is occurring or may occur include:

- Drug activities
- Frequent violent, criminal, and disruptive activities
- Gang activities, violence
- Criminal activities occurring near the school
- Weapons in school

#### 2.2 Individual

Clues to identifying "at risk" children prone to violence include:

- Child has experienced traumatic events (violence) at home
- Child got into trouble at an early age
- Child gets into trouble on regular basis
- · Child has a history of violence

Indicators to be taken seriously:

- Child is emphasizing "killing someone" as opposed to vague threat of "getting even" with or "getting back" at someone
- Child details specific plan or actions of how he/she will "kill someone"
- Child emphasizes that he/she has access to weapons

Mitigation and prevention measures for individuals include:

- Counseling (peer counseling seems to be most effective)
- Expelling a troubled child from school may make matters worse. Violent children feel that no one cares for them. Some thinking suggests that keeping troubled children engaged within school will more likely avert violence than isolating them

#### Annex "C"

#### **SCHOOL VIOLENCE**

#### 2.3 **Prevention Strategies**

General Actions take a systematic approach to security, to include the following:

- Intervene early
- Provide intensive intervention
- Build a School-wide foundation
- School administrators must clearly define security goals, and accept security as a professional discipline
- Onsite "hall guards" must be professionals and trained in dealing with violent youths and serious security threats
- Establish a violence prevention curriculum
- Enhance intervention services for "at-risk" students
- Establish codes of conduct and strongly enforce discipline
- Establish a site-specific physical security plan and access control
- Establish specially trained mediation teams
- Address the "root causes" of school violence through programs that identify and minimize students problems
- Establish safety and security committee
- Crisis Management Training for School Administrators and Teachers
- County-wide Plan for response to school incidents
- Planned tactical response to active shooter incidents at the road patrol level
- Familiarization of school sites by local law enforcement
- Identification of early warning signs of violent behavior

#### 2.4 Factors

- Lighting
- Isolated areas
- Ball and class schedules
- Mixing of students from various grades
- Length of time students stand in line for lunch and bus transport
- Number and types of exits
- Bathrooms location and design
- Design and layout of cafeteria, common areas, and the playground
- Patterns of supervision
- Density of human traffic patterns during various times of the day

#### Annex "C"

#### **SCHOOL VIOLENCE**

#### 2.5 Specific Measures

- Monitoring restrooms and hallways, issue and check "hall passes", students supervision in common areas
- Re-entry program for suspended/expelled students
- Access control
- Visitor sign-in and escort procedures
- Surveillance cameras
- Metal detectors
- Posted signs indicating rules, off limit areas, etc.
- Crisis preparedness plans and emergency procedures
- Training, tests, exercises for students and staff regarding plans and procedures
- Emergency communication system
- Incident reporting procedures
- Uniform or dress code
- 24-hour "hot line" to encourage confidential reporting of problems and concerns/anonymous tip program
- Workplace violence awareness training for students and staff
- ID cards for students and staff

#### 2.6 Primary Prevention

- Promotion of academic and mental/emotional wellness for all students through: positive school climate, social skills training, teachers/staff training, individualized instruction and team support
- 80% of students are able academic and emotional learners that will gain tremendous benefit from primary prevention efforts

#### 2.7 **Early Intervention**

- Providing academic and emotional support and remedial help to students deemed at-risk
- 15% of students will demonstrate at-risk behaviors that will require immediate and effective intervention

#### 2.8 <u>Intensive Intervention</u>

- Intervention for emotionally disabled: such services are intense, comprehensive, coordinated, interagency and family focused, high quality, and offer sustained help
- 5% of students will require intensive, longitudinal services

Annex "C"

#### **SCHOOL VIOLENCE**

#### 2.9 Service Integration In Higher Risk Schools

- <u>Primary Prevention:</u> 30% of students will greatly benefit from educational reform services
- <u>Early Intervention:</u> 60% of students will necessitate additional academic/behavioral consultation, support and services; including intensive family and community-based agency involvement
- <u>Intensive Intervention:</u> 10% of students will require coordinated, multiple agency, well managed system of care

Unless we have effective cognitive-behavioral and family interventions, school climate programs, parental involvement programs and media exposure reduction, this will continue to be one of the most complex problems in today's society

### **ANNEX "D"**

### **VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE**

#### ANNEX "D"

### **VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE**

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#### Annex "D"

#### **VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE**

#### 1.0 INTRODUCTION

Recent workplace violence incidents within the State of Florida have led to increased concern by both the State and by employees themselves for on-the-job safety and security.

Information in this section is intended to serve as a guide and a resource. It is not a directive, nor is it a statement of minimum standards or expectations.

#### 2.0 PROBLEM OVERVIEW

National trends indicate that incidents of citizens dissatisfaction, hostility, and violence against government workers has increased. Hostility and violence, by current and former disgruntled co-workers, has also increased. According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, workplace violence is the third leading cause of all workplace fatalities.

Co-workers and supervisors accounted for 86 percent of all harassment, one-third of threats, and one-fourth of attacks. Forty-six percent of harassment victims and 27 percent of workers threatened, identified job-related, interpersonal conflict as the likely cause. Irrational behavior, such as mental disturbance or influence of alcohol or drug use on the part of the perpetrator, was the reason given by 26 percent of workplace attack victims and 21 percent of workplace threat victims. The study also concluded that 58 percent of harassment victims, 43 percent of threat victims, and 24 percent of attack victims do not report the offense.

#### 3.0 WORKPLACE VIOLENCE PREVENTION POLICY STATEMENT

An important element of an effective program for prevention of workplace violence is a clearly written company policy, which demonstrates top management's concern and commitment to their employees' safety and health.

#### 3.1 Strict policies should be implemented that:

- Address the confidentiality of personal employee information (i.e., home address, work schedules, etc.)
- Deny or restrict workplace access to employee relatives or outside visitors
- Allow flexibility in the use of leave, work schedules or transfers in situations where employee may be at risk of violence

#### 3.2 The written policy should state that the employer:

- Will provide adequate authority and budgetary resources to responsible parties so that identified goals and assigned responsibilities can be met
- Includes and encourages employee participation in the design and implementation of its workplace violence program
- Refuses to tolerate violence at the workplace, and has developed and implemented a program to reduce incidents of violence

#### Annex D"

#### **VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE**

#### 3.3 The written policy should state that the employer (continued):

- Applies workplace violence policies consistently and fairly to all employees, including supervisors and managers
- Requires prompt and accurate reporting of violent incidents, whether or not physical injury has occurred
- Will not discriminate against victims of workplace violence

The policy should be easily accessible to all employees and copies should be made available to employees upon request.

#### 4.0 ESTABLISHMENT OF A THREAT ASSESSMENT TEAM

The initial step in developing a workplace violence prevention program is to designate a Threat Assessment Team to assess the vulnerability to workplace violence, and reach agreement on preventive actions to be taken.

#### 4.1 The Threat Assessment Team should be responsible for:

- Recommending, implementing employee training programs on workplace violence
- Implementing plans for responding to acts of violence
- Communicating internally with employees
- Auditing the overall workplace violence prevention program

### 4.2 The Threat Assessment Team membership should include the following representatives:

- Senior Management
- Operations
- Employees or their representative
- Security
- Finance
- Legal
- Human Resources

#### 5.0 HAZARD ASSESSMENT

- **5.1** Records Review: The Threat Assessment Team should begin by reviewing and analyzing existing records of previous incidents in order to:
  - Develop a baseline
  - Identify patterns that may indicate the causes and severity of assault incidents and identify necessary change
  - Develop an appropriate plan to correct hazards

#### Annex "D"

#### **VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE**

#### 5.0 HAZARD ASSESSMENT (continued)

- **5.1** The Threat Assessment Team should analyze the following, when available, to complete a record review:
  - OSHA 200 logs and any other appropriate records
  - Incident reports
  - Records of, or information compiled for recording of, assault incidents or near assault incidents
  - Medical records
  - Insurance records
  - Workers compensation records
  - Police reports
  - Accident investigations
  - Training records
  - Grievances
  - Other relevant records of information (i.e., minutes of meetings, etc.)

The Threat Assessment Team should identify and analyze any apparent trends in assault incidents relating to particular departments, units, job titles, unit activities, time of day, etc. The Threat Assessment Team should communicate with similar local businesses, trade associates, community and civic groups concerning their experiences with workplace violence.

5.2 Workplace Security Analysis: In addition to records review, the Threat Assessment Team should inspect the workplace as well as evaluate the work tasks of employees to determine the presence of hazards, conditions, and operations

and situations which might place workers at risk of occupational assault incidents.

The Threat Assessment Team should conduct follow-up inspections of the workplace and observe hazardous work tasks on a periodic basis.

5.3 <u>Workplace Surveys:</u> A questionnaire or survey should be distributed to employees to identify the potential for violent incidents, and to identify or confirm the need for improved security measures.

The Threat Assessment Team should seek employee input into the questionnaire design, format, and dissemination methods. All employees should be encouraged to complete the questionnaire.

Employee questionnaires should be reviewed, updated and distributed as needed, or at least once within a twenty-four month period of time. Results should be analyzed, and used to revise and improve the overall content and implementation of the workplace violence prevention program.

#### Annex "D"

#### **VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE**

#### 6.0 WORKPLACE HAZARD CONTROL AND PREVENTION

The Threat Assessment Team should identify and institute a combination of control methods designed to eliminate or minimize the risks of assault incidents. Control and prevention methods include, but are not limited to:

#### **6.1** General Building, Workstation and Area Designs

- Review the design of all new or renovated facilities to ensure safe and secure conditions for employees
- Design work areas and arrange furniture to prevent entrapment of the employees and/or minimize potential for assault incidents
- Control access to employee work areas (use of locked doors, buzzers, card access, etc.)
- Provide appropriate lighting systems for all indoor building areas as well as grounds around the facility and in parking areas. Lighting should meet the requirements of nationally recognized standards as well as local building codes
- Security should not conflict with "Life Safety Code" requirements. Although it
  may be tempting to keep doors locked to prevent intrusion, egress from
  inside the building must not be impeded

#### **6.2** Security Equipment

- Utilize electronic alarm systems activated visually or audibly. Systems should identify the location of the room or location of the employee by means of an alarm sound and/or lighted indicator or equally effective measure
- Utilize closed circuit television which permit security guards to monitor high risk areas, both inside and outside the building
- Utilize metal detection systems to identify persons with weapons
- Utilize cellular telephones, pagers, 2-way radios or hand-held alarms in field situations
- Test and maintain security equipment on a regular basis to ensure its operability

#### 6.3 Work Practice Controls and Procedures

- Provide identification cards for all employees, and establish sign-in and signout logs, and escort policy for non-employees. Identification badges must be worn for identification purposes
- Develop internal communication systems to respond to emergencies
- Develop policy on how employees are to react to and deal with violent emergencies or hostage situations
- Develop and implement security procedures for employees who work late or off hours, banning weapons in facilities unless authorized and how the employer will respond to assault incidents

#### Annex "D"

#### **VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE**

#### 5.0 WORKPLACE HAZARD CONTROL AND PREVENTION

#### **6.3** Work Practice Controls and Procedures

- Develop procedure for employees to follow when entering any locations where they feel threatened or unsafe
- Train employees on awareness, avoidance, and actions to take to prevent mugging, robbery, rapes and other assaults
- Modify existing work practices that are identified by the hazard assessment where employees face increased risk of violence

#### 6.0 TRAINING AND EDUCATION

#### **7.1** All employees, regardless of their level of risk, should be taught:

- Techniques for recognizing the potential for violence
- Procedures, policies and work environment arrangements developed to control the risk to workers
- Proper use of security equipment
- The appropriate response to incidents of violence, including emergency and hostage situations
- Procedures for reporting, investigating and documenting incidents of violence

#### **7.2** Effective training:

- Should be given on company/agency/organization time
- Uses easily understood terminology
- Provides sufficient time for questions and answers
- Is conducted by trainers knowledgeable or qualified in their field of expertise
- Is conducted before acceptance of a new job assignment, annually or when laws or procedures change
- 7.3 Workers with job tasks or locations that place them at higher risk for violent incidents should be provided specialized training in addition to those topics outlined above. Training should be designed to deal with the nature of this risk
- 7.4 Managers and supervisors should undergo the training outlined above, plus additional training to enable them to recognize a potentially hazardous situation or make any necessary changes in policies and procedures
- 7.5 Managers and supervisors should also be trained to ensure that employees are not placed in assignments that compromise safety and in methods and procedures which will reduce the security hazards
- **7.6** Security personnel need to be trained whenever possible for the specific job, facility layout, security devices on premises and particular high risk jobs

Annex "D"

#### VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE

#### 8.0 INCIDENT REPORTING, INVESTIGATION, FOLLOW-UP AND EVALUATION

#### **8.1** Incident Reporting

- A procedure for reporting violent incidents should be developed and must be applicable to all types of violent incidents, whether or not physical injury has occurred. Procedure must be in writing and easily understood by all employees
- Each incident should be reported to and evaluated by the Threat Assessment Team
- Once an incident occurs, the employer should report it to the local police department, secure work area where disturbance occurred, ensure the physical safety of employees and others remaining in the area as soon as possible, ensure that no work area is left short-staffed while others assist the victim or help in securing the area
- Quickly assess the work area for disturbance or damage as a result of the incident and determine safety
- Provide critical incident debriefing to victims, witnesses and other affected personnel

#### 8.2 <u>Incident Investigation</u>

- All incidents, including all misses, should be investigated as soon as possible.
   A delay of any kind may cause important evidence to be removed, destroyed intentionally or unintentionally. The investigation should be focused on fact-finding to prevent re-occurrence and not on faultfinding.
- When conducting an investigation, the Threat Assessment Team should collect facts on who/what/when/where and how the incident occurred, record information, identify contributing causes, recommend corrective action, encourage follow-up and consider changes in controls, policies and procedures

#### **8.3** Follow-up

Procedures should be established for responding quickly and appropriately to the medical and psychological needs of employees following exposure to an assault incident

#### **8.4** Evaluation

The Threat Assessment Team should conduct periodic physical evaluation of the work-site, and should focus on the identification and assessment of workplace security hazards and address changes in employee work practices

#### Annex "D"

#### **VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE**

#### 9.0 RECORD KEEPING

An effective record keeping system helps in selecting the appropriate level of controls to prevent recurrence and in determining required training. Records should include:

- Employee "injury" log (OSHA 200 Log or equivalent)
- Incidents of assault (who, type of activity, circumstances, etc.)
- Minutes of safety meetings and inspection reports
- Training records
- Inspection records
- Employee questionnaires
- Insurance records
- Workers compensation records
- Medical records

#### 10.0 CHECKLISTS OF WORKPLACE VIOLENCE SIGNS AND INDICATORS

Preventing workplace violence is an awareness issue. Both supervisors and employees should be alert to the following:

#### 10.1 Stress can lead to violence

Long periods of stress can cause an individual to become increasingly angry and hostile. Symptoms of stress include:

- Hypertension
- Nervousness
- Tense demeanor
- Excessive worry
- Inability to relax
- Abuse of alcohol and/or drugs
- Sleep disorder
- Aggressive, hostile or uncooperative attitude
- Feelings of insufficiency
- Emotional outbursts or emotional instability
- Digestive disorders

#### **10.2** Preventing stress, actions/activities can include:

- Develop an awareness of personal stress reactions
- Affirm self-worth through positive statements
- Be aware and conscious of achievements and positive personal qualities
- Do not engage in useless or negative competition
- Reinforce positive, assertive self behavior
- Accept personal limitations

#### Annex "D"

#### **VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE**

### 11.0 SIGNS OF INCREASED STRESS AND/OR BURNOUT WITHIN THE WORK ENVIRONMENT

#### **11.1** General indicators within the workplace

- Destructive, competitive and hostile manner between divisions, departments and/or offices
- Bureaucratic "turf" becomes increasingly sharply defined and jealously guarded
- Authority conflicts emerge more frequently and within greater anger and ill will
- Important organizational decisions are more frequently decided by an increasingly isolated, elitist group which less and less, seeks meaningful input from lower staff levels
- Communication within the system (organization) becomes poor; humanistic, stereotyped, fixed role, formal, but always proper

#### 11.2 Individual indicators

- Decline in work quantity and quality
- Pattern of absenteeism or lateness
- Pattern of personal "emergencies" necessitating leaving work early
- Psychosomatic illness
- Use of alcohol during work hours
- Persistent failure to perform required tasks (i.e., paperwork)
- Acting-out behavior at meetings (silent withdrawal, destructive criticism, raising irrelevant issues, etc.)
- Constant downgrading of colleagues, together with unwillingness to engage in effective conflict resolutions
- Spreading apathetic attitudes among other employees through backbiting, nitpicking, sabotage (beyond normal levels of workplace complaining)

#### 11.3 Causes of workplace stress

- Excessive workload
- Inadequate time for work completion
- Poor supervision
- Uncertain organizational requirements
- Unclear responsibilities or job functions
- Philosophical differences between the organization and employee
- Unexpected or significant change at work or at home
- Unanswered or unresolved frustrations

#### Annex "D"

#### **VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE**

#### 11.4 Management actions for workplace stress reduction

- Allow for open communication between workers
- Use conflict resolution techniques to minimize employee conflict on the job
- Ensure that workers have sufficient authority to perform their jobs
- Ensure that staffing and budget is adequate for the work to be performed
- Communicate frequently and honestly with employees
- Provide a supportive work environment that recognizes employees efforts
- Ensure adequate vacation benefits
- Work at bureaucracy reduction within the workplace
- Recognize workers accomplishments and contributions

#### 12.0 WORKPLACE VIOLENCE BEHAVIORAL WARNING SIGNS/INDICATORS

#### **12.1** Early warning signs – Management intervention is necessary if employee:

- Will not take direction or will not cooperate with supervisors or managers
- Argues with co-workers
- Is angry or hostile with coworkers or customers
- Es excessively profane and has a tendency to be provocative with others (especially regarding matters of sexual nature)
- Verbally harasses coworkers or customers

#### **12.2** Potential threat warning signs

The employee is no longer functioning effectively in the workplace and clearly poses a potential threat. Employee:

- Argues openly and frequently with others
- Is openly defiant of supervision and refuses to comply with organizational policies
- Is involved in theft or destruction of company property
- Expresses desire to physically harm others
- Threatens others in writing
- Complains frequently that he/she is the victim of poor supervision, inept management, or an organization that is focused on his/her destruction

13.0 - Annex "D"

#### **MANAGER'S CHECKLIST**

Tiostile toward a	utnority (describe):	
Irresponsible (de	escribe):	
Excessive tardin	ess or absences	
Increased need t	or supervision	
Reduced produc	•	
Deteriorating per		
•	ssively regarding outside pressures	
Extreme mood c	hanges	
Inconsistency		
Strained workpla		
Inability to conce		
Violation of safet		
Changes in heal	to personal appearance	
Unusual behavio		
	r (describe).	
Social isolation o	or withdrawal	
Fascination with	•	
Substance abuse	Э	
Stress		
Excuses and bla	ming	
Depression		

**Reference:** "Workplace Violence Awareness and Prevention: An Information and Instructional Package for Use by Employers and Employees," Long Island Coalition for Workplace Violence Awareness and Prevention, 1996

### **ANNEX "E"**

# FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT FLORIDA MUTUAL AID PLAN

### **ANNEX "L"**

### **HAZMAT CLEANUP VENDORS**

### **HAZMAT CLEANUP VENDORS**

•	Safety Clean	(863) 533-6111
•	Cliff Berry	(954) 763-3390
•	Magnum	(305) 785-2320 (800) 394-8601
•	ОНМ	(352) 394-8601