# Crime, violence, terrorism and tourism

## An accidental or intrinsic relationship?

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The relationship between crime and tourism is discussed. After suggesting a classification of the relationship between crime and tourism, it is suggested that further analysis must recognize that both tourism and crime are demands derived from a wider social context. The practical implications for tour operators are also discussed.

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Violence and crime can have serious consequences for both individual holiday-makers and tourist destinations. A tourist may not only be robbed, but possibly killed. The reporting of such events by popular newspapers in tourist-generating countries, particularly if the stories occur at the time of booking holidays, can adversely affect the level of business in tourist locations. In extreme cases, such as the activities of Sendero Luminoso in Peru, or in the event of war, violence can undermine a country's tourism industry for a shorter or longer period. In lesser cases of both repeated petty crime and more extreme cases of violence, the need to ensure client safety can raise questions of policy for tour operators.

This paper seeks not to detail criminal and violent activities, but rather to analyse the relationship between crime and recreation in tourist locations. It begins by proposing a classification, suggests a matrix which might better explain the relationship between crime and tourism, and finally considers some practical implications for tour operators.

## A classification of criminal activity

The relationship between violence and tourism can be said to range from, on the one hand, the commitment of crime where the tourist setting is incidental, to, at the other extreme, a situation where tourists and tourist facilities are deliberately sought as objects of terrorist action. The following classification is constrained by these extremes, and thus does not cover other possible relationships such as tourism inhibited by warfare or where governments resort to violence against their own citizens. Examples of these latter cases are only too recent. For example, although not a participant, Jordan suffered a significant reduction in tourism in the period of the Gulf War. The shooting of demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, or in East Timor are factors that deter tourism. However, for purposes of the following classification, it is argued that these events are different in kind to those described below.

The types of relationship between crime and tourism can therefore be classified as being:

- Type one: tourists are incidental victims of criminal activity which is *independent* of the nature of the tourist destination. In this case most

crime is directed against the indigenous population, and is of a nature consistent with that found in non-tourist locations.

● Type two: a venue which is used by criminals because of the *nature of the tourist location*, but the victims are not specifically tourists.

● Type three: a location which attracts criminal activity because *tourists are easy victims*. A subset of this stage is the case where tourists are not only victims but also aggressors. In both cases, however, crime is comparatively unorganized; that is, most crime is committed by individuals or small groups, is opportunistic and primarily motivated by the acquisition of property.

● Type four: criminal activity becomes organized *to meet certain types of tourist demand*.

● Type five: organized criminal and terrorist groups commit *specific violent actions against tourists* and tourist facilities.

A number of immediate questions arise. For example, do the stages exist simply in terms of outcomes, or do they contain an inherent structure which might permit development from one stage to another? If it is the latter, what are the characteristics of the structure, and what relationships might exist between the determining variables and the outcomes of crime and violence? In analysing these issues there are some definitional problems – notably the concept of crime itself. For the purposes of this paper crime is simply defined as an action which is contrary to written or case law in either the tourist-generating or tourist-receiving country. What is illegal in one country is not necessarily so in another, and this is particularly pertinent to some types of crime commonly associated with tourism. Thus, whilst a brothel may be illegal in the UK, it is not the case in some parts of the USA or Australia. From the viewpoint of a link between tourism and crime, however, it might be the very freedom to commit certain illegal or quasi-legal acts that motivates the tourist trip.

## Type one: tourists as incidental victims

As previously indicated, this situation exists where most crime is directed at the indigenous population. The probability of the tourist being either physically attacked, or being subject to the attention of pickpockets, thieves or other similar criminals is therefore no greater than that of local people. Tourism is thus considered not to be a factor which specifically attracts criminals. This implies that tourism is unimportant within the locale. In terms of the tourist destination life cycle as described by Young or Butler[1] the destination is in the initial stages of its development. Conventionally, it is assumed that tourists attracted to such areas are of the 'explorer' type – the risk-taking tourist – and there appears to be a paradox in that the 'risk-taker' is, in fact, taking less risks than the 'risk-averse' tourist who patronizes the mass tourist location. A number of observations might be made. First, the usual interpretation of the tourist life cycle implies that the location explored by the 'allocentric' tourist[2] is underdeveloped and marginal to the main economic systems. It is therefore a small community, characterized by local mores that value cooperation, and strengthened by the fact that the activities of individuals are quickly known to all. In such cultures the values of sharing and hospitality would ensure that criminal activity tends to be low.

However, the destination life cycle theory is open to a different interpretation. The premise behind the theory of the initial stages is that tourism is unimportant in the economic activity of the destination. This might be said to be the case of established towns dependent upon non-tourist activities. Yet, tourism can exist. The friends and relatives of the local population will visit the community. However, in their

[1]B. Young, 'Touristization of traditional Maltese fishing–farming villages', *Tourism Management*, Vol 4, No 1, 1983, pp 35–41; R. Butler, 'The concept of a tourism area cycle of evolution', *Canadian Geographer*, Vol 24, No 1, 1980, pp 5–12.
[2]S. Plog, 'Why Destinations Rise and Fall in Popularity', in E.M. Kelly, ed, *Domestic and International Tourism*, Institute of Certified Travel Agents, Wellesley, MA, pp 26–28.

spending and recreational activity there may be little to distinguish these visitors from the activities of the local population. Under these circumstances, tourist activity might be quite substantial in terms of the additional expenditure it generates, but because it does not occur at facilities whose rationale is solely that of tourism, the zone as a whole might be characterized as being in the early stages of the tourist life cycle.

The possibility of tourists finding themselves victims is determined by existing levels of criminal activity. This can be independent of the level of tourism. Attention must also be paid to the spatial distribution of both criminal and tourist activities. For example, crimes against tourists have occurred in areas generally designated as tourist zones, but on closer examination the tourists have been accidental victims of criminal activity in zones not normally visited by tourists. For example, the attack on Rose and John Hayward, an elderly pair of British tourists who got lost in their hire car from the airport on arriving in Miami in August 1991, occurred when they accidentally strayed into non-tourist downtown areas.[3]

But it is difficult to be dogmatic about the distinctions between tourist and non-tourist areas. In Kenya there are cases to illustrate the problem. The shooting by bow and arrow of Pelle Palm in November 1988, the shooting of two French tourists in Meru National Park in July 1989, and the hold-up, in the same month, of minibuses carrying 20 tourists in the Tsavo National Park or that of British tourists in Meru in February 1992, were all incidents that arose because the tourists were in areas not normally visited by tourist excursions and, by accident, poachers were disturbed.[4] Thus, the tourists were accidental victims of criminal activity, but, in this case, the existence of the venue of the crime was, in part, sustained by tourism.

*Type two: the tourist location as a venue for crime*

Pearce, Mathieson and Wall and Ryan[5] have all referred to a 'tourist culture' which characterizes tourist destination zones. Such characteristics include:

- large numbers of visitors staying for a short duration;
- large numbers of seasonal workers;
- transient relationships between visitor and visitor, visitor and worker (both local and temporary), and between tourist and agencies of the tourist industry within both tourist-receiving and tourist-generating country;
- leisure is the main motivation of activity;
- tourists are freed from the constraints of their normal lifestyle, and are even more selective as to those norms of their peer groups to which they adhere than normally;
- spending is comparatively unrestrained;
- businesses reflect the importance of tourism;
- the cultural expressive symbols are based on stereotypes and caricature; and
- superior/inferior relationships exist.

Other aspects of the tourist culture also exist, such as the formalization of the previously informal 'back stage scene',[6] and the role of language as a medium of communication.[7]

Within their pursuit of criminals the law enforcement agencies are often aided by the recognition of the unfamiliar by local people. The tourist resort offers a setting where the unfamiliar is a commonplace. There is a high turnover of personnel. The nature of the location makes it difficult for the police to stop and detain people because open accessibility is the norm. Customs officials will be faced with long

[3]B. Davidson, 'Miami comes clean on vice – warnings to tourists on crime', *Daily Telegraph*, 12 October 1991, p 11.

[4]Sources include: Reuter's news services, 'Kenya: West German tourist injured in robbery in Kenyan Game reserve', 10 January 1990; R. Winsbury, 'Kenya: end of the game for the tourist industry', *Management Today*, November 1989, p 22; Reuters report, 'Kenya: attacks on tourists worry officials', *African Business*, 1 October 1989, p 9; Reuter's report, 'Kenya, security in game parks', *African Economic Digest*, 7 August 1989, p 3 – all Textline searches.

[5]P. Pearce, *The Social Psychology of Tourist Behaviour*, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1982; A. Mathieson and G. Wall, *Tourism, Economic, Physical and Social Impacts*, Longmans, Harlow, 1982; C. Ryan, *Recreational Tourism – A Social Science Perspective*, Routledge, London and New York, 1991, p 145.

[6]D. McCannell, *The Tourist – a New Theory of the Leisure Class*, Stocken Books, New York, 1976.

[7]P.E. White, *The Social Impact of Tourism on Host Communities: a Study of Language Change in Switzerland*, Research Paper No 9, School of Geography, Oxford University, Oxford, 1974.

queues of impatient, but law-abiding people, and hence may be inhibited from making other than cursory searches. Banks and other financial agencies will become used to large flows of foreign currencies. Heavy traffic will be common, and large delivery vehicles importing the necessities of the tourist industry will be commonly part of that traffic. Under such circumstances it is easy for the criminal to remain inconspicuous.

Tourist activities have provided a front for criminal activity. For example, the Mafia boss, Francisco Di Carlo, ran a series of businesses including a hotel, bureau de change, travel agency and a wine bar in the south of England as a front for drug trafficking. This began in 1976, and was only discovered in 1985 when customs officials in Felixstowe found cannabis hidden in some office furniture that the business was apparently importing.[8] The costas of Spain have been the access point for drugs from both North Africa and South America destined for the North European market. In 1989, in a raid on a warehouse in Benidorm, police found 7.7 tonnes of hashish worth over £100 million at street prices.[9] Hotel rooms provide privacy for both legal and illegal activities. In some instances the conference facilities provided by the hotel industry have been openly used by terrorist organizations. In 1990 and 1991 the National Front for the Liberation of Corsica (FNLC) hosted a conference in Corsica which was attended by delegates from other bodies such as the IRA.

Hence, mass tourist destinations possess in themselves characteristics that aid criminal activity. Sax[10] refers to tourist development importing into the countryside the problems of the urban area. He had in mind the queues, the noise and the traffic of the city. It would appear that just as large towns and cities provide anonymity, so too do mass tourist sites – possibly even more so because of the mass movement of people and their stays of short duration.

### Type three: tourism, the provider of victims

Whilst tourism may provide a backdrop within which criminals may undertake their activities with less chance of detection, so too, it provides victims for crime. In an analysis of police records for the city and county of Honolulu, Chesney-Lind and Lind[11] found the average annual crime rates for robbery, burglary, larceny and crimes against property were all significantly higher in the tourist areas for either the rest of Honolulu, Hawaii or the remainder of the USA.

One problem of this type of analysis is the categorization of crime and the levels of reporting. For example, it seems from Hawaii that, whilst assault in the tourist areas is lower than in the residential locales, what is categorized as 'violent crime' is akin to or higher than that reported in the non-tourist areas. Yet the distinctions between assault and violent crime may be difficult to distinguish in practice; and similar crimes may be categorized differently in different police jurisdictions. Equally, reporting may be higher in tourist areas because of the need to obtain police reports for insurance claims, whilst, at least for some areas of the residential zone, reporting may be deemed to be unnecessary. Other factors might also be specific to destinations. In Hawaii, outside the main tourist zones, there exists a culture which is more akin to that of North American native peoples with an emphasis on traditional holistic values of man's relationship with the natural environment. This cultural difference might generate additional differences between the tourist zone and the surrounding geographical area.

Another factor that has been commentated on is the weakening of social restraints upon the host society that is caused by excessive tourism. In Doxey's Irridex[12] the final stages are characterized by antagonism towards tourists because of the nuisance that they repre-

[8]A. Jamieson, *Global Drug Trafficking*, Conflict Studies No 234, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, London, UK, September 1990.

[9]C. Ryan, *Tourism, Terrorism and Violence – the Risks of Wider World Travel*, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, No 244, RISCT, London, 1991.

[10]J.L. Sax, *Mountains without Handrails: Reflections on National Parks*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 1980.

[11]M. Chesney-Lind and I.Y. Lind, 'Visitors as victims: crimes against tourists in Hawaii', *Annals of Tourism Research*, Vol 13, No 2, 1986, pp 167–192.

[12]G.V. Doxey, 'A causation theory of visitor–resident irritants; methodology and research inference', paper presented to The Travel Research Association Conference, San Diego, California, Conference No 6, TTRA, 1975, pp 195–198.

sent, and the potential threat they pose to valued customs and patterns of life. Pearce[13] comments that there is a 'new readiness to cheat, victimise and even assault the tourist' as a result of accumulated local resentment on the part of locals in areas of high tourist density.

It is difficult to assess the evidence for just how much additional opportunity tourist zones provide for criminal activity. It is true to state that tourists are clear targets for petty theft. They are obvious in their dress, and they carry items of wealth that are easily disposable such as currency, passports and cameras. They are relaxed, and off guard. They are also less likely to press charges should the criminal be caught. Nor, in the event of the criminal being caught, are they likely to be either in the country, or to wish to return to the scene of the possibly traumatic experience. Such unwillingness to return is all the more understandable when it is placed within the psychological context of the motivations for the holiday being frustrated – the holiday is partly about an escape from daily reality, not a reminder of the harsher side of that reality. Additionally, a return to give evidence may mean extra costs of travel, lost income from not being able to attend work, and also coping with unfamiliar judicial procedures in a foreign language. In less traumatic cases, the actual loss may be small because of the tourist being able to recoup from insurance. Chesney-Lind and Lind[14] provide evidence of the lower prosecution rates for crime in tourist areas than non-tourist zones for Hawaii.

Yet the position is not clear cut. Certainly there is a perception that tourist areas do attract crime. Pizam[15] and Milman and Pizam[16] report that local people perceive a link between tourism and crime. Outside formal studies there has certainly been significant reportage of petty theft aimed against tourists, from, on the one hand, reports from Mediterranean resorts of handbag snatching to, in Italy, actions by gangs gassing passengers as they sleep on overnight trains in order to steal their possessions.

There is also evidence that tourists themselves are aggressors and not simply victims. In 1988 and 1989 both the UK government and ABTA had discussions with the Spanish government and police over the activities of drunken British tourists who were involved in violence. In 1989 drunken British tourists killed a Spanish taxi-driver.[17]

To summarize, it appears there are differences in criminal activity between tourist and non-tourist areas. In a review of 1728 offences committed in tourist and non-tourist areas in New South Wales, Australia, Walmsley *et al*[18] stated:

In terms of the socio-economic status of the victims, tourist areas differed from non-tourist areas in that they had more victims than expected in the high and middle occupational status range, and fewer than expected in the occupations with low status. (p 153)

And again:

There were a number of differences between tourist and non-tourist centres in terms of criminal behaviour: the former had fewer drug offences, fewer sexual assaults, more day-time crime (particularly shop lifting and other theft), more local residents among the victims, and younger offenders. They also had lower clear-up rates and a greater interval between the time of a crime and the apprehension of an offender. (p 154)

The question arises as to whether there is something inherent in the tourist location that creates special opportunities, or whether it is simply a scene of displaced activity, ie are the motivations and determinants of crime found in the tourist-generating area and simply imported by the tourist-receiving zone? In the case of the 'lager lout' this is probably the case but within the characteristics of the tourist zone might be found

[13]Pearce 1982, *op cit*, Ref 5, p 84.
[14]*Op cit*, Ref 11.
[15]A. Pizam, 'Tourism impacts: the social costs to the destination community as perceived by its residents', *Journal of Travel Research*, Vol 16, No 4, 1978, pp 8–12; A. Pizam, 'Tourism and crime, is there a relationship?', *Journal of Travel Research*, Vol 20, No 3, 1982, pp 7–10.
[16]A. Milman and A. Pizam, 'Social impacts of tourism on Central Florida', *Annals of Tourism Research*, Vol 15, No 2, 1988, pp 191–205.
[17]F. Barrett, 'An unhappy birthday for the package holiday industry', *The Independent*, 22 July 1989, p 45; M. Chittenden, 'Drink, fight, drop – it's summertime in Spain', *The Sunday Times*, 30 July 1989.
[18]D.J. Walmsley, R.M. Boskovic and J.L. Pigram, 'Tourism and crime – an Australian perspective', *Journal of Leisure Research*, Vol 15, No 2, 1983, pp 136–155.

reinforcing agencies. If one of the aspects of a 'tourist culture' is the loosening of a sense of responsibility, then this might be said to be a contributing factor. Ryan[19] commented that for the 'lager lout' the mass tourist destination such as Torremolinos combines not only the sense of freedom from normal constraints, but a familiar milieu of bars, discos and pubs with peer reinforcement that values traits such as heavy drinking. In this case, it is not the 'foreignness' of the overseas destination, but rather its provision (over-provision?) of the familiar resources required by such behaviour that reinforces behaviours learnt in the tourist-generating zone.

### Type four: tourists – generators of a demand for criminal activity?

The example of the 'lager lout' searching for a familiar environment away from home in order to indulge in 'anti-social' or 'self-destructive' behaviour marks a transition into the situation where tourists generate a demand for criminal activity. This can occur on at least two levels – the individual and the institutional.

The individual level is characterized by indulging in behaviour not normally undertaken, and which crosses the divide between the legal and the illegal. This would include drug taking and prostitution. The evidence for the linkage between tourism and prostitution is well documented, and it is not the author's intention to repeat that evidence. However, such behaviour is consistent with the notion that an important component of the tourism culture is the loosening of a sense of responsibility and the opportunity for self-indulgence. This is allied to the fact of being away from home and using the anonymity of the tourist resort. There is, on the part of the tourist, little loyalty to the place or its people. The usage of illegal resources such as drugs or prostitutes is, arguably, in itself part of a continuum of self-indulgence for the socially unacceptable which, at one level, is seen in having casual sex with fellow holiday-makers, going to strip bars or drinking to excess to, at the other extreme, using drugs, or being involved in other illegal acts.

What is not clear from the literature is the role of tourism in initiating a demand for illegal services as distinct from reinforcing factors within the host society which gave rise to those services in the first place. The sex tourism of the Far East arises from a social fabric which combines extreme poverty with attitudes whereby deserted females have few means of economic support, and where in many cases local use of prostitution has been reinforced by military bases. What tourism does create is an additional demand with the often false hope of finding a 'rich' western male who will break the cycle of poverty.[20]

Equally, what is also not documented is the institutional illegal behaviour that tourism might generate. Examples of this would include past actions of the Mexican agency, Fonatur, under a previous regime. Hoosie[21] describes how officials purchased land from the peasantry under false pretences, and subsequently sold this land at greatly inflated values for the creation of the resorts of Cancun and Huatulco. Chesshyre[22] cites the example of the compulsory purchase of orange groves by the Turkish government to build tourist complexes managed by multinational hotel organizations. The purchase based on the value of land as an orange grove, even if generous, obviously falls short of its value as part of a world industry. In this latter case, while legal, questions of a wider ethical nature are obvious.

Extending the ethical limits of what is permissible generates a series of complex issues. Tour operators may be in the position of using accommodation that might fail the requirements of health and safety legislation in the tourist-generating country, but be permitted in the tourist-receiving country. In such a case, does the tour operator provide the due care its clients might expect?

[19]*Op cit*, Ref 5, Ryan, pp 159–160.
[20]E. Cohen, 'Thai girls and Farang men, the edge of ambiguity', *Annals of Tourism Research*, Vol 9, No 4, 1982, pp 403–428; D.R.W. Jones, *Tourism and Prostitution*, Occasional Paper No 11, Department of Geography, Trent University, Ontario, 1986.
[21]L. Hoosie, 'Gringos in Paradise', *Business Magazine, Toronto Globe and Mail*, February 1990, pp 65–70.
[22]R. Chesshyre, *Not in Front of the Tourists*, BBC TV Bristol, dir. D. Pearson, 1988.

*Type five: tourists and tourist resources as specific targets of criminal action*

Tourism is notoriously vulnerable to terrorist action. The effect of the hijackings of the mid-1980s on the US market have been well documented, and various sources indicate that the level of transatlantic traffic fell by 20%.[23] What the examples of the mid-1980s would also seem to indicate is the role of the tourists' experience of the tourist-receiving zone. For example, whilst it is notable that the US traveller was reluctant to visit Europe during this period of action by Palestinian terrorist groups, the ETA campaign of the same period had less effect upon the British market. In 1986 *ETA-Militar* placed bombs at a number of hotels including the 'Las Garzas', Benidorm (June), 'Atalaya Park', Estepona, (June) and the 'Don Carlos', Marbella (July), as well as on beaches.[24] Yet, during the period 1985 to 1987, the number of British tourists visiting Spain increased by 18%. One important factor might have been that due warning was given, and no loss of life occurred, unlike the cases of the hijackings of aircraft or the attack on the *Achille Lauro* in 1985. This may have given credence to statements by both the Spanish authorities and the British tour operators that Spain was safe to visit, but arguably such statements were simply reinforcements of a British predisposition to visit Spain that already existed.

The ETA campaign of 1986, and the warnings issued in 1991 by ETA and *Terra Lliure* (the Catalan independence terrorist group which has been responsible for over 100 small bomb attacks in Cataluna) that the Olympic Games and the World Fair in Seville were to be potential targets raises another issue. It is not so much the tourism associated with the events that attracts terrorist attention, but the 'news value' of the attack. Terrorist groups not only seek publicity for their views, but also a confirmation of their own importance. From the terrorists' viewpoint the generation of political change requires public recognition in order to create the desired change.

The linkages between tourism and terrorism are clearer in two other instances. In the case of the *National Front for the Liberation of Corsica (FNLC)*, and its more extreme counterpart, *Cuncolta*, attacks on tourist complexes are consistent with their political views. In 1990 and 1991 attacks were made on the Corsicana complex, 17 miles south of Bastia. In the second case, in January 1991, 30 terrorists held a dozen tourists hostage for four hours. In the same month holiday homes were blown up or set on fire in Anghone and Porto Vecchio. Further attacks occurred in 1992. As nationalist groups, the perpetrators justified the attack on tourism complexes on the grounds that tourism represents a threat to a Corsican way of life. Leo Battesi, a Corsican nationalist leader, has stated on French TV that Corsica should not become simply a 'sun-trap location for tourists'.[25] But other variables are also important. Not only is there a conflict with the French authorities, perceived as an occupying power, but also a feud with Mafia clans. The attacks on at least some of the tourist complexes may have been because they were built with Italian funding that was suspected to be of Mafia origin.

The same justification of an attack on tourism, as being a legitimate target because it threatens a valued pattern of life, is made by other nationalist groups. Within the British mainland a series of attacks by the '*Meibion Glyndwr* (*Sons of Glendower*)' on holiday homes and other tourist-associated businesses, such as the burning of a windsurfing shop at Bala in 1987, has been justified as an attack both against English occupation, and on tourism which undermines a traditional culture.[26]

One country that has suffered significantly from terrorist attacks aimed specifically at tourist targets is Peru. In 1989 the value of overseas tourism to Peru was approximately US$430 million with over 350 000 visitors. In 1991 it is estimated that Peru received few more than 30 000

[23]J. Brady and R. Widdows, 'The impact of world events on travel to Europe during the summer of 1986', *Journal of Travel Research*, Vol 26, No 3, 1988, pp 8–10.

[24]'ETA bomb attack on hotels in Marbella and Alicante', *The Times*, 18 June 1986, pp 1, 9; 'ETA warning', *The Times*, 14 June 1986, p 3.

[25]Reuter's report, 'France: Police foil attack on Corsican nudist camp', 3 January 1991; Reuter's report, 'France warns of crackdown after Corsican separatist bombings', 3 January 1991 – Textline search.

[26]S. Pagani, 'Welsh Nationalists bid for home rule, some with condom rules', Reuter's report, Textline search, 3 September 1991.

overseas tourists. A major reason for this decline has been the activities of *Sendero Luminoso*. In 1989 the group killed a British tourist, Edward Bartley. In January 1990 two French tourists, Stephane Marino and Christelle Bertholot, were ordered off a bus and shot. A tourist hotel at Huarez was attacked in July 1990. Strong[27] has reported that hotel management and staff in Lima have been subjected to threats. For much of 1991 the British Foreign Office Travel Advisory Notes indicated 'no-go' areas in Peru, and warned that '*Sendero Luminoso* is very dangerous indeed and any foreigner falling into its hands is likely to be killed . . .' (note of 15 February 1991). This is not a full list of incidents involving attacks on tourists and tourist targets, but it is sufficient to indicate the nature of the threat. It raises the question as to why this should be the case.

Abumael Guzman, the founder of the group, has declared a Maoist philosophy that attacks capitalism.[28] Terrorist action against tourism is validated by the view that:

- tourism is symbolic of capitalism;
- tourists are generally from wealthier countries, and hence symbolic of regimes perceived as capitalist or otherwise repressive; and
- state-sponsored tourism becomes symbolic of governments, and hence an attack on tourism is an attack on the government.

At a tactical level the attack on tourism is justified because tourism is being promoted by the Peruvian government as a means by which rural areas can earn an income, and thus it is an alternative to the growing of coca. *Sendero Luminoso* supports the growing of coca, pays the *campesinos* to grow crops, and subsequently distributes the drugs through the Latin American gateways. Some of these drugs may be accessing the European and North American markets via tourist areas such as the Virgin Islands and the Spanish costas. The undermining of capitalist societies by the marketing of drugs is consistent with anti-capitalist theories of violent and extreme action. On their part the Peruvian government has resorted to the spraying of coca-growing areas with herbicides, and there have been gun battles between goverment troops and terrorists in rural areas. In total it has been estimated that *Sendero Luminoso* has killed over 23 000 people in over a decade, and has an army of 5000.[29]

## Discussion

The above typologies thus cover many different sets of situations. Initially it might appear that there is some relationship with the tourism zone life cycle in that tourists as incidental victims relate to the introduction stage, whereas other classifications of the tourist–crime relationship are more likely to be associated with the late growth and maturity stages. But it can be maintained that the pattern is more apparent than real. To imply that the crime–tourism relationship relates to the tourism destination life cycle is to imply a continuum for the crime–tourism relationship as it changes in nature over time. But it is difficult to see why this should be the case. The various types of relationship can exist simultaneously and, while tourists might themselves demand criminal activities, which, combined with their increasing numbers, increase tolerance by indigenous populations towards crimes where tourists are the victims, it is a big jump to state that such tolerance would become an active support of organized terrorist attacks against tourists. The cases of Corsica, and to some extent Wales, would show that an additional factor such as nationalist feeling must be strong if this is to occur.

The existence of extrinsic factors might help in creating an analytical

[27]S. Strong, 'Peruvian Maoists start to penetrate deep into capital', *The Independent*, 25 May 1991, p 12; S. Strong, 'Bloody anniversary in Peru highlights guerilla threat', *Independent*, 28 June 1991, p 14.
[28]S. Strong, *Shining Path*, HarperCollins, London, 1992; this also quotes extracts from Guzman's writings in *El Diario*, Lima, 1988. See also, C. Moorehead, 'Path of blood', *The Indepedent Magazine*, 20 June 1992, pp 22–28.
[29]*Op cit*, Ref 27.

The tourist as

|  | an incidental victim | a deliberate victim |
|---|---|---|
| Inherent touristic values | Cell 1<br><br>Self-indulgent<br>Loosening of responsibility<br><br><br><br>Type 4 | Cell 2<br><br>Relaxed<br>Off guard<br>Leisure orientated<br><br><br>Type 3 |
| Extrinsic touristic values | Cell 3<br><br>Open access<br>Ease of movement<br><br><br><br>Type 2 | Cell 4<br><br>Threat to national culture<br>Perceived as a threat<br><br><br>Type 5 |

**Figure 1.** The crime–tourism matrix

structure which more usefully explains the relationship. Two dimensions might be seen to exist. The first is where the tourist is either a deliberate or an incidental victim. The second is whether or not the determinants are primarily those that are intrinsic or extrinsic to tourism. By intrinsic is meant that process described by Iso-Ahola[30] as the 'dynamic dialectic' of tourism, that paradox of tourists seeking both the new and the familiarity of the known. Extrinsic factors thus refer to non-tourist systems present within the tourist zone.

This gives the four segments illustrated in Figure 1. Cell 1 represents the position where those values inherent in a demand for tourism motivated by an escape from daily responsibility, and a release from normal social constraints, lead to a demand for services which are either criminal or quasi-criminal in nature. It is thus a type 4 situation. Cell 2 describes a situation whereby the intrinsic demand for relaxation engenders a situation where, by taking less care, and being obvious, the tourist can more easily become a victim of crime. Cell 3 represents a case where the nature of the tourist zone creates an opportunity for criminal activity to occur as described earlier. Finally, cell 4 reflects the attribution of anti-tourist sentiments whereby tourism is perceived by its nature to be a destructive force and, hence, in extreme cases, justifies violent action against tourists and their facilities. A stage 1 situation need not be covered because the level of tourism is generally unimportant within the locale.

In answer, therefore, to the question of whether there is something inherent in the nature of tourism itself which might give rise to a relationship between tourism and crime, it would seem that some of the very forces that motivate tourism contain the seed for criminality. However, for the potential to be actualized, specific forces within the host destination must also be present. For example, the cell 2 situation of the relaxed tourist falling prey to, for example, the *scippo* (snatch) experienced by tourists to Naples and other parts of Italy is primarily determined by the state of urban life and its social fabric.

In short, the question as to whether or not there is a relationship between crime and tourism may be a false question. Both are reflections of more fundamental social forces to be found in an increasingly urban lifestyle. The social and psychological motivations for tourism contain within them responses to the complex network of work, family and peer groups. So, too, does crime. The concept of a relationship between crime and tourism must recognize that both are derived patterns of action formulated by the social mores, cultures and economic systems

[30]S. Iso-Ahola, 'Towards a social psychology of tourism motivation – a rejoinder', *Annals of Tourism Research*, Vol 9, No 2, 1982, pp 256–261.

that generate demands for escape from a current reality. From one perspective, both tourism and crime are mechanisms of escape from a status quo. The difference may be within the social acceptability of the behaviour patterns evinced by each, yet both have their continua of varying degrees of tolerance by the wider society. Figure 1 is little more than a simplification of a complex pattern of social forces, in that it notes that both the nature of tourism demand and extrinsic attitudes towards tourism can only make sense within a wider social context.

*Problems for tour operators*

Located in this web of socio-economic forces, tour operators have the potential to either confirm the status quo, or act as 'change agents'. However, their business actions are generally not motivated by the wish to play a social role, but to provide the type of experience that generates satisfied clients who will subsequently use their services in the future. From this perspective the immediate concerns of the tour operator are the well-being of their clients, and avoiding their exposure to unnecessary risk. In the first instance this means the selection of destinations that pose as few dangers as possible.

However, hardly any resort is risk free, for tourist resorts themselves attract illegal activity. From a practical viewpoint the occasions when a tour operator can warn clients are limited to:

- details in the original brochure;
- details at the time the client makes a booking through the travel agent;
- details at the time the client makes a final payment;
- details at the time the tickets are sent; and
- a briefing at the point of arrival.

To include details in the brochure presents significant practical problems. A brochure may be placed with the publishers in the August or September prior to the following summer season, and will be published before Christmas. Yet it covers a period from May to September of the following year. Any warnings as to specific dangers may be out of date or unnecessary at the time when the tourist is on holiday. The same is true of any warning prior to departure. There are also the questions of what level of warning should be carried, and the responsibility of the tourist to take care. In the case of petty theft at the resort the tourist may simply need to do little more than act sensibly, and for the tour operator to point this out at the time of sending tickets and at the welcoming function is probably sufficient.

The other extreme might be presented by the situation where there is a history of terrorist action in the country where the resort is located. In such instances the Foreign Office produces travel advisory notes, and, theoretically, travel agents may be able to access these through the service provided by ABTA. In practice, few clients are aware of their existence and travel agents are not always able to access the correct databank. Additionally, situations can change rapidly, and what is appropriate at the time of booking may not be appropriate at the time of departure. Often the last communication between tour operator and client prior to departure is when tickets are forwarded. It is suggested that at this point the latest Foreign Office Travel Advisory Note is posted to the client, or, where there is a history of past problems, the client is provided with the Foreign Office telephone number so they can pursue their own enquiries. Such information already exists within the 'public domain' and hence the tour operator is simply doing what the more enterprising of their clients will undertake on their own behalf.

One problem that faces a client who heeds a notice to take precautions is that to cancel their holiday at this stage entails significant

financial loss, for such a cancellation is not generally covered by their insurance policies. Typical of the exclusion clauses is the wording, 'we cannot accept any liability for loss, damage or expense resulting from war or terrorist activities threatened or actual, civil unrest, closure of airports, industrial action, threatened or actual or any event outside our control where such delays extend or compel a change in holiday arrangements'. Apart from considerations of legality, past history would indicate that the package holiday industry as a whole does take a more responsible attitude, as evidenced by the cancellation of holidays at the time of the Gulf War due to the risk of terrorist or other action. Arguably, the provision of a more expensive insurance policy option for clients, which permitted cancellation under these circumstances, might have saved the industry money.

The difficult area lies in the situation where tourists are taken to resorts that are known to experience difficulties, but where these problems occur in comparatively few cases or in specific areas. Tour operators are reluctant to inform potential clients for fear of loss of business not simply to themselves, but also to the ground handling agents, hoteliers and others to whom they have responsibilities at the destinations. In many cases most clients will have satisfactory holidays – yet a measurable probability remains that a minority might suffer injury. Arguably, informing clients after they arrive is not entirely satisfactory and might, for some, cause unnecessary alarm. The issue is complex in its ramifications. Tour operators are the 'gatekeepers' to destinations, and hence their reluctance or willingness to take clients to any given location is important. If the result of their informing clients of the possible dangers results in a reduction of tourists to a given destination, which, in turn, means that the law-enforcement agencies intensify their efforts, then the short-term costs may be followed by a longer term gain. What is certain is that it is difficult for any one operator to take action, unless a fuller disclosure of information prior to the tourist's departure can be seen as a means of obtaining competitive advantage. Such advantage, however, relates only to the securing of clients, and may inhibit the acquisition of hotel accommodation at the destination in the future.

It is suggested that, as a general principle, the policy should be that tour operators provide sufficient information to enable clients to take reasoned judgements about the nature of the tourist resort. Over time there has been a movement towards the fuller provision of information. Misleading information or photographs in the brochures are, generally speaking, a part of the history of the industry. The EC Directives and their acceptance by ABTA (indeed, the wish by ABTA to improve on them) are indicative of a trend towards a fuller disclosure of material facts. This trend is important to the establishment of a quality of service ensuring the retention of more experienced package holiday-makers. In the changing trading conditions where concepts of 'consumer charters' are evolving, it can be argued that the costs of failing to provide disclosure of significant facts relating to holiday destinations may exceed the revenues obtained from non-disclosure – either directly through claims being made by aggrieved holiday-makers or through adverse publicity affecting bookings. On the other hand, a policy of enlightened self-interest can lead to a confirmation of public trust in tour operators, and a reinforcement of the package holiday as a means of enjoying a safe holiday that is 'value for money'.